

# THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE

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MARITIME HISTORY & ARTS



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*A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF MARITIME HISTORY AND ARTS*

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Summer, 1995

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SALEM, MASSACHUSETTS

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ON THE COVER

Duncan McFarlane (1818-1865)

*Packet John Elliot Thayer arriving off Prince's Dock, Liverpool,  
1857 30 in. by 45 in.*

Though of classic format and proportions, this highly detailed ship portrait differs from most of those of the Liverpool marine school in one important respect: rather than presenting the same ship in three different positions, the artist here depicts three different ships. The central ship, *John Elliot Thayer*, is flanked by the *Parliament* to the left and by the *Daniel Webster* to the right. All three ships sailed the Boston-to-Liverpool run for Enoch Train's White Diamond Line.

The painting is featured in the exhibition *Across the Western Ocean: American Ships by Liverpool Artists* (see page 259).

Oil on canvas

Private collection

Peabody Essex Museum Photograph by Mark Sexton

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## Editor's Note

An editor's single advantage is claimed to be the privilege of having the last word. I intend to use mine in praise of those who have been so important to *The American Neptune* over the past five years while I served as editor. During this period readers have witnessed a number of changes in format and content. This includes the publication of articles by more contributors from abroad and by women, and an effort to incorporate maritime arts into the journal.

We decided in 1990 to attempt production of the journal on computer in order to effect cost savings that would put the journal on a more secure financial basis. I am greatly indebted to talented former Assistant Editor Jan Copes for her successful effort to bring *The Neptune* into the computer age, editing and producing the journal (and special supplement) for four years on disk and on time. Book Review Editor Tony Busch, Arts Editor Dan Finamore, and veteran Managing Editor Jerry Ayers have made my work enjoyable because they care about the journal and are always willing to do their part. Members of the Editorial Advisory Board have been most helpful in the review of manuscripts considered for publication and for their counsel.

Donald Petrie is a friend of the journal and a wise counselor.

Cleveland State University generously provided financial assistance and office space for four years which made it possible to produce *The Neptune* in Cleveland for which I am extremely grateful. For the assistance received from East Carolina University over the past year, including the efforts of students in the graduate program in Maritime Studies such as Paul Steinberg, I am most thankful.

These comments should make clear what most readers already know and that I have taken some few lines to express, that teamwork is essential to the success of complex enterprises such as the publication of a scholarly journal. Finally, I express my thanks to the Peabody Essex Museum for the opportunity to edit the journal. Curator Peter Fetchko began my tenure as editor with a dinner party in the museum galleries that included a number of toasts. I propose yet another toast now to the health and continued success of *The American Neptune*.

TIMOTHY J. RUNYAN

Greenville, North Carolina

## To the *Neptune* Readers

During the last five years, Dr. Timothy Runyan has provided us with twenty issues of *The American Neptune*, soundly edited and excellently produced. When he first agreed to accept the editorship, he wisely chose Jan Copes as his Assistant Editor. With the generous support of Cleveland State University, he immediately took the task of turning out camera-ready copy and, with Jan, produced the printer-ready materials. *The Neptune* evolved with handsome covers, illustrations, a very significant increase in subscriber levels and in paid advertising during his tenure.

Tim wisely developed a web of relationships with his Maritime History colleagues, traveling to many academic meetings in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. By extending his academic relations with historians from many other countries, as well as his American colleagues, he was able to

draw from their membership many of the scholarly contributions to *The Neptune*. Tim's five-year tenure was particularly notable for the strong academic quality of the articles he reviewed and edited for our enjoyment and use. The quality of his editorial work and his selection of articles for *The Neptune* publication has been reflected, over the years, by the selection of several of these articles for literary and historical prizes.

We thank Tim Runyan for his many contributions to *The American Neptune*, and wish him smooth sailing, interesting ports, and joyous accolades in the years to come!

DAN L. MONROE

Executive Director and CEO  
Peabody Essex Museum



## The Piracy Trial of Luke Ryan

DONALD A. PETRIE

On the evening of 16 April 1781, off St. Abbs Head just south of the Firth of Forth, the French privateer *Calonne*, commanded by Luke Ryan, captured the merchant brig *Nancy* of Aberdeen. *Calonne* was a frigate of 400 tons, with thirty-two guns and a crew of 238 men, a privateer of unusual size and force.<sup>1</sup> France was allied with the United States in the American War of Independence, and *Nancy* appeared to be a valid prize. Captain Ryan preferred to ransom the brig rather than incur the risks and inconvenience of sending her into a French port, but it took three hours of haggling with *Nancy*'s commander, John Ramsay, before the good Scots captain would agree to bind his owners for payment of the 300 guineas Ryan demanded. After midnight, ransom papers were signed and *Nancy* was released, while Captain Ramsay remained on board *Calonne* as a "ransomer," or hostage, to ensure payment of the ransom notes.<sup>2</sup>

The transaction was barely completed when a cry from the masthead of *Calonne* reported that the lights of two vessels were to be seen at the entrance to the Firth of Forth. Ramsay remarked

to Ryan that a few hours earlier he had passed a pair of whaleships on their way to the Arctic for a summer's fishing. Ryan gave commands, and *Calonne* set off in pursuit.<sup>3</sup> Luke Ryan had just made the biggest mistake of his life.

As the vessels began to close, the nearer of the two ships appeared to Ryan to be a fat north country merchantman. In fresh and squally westerly winds, *Calonne* came in fast under the stranger's quarter. In rapid succession, Ryan released a broadside, called out to his quarry to heave to, and put overboard a boat with a boarding party of thirteen men.

The stranger's reply came back through the darkness: the unmistakable drum roll of a British man-of-war calling her crew to battle quarters. Ryan instantly put over his helm and fled, abandoning his boarding party.

*Calonne*'s quarry proved to be the 74-gun ship-of-the-line *Berwick*, carrying Captain Keith Stewart to Leith to assume command of the North Sea Squadron of the Royal Navy. Further up the Forth, her escort, the 36-gun frigate *Belle Poule*, Captain Philip Patton, saw the encounter and set off in pursuit. As *Belle Poule* passed the flagship, *Calonne* began firing her stern chaser, but *Belle Poule* was simply too fast for the privateer. By five in the morning, *Belle Poule* was close enough to fire a broadside.

Ryan responded by hauling his wind with the intent to rake his enemy. Patton turned parallel to *Calonne*, and for an hour, the two frigates exchanged broadsides with remarkably little damage. The delay enabled the slower-sailing *Berwick* to approach, and with her arrival, Luke Ryan had no alternative but to strike his French flag and surrender to *Belle Poule*.<sup>4</sup>

On the following day, when *Belle Poule* arrived at Leith road, Captain Patton transferred

*The author is indebted to Mary S. Cook for suggesting this essay, the third to appear in this journal on the law of nations, to his assistant, Lori K. Anderson, for her tireless efforts in preparing the manuscripts and to Eric J. Graham for having introduced Luke Ryan. Barbara Oberg and her colleagues at the Franklin Papers, Yale University Library, have generously shared their great treasure. Eugene Coyle of Skerries, Ireland, has supplied the Fingallian historical traditions. Antonia Macarthur and Graham K. Salt in England, and Michael Dun in Scotland, have retrieved invaluable documents. On all of these voyages of discovery the author's commodore has been Dr. W. M. P. Dunne of Hampton Bays, Long Island.*

his prisoners to Edinburgh Castle and immediately forwarded a two-sentence dispatch to Philip Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty, advising him of the capture of *Calonne* and Luke Ryan.<sup>5</sup> The reply arrived by express at midnight on 26 April. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty were well pleased, and directed that Captain Patton should take particular care that Luke Ryan not escape, "there being reason to believe that he is a subject of His Majesty." Patton replied the following morning that he had communicated their Lordships' instructions to the Governor of Edinburgh Castle, who had taken action "by which all possibility of escape will be prevented."<sup>6</sup>

Who was Luke Ryan that he should distract the attention of the Lords of the Sea from their normal concerns with mighty fleets and the fate of nations?

### ORIGINS

At his trial at the Old Bailey on 30 March 1782, Luke Ryan, calling himself Luc, asserted that he was a native of France who had been brought to Ireland in his infancy and raised by an Irish farmer, Michael Ryan of Kenure. The Admiralty's prosecutors insisted that he was Irish-born.

Whether or not Michael Ryan was the biological father of Luke Ryan, it is undisputed that he stood *in loco parentis* to the lad during his formative years on the Ryan farm. The demesne of Kenure is in the town of Rush on the east coast of Ireland, a dozen miles north of Dublin. The stretch of coast from Rush to Balbriggan is called Fingal, which is, in the Gaelic tongue, "the land of fair-haired strangers," a remembrance of the Vikings who once ruled the coast and made Dublin their capital.

Luke Ryan attended a country school at Hachettstown near Skerries, two miles to the north of Rush.<sup>7</sup> When Luke was fourteen or fifteen years of age, Michael Ryan arranged for his apprenticeship with a boat builder named King, of Ringsend, who specialized in the building of fast cutters for the revenue service and for smuggling. Smuggling was an important industry in Fingal, and the Fingallians played both sides of the game with gusto.<sup>8</sup> For the reader not familiar with the

economic history of the period during which England pursued maritime hegemony through use of navigation laws and the entrepot, it should be understood that smuggling was an enterprise in which the participation of respectable citizens was regarded as acceptable — and even patriotic — in the nations which surrounded England and opposed her pursuit of maritime monopoly: France, Holland, Denmark, Ireland, and Scotland.<sup>9</sup>

During Ryan's apprenticeship, Michael Ryan died, and his widow married one of the farm workers. At some point, Luke Ryan forsook ship-building and became an active member of the Rush smuggling fraternity. Little is known of the details of Ryan's young life during this period. In the affidavit submitted during his piracy trial, he said that, at about this time, his uncle summoned him to France, and he went there and became fluent in French. Whatever the sequence of events, by the beginning of 1779, when he was twenty-nine years old, he was back in Rush and had become captain and part-owner of a fast smuggling cutter, *Friendship*, of 120 tons.<sup>10</sup> Another owner was Ryan's friend Edward Wilde, sometimes called Edward Macatter. Ryan and Macatter each appear to have held minority shares in the vessel; the principal owner, with a half interest, was the Ryan family's friend, John Torris, merchant of Dunkirk. At the beginning, Ryan was ship's carpenter and Macatter, captain. Later, Ryan became captain and Macatter his first mate. Dunkirk was the principal source of their contraband in the smuggling trade.<sup>11</sup>

Meanwhile, the American Revolution had begun to be felt in the Scottish and Irish ports of the Irish Sea. The raids of the American naval officers, Lambert Wickes in 1777<sup>12</sup> and John Paul Jones in 1778,<sup>13</sup> badly upset ships and merchants engaged in coast-wise commerce. As a counter-measure, the English Admiralty began to offer privateering commissions to the owners of Irish vessels prepared to arm and fight back.<sup>14</sup> In October 1778, the first such privateer, *Dublin*, manned principally by seamen from Rush, sailed on a cruise from the city for which she was named.<sup>15</sup> Someone at the Admiralty decided then that the doughty smugglers of Rush would make admirable privateers. Their frequent smuggling voyages to French ports could supply valuable intelligence

about the French, who were actively entering the War of American Independence. By February 1779, Ryan received a commission from the English Admiralty, posted the requisite bond, armed *Friendship* with fourteen carriage guns and sixty men, and sailed forth on the first voyage of his new profession, which was to bring his name down through the centuries.<sup>16</sup>

Luke Ryan's career as an English privateer was brief, and no documented details have been found of his first commissioned voyage except that *Friendship* left Dublin under his command at the end of February 1779 and returned to Rush in mid-April.<sup>17</sup> If *Friendship* took any prizes during the voyage, we can be sure that they did not enjoy the blessings of an Admiralty prize court. When Ryan was later captured and charged with piracy, the authorities confronted him with his signature on *Friendship's* 1779 English privateer's bond.<sup>18</sup> If there had been any prize proceedings, surely the Admiralty, which controlled all records of such proceedings, would have produced them to condemn Ryan.

Circumstantial evidence indicates that during the voyage, *Friendship* called at Dunkirk and Ryan held extensive discussions with his friend and partner, John Torris. The latter, a French subject and prominent financier, was in an uncomfortable position as part owner of a vessel carrying a commission from the British enemy. One solution would have been for Ryan and Macatter to change sides in the war, but this proposal constituted a deadly threat. Ryan spoke French and might claim French citizenship, but Macatter and the rest of the crew were indelibly Irish, and if *Friendship*, with a French commission, were to be captured by a British vessel, they could all expect to hang. Another solution had to be found.

### THE FLEMISH CONNECTION


The border of Flanders is but a few miles east of Dunkirk, and John Torris and his brother Charles, a partner in his firm, were of Flemish origin. Their good friend and countryman, Francis Coffyn, was the resident agent in Dunkirk of Benjamin Franklin, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of France headquartered at Passy, a Paris suburb. Dunkirk was the southern terminus of an escape route by which

American seamen, taken at sea by British ships and imprisoned pending trial for treason, fled from Britain to the safety and opportunities of France. Coffyn's reception, support, and aid to these escaped Americans had so impressed Franklin that Coffyn was among the first to whom Franklin wrote after receiving from Congress his confirmation as Minister Plenipotentiary, to confirm the agent's continued appointment.<sup>19</sup> Coffyn had rendered further service to Franklin the prior year when he had exposed as unsound and unreliable the Dunkirk firm of Poreau, McKenzie & Co., who sought for a ship at their disposal an American commission to raid British shipping from French ports. Coffyn's help had enabled the Americans to extricate themselves from a potentially embarrassing situation.<sup>20</sup> It had also planted in the minds of Torris and Ryan an idea for the solution of their present dilemma: with Coffyn's help, they would obtain an American commission for their ship. If captured, the crew could claim to be Americans. In addition, they hoped to avoid paying to the French government taxes and charges on French prizes.<sup>21</sup>

They enrolled Coffyn in their plan, as well as Count Sutton de Clonard, a French nobleman of Irish origins and a former colonel in the Irish Brigade, who was friendly with Franklin and who inspected the cutter while she was in Dunkirk.<sup>22</sup> Franklin was more likely to issue the commission if the vessel were commanded by an American, and here, again, Coffyn was able to help. He produced American merchant seamen, Captain Stephen Marchant of Boston and his friend and first mate, Jonathan Arnold of Middletown, Connecticut, who had escaped from British capture and fled to Dunkirk. It was agreed that Torris, Coffyn, Marchant, and Clonard would lay the groundwork with Dr. Franklin. Ryan, whose identity and interest were to be kept secret, would return to Rush to deliver his present cargo of contraband goods, recruit additional crewmen, and put his affairs in order. *Friendship* was to return to Dunkirk at the beginning of May to become an American privateer, dramatically renamed the *Black Prince*.

### THE CUTTING OUT

In mid-April, *Friendship* returned to Rush carrying a valuable cargo of contraband



Skerries wherry, the type of vessel used by Ryan's crew in the cutting-out of *Friendship*. Lithograph by Samuel Watson in *The deep sea and coastal fisheries of Ireland* (Dublin, 1848).

goods, probably procured from Torris. Shortly after *Friendship* moored, John Draper, Inspector of the Tide Duty of the Port of Dublin, appeared in a revenue barge full of his officers, seized her as a smuggler and arrested her crew. Draper's men sailed *Friendship* around the Howth to Dublin and moored her in the Poolbeg in the mouth of the Liffey River under guard of James Morris and nine other revenue officers. Ryan's response demonstrated the charismatic leadership for which he became famous.

During the night of 11-12 April 1779, members of *Friendship*'s crew broke out of the Black Dog Gaol, armed themselves, and boarded the cutter from a Skerries wherry, a Rush fishing boat. They overcame the revenue men, cut the anchor line and, under the command of Macatter, sailed her out into the Irish Sea.<sup>23</sup> The crew headed north to Rush where, the next day, they rendezvoused with Ryan, who came aboard with other crew members and reinforcements from Rush.<sup>24</sup>

There can be no doubt that the entire plan was executed under Luke Ryan's directions; from the

moment he stepped on board, he resumed command, with Macatter as his first mate.

Ryan sailed promptly, setting a southeasterly course. His destination was France and his expressed intention to shift his allegiance to Britain's enemies, the French and American allies. Either before or after the cutting-out, he succeeded in winning the support of the entire crew for his dramatic plan with the exception of one Bowen, who demurred and was set ashore on the coast of Wales as they passed.<sup>25</sup> In the English Channel, *Friendship* broke her boom. Ryan put into Studland, Dorset, to obtain a replacement and to release the revenue men.<sup>26</sup>

At the beginning of May, as scheduled, Luke Ryan sailed the *Black Prince* into Dunkirk with his crew of Irish smugglers, including Edward Macatter and Patrick Dowlin, ready to join the American cause.

#### DUNKIRK

Long a center of the smuggling trade with Britain, the port of Dunkirk in 1779 was

rapidly developing a new industry. That industry consisted of the seizing or ransoming of defenseless coastwise merchant ships of England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. *La guerre de course* was as important to eighteenth-century France as the seizure of Spanish treasure galleons had been to Elizabethan England. The French were very good at the prize game, and Dunkirk was its capital. Here were located the *armateurs*, merchant bankers who armed, outfitted and provisioned the privateers with their own money or that of their clients; here were the port facilities for preparation of the vessels for warlike purpose; to Dunkirk flocked the officers and men of a dozen nations eager to share the risk and the rewards. An enthusiastic King Louis XVI protected seamen on this clamorous, crowded shore by prohibiting their impressment into the Royal French Navy.<sup>27</sup> From Dunkirk, the prowling privateers entered the English Channel, and from there had easy access to the North Sea to the east and to the Irish Sea to the west.

An extensive French bureaucracy regulated all these activities and participated in the rewards through duties, charges, and fines levied on behalf of the king. Its regulations were enforced locally by the Dunkirk Admiralty under the watchful eye of Antoine de Sartine, the French naval minister.

#### LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL

The law of nations was a body of rules and understandings that originated during the Renaissance among the nations of Europe and the Mediterranean for the delineation of rights and obligations among themselves, or between one nation and the nationals of another in peace and war. To many mariners, the most important aspect of that law related to the seizure of foreign vessels and, under the jurisdiction of prize courts, the conversion of such vessels and their cargoes into cash in which officers and crew shared.

The law of nations permitted uncommissioned merchant vessels, on their own initiative, to sail with armaments during times of trouble, but such arms might be used only defensively. The proceeds of prizes taken in the course of such defensive action became the sole property of the captor's sovereign. However, some armed vessels,

meeting specific requirements and posting bonds for their performance, were supplied with commissions issued by their sovereigns to act offensively in taking prizes. Such commissions were called "letters of marque and reprisal." The word "reprisal" refers to a condition between nations more hostile than peace, but short of outright warfare. Reprisal is declared by the sovereign of at least one of the nations to justify retribution for a perceived wrong, or to collect a debt.<sup>28</sup> In early centuries of the post-Renaissance, letters of marque and reprisal authorized a wronged private party to secure redress by seizing vessels of the offending nation. They were clearly not instruments of warfare. By the finale of fighting sail, in the middle of the last century, the concept of letters of marque and reprisal had been completely reversed. In the nineteenth century, such commissions were issued *only* in time of war to supplement the public vessels of the respective navies. The origins of the word "marque" are obscure, disputed and not particularly helpful.

As a matter of practice rather than law, commissioned private vessels during the final century of fighting sail were of two types. Merchant ships engaged in the carrying trade obtained commissions authorizing them to take enemy prizes, if they could, in the course of their commercial endeavors. Characteristically, such vessels were square-rigged and slow, had substantial cargo-carrying capacity, and their limited crews were paid regular wages. Often, they sailed without hostile intent, but sought arms and commissions for the commercial purpose of instilling confidence in their passengers, shippers, and insurance underwriters. They took few prizes. Confusingly, such vessels were, themselves, called "letters of marque."<sup>29</sup>

The other type of vessels commissioned to make private war on the maritime resources of an enemy were outfitted for that special purpose and were called "privateers." They were heavily armed and fast sailers, often fore-and-aft rigged. They had little cargo-carrying capacity, but carried large crews to fight at sea and to supply the prize crews needed to bring their captures into a safe port. Because of their limited capacity to accommodate prisoners, privateers often preferred to ransom the vessels they captured rather than make prizes of them. The crews of privateers

were usually compensated solely from the proceeds of their prizes.

### THE PRIZE GAME

For privateers during the last century of fighting sail, the prize game partook more of the nature of blood sport than of warfare. The very language of the game, in both French and English, reflects this affinity. The French called it *la guerre de course*, as in race course or golf course. In log books and journals, the vessel being pursued was "the chase" or, more frequently, "the chace." In French, the word for hunting is *la chasse* and the hunter, *le chasseur*.

Privateers were not plaster saints but, in most of them, a decent, civilized greed outweighed vainglory and blood-lust. Like sportsmen, privateers played by a code of rules. A wide variety of *ruses de guerre* were acceptable: privateers often sailed with several sets of false papers and the flags of half a dozen nations in their flag lockers. They lied wildly when they spoke to other ships. However, they were civil to the few women they captured at sea, and they never fired a gun with false colors at their mast.

In warfare as in business, financial incentives really *do* work, and many of these men acted with energy, intelligence, and panache. A few actually became wealthy from prizes.

### CRUISES OF THE *BLACK PRINCE* AND HER SUCCESSORS

From the time of Ryan's return to Dunkirk in early May, events moved swiftly forward with the precision of a well-laid plan. On 11 May 1779, Sutton de Clonard wrote to Franklin from Paris that Stephen Marchant had come to Paris to solicit an American Commission "to Enable him to Command the Cutter of 16 guns, which I mentioned to you. I request you may gratify him therein."<sup>30</sup> Coffyn also traveled to Passy on the same mission, and on 14 May, Franklin's grandson and secretary, William Temple Franklin, forwarded to Coffyn, with careful procedural instructions, the American privateer's commission for *Black Prince*, an oath of allegiance to be signed by Stephen Marchant as master, and the requisite bond to be signed by the owner. A copy

of the commission has survived and lists the owners as Charles Torris, the brother of John, and one Peter Bernardson, a pseudonym for Luke Ryan.<sup>31</sup> In this entire transaction, the name of Luke Ryan never appeared, and neither Franklin for the American government nor Antoine de Sartine for the French had any reason to connect *Black Prince* with the cutter which had been so spectacularly cut out of Dublin harbor.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, Dr. Franklin's innocence should not be exaggerated. He also supplied the Irish crew with instant naturalization as Americans. *Black Prince* was re-registered in Boston.<sup>33</sup>

Meanwhile, Torris and Ryan were busily preparing the cutter for sea. The vessel was remodeled to accommodate a larger crew, armaments enhanced, and provisions stored. The thirty-six Rushmen whom Ryan had brought with him constituted the bulk of the crew. Others were recruited locally. Authentic Americans, including Marchant as master and Arnold as mate, numbered no more than five. The captain's cabin was remodeled to provide a berth for Luke Ryan, who sailed as owner and promptly abandoned the name Peter Bernardson for all time.

After a flurry of correspondence between Passy and Dunkirk intended to dissuade Ryan and Marchant from seizing the Dover/Calais packet boats maintained by France and Britain for their war-time convenience,<sup>34</sup> *Black Prince* sailed on 12 June 1779 and returned ten days later to Morlaix in Brittany. In those ten days in the English Channel, she captured eight British merchant ships, of which she ransomed one, one was brought safely into port, and six were recaptured by the 32-gun British frigate *Quebec*, Captain George Farmer, along with twenty-one members of the prize crews.<sup>35</sup> Having received a detailed report of the voyage from Marchant,<sup>36</sup> Franklin wrote the captain to congratulate him.<sup>37</sup> Franklin may have been pleased, but Luke Ryan was not. He did not intend his prizes and prize crews to be recaptured by the Royal Navy vessels which dominated the English Channel. Clearly, *Black Prince* would have to find safer hunting ground.

Furthermore, he was finding Dunkirk an impractical base of operation. It had been fine for smuggling and still had advantages for privateers raiding in the North Sea, but slow-sailing prize ships going up the Channel from the west were



Benjamin Franklin at the time of his dealings with Luke Ryan. Engraving by Chevillet after Duplessis, 1778. Courtesy Franklin Collection, Yale University Library.

simply too vulnerable to the Royal Navy and British privateers. Ryan therefore instructed Marchant to shift his base to Morlaix in Brittany. John Torris cooperated by sending his trusted clerk, John Diot, to Morlaix to handle finances, supplies, and prizes of the venture.<sup>38</sup>

On her second cruise, from 15 July to 25 July 1779, *Black Prince* sailed straight from Morlaix to Land's End and then cruised for a week off the west coast of Cornwall, Devon, and Wales, capturing British coasters. Marchant and Ryan minimized the risk to their prize crews by the simple expedient of ransoming eleven of their thirteen captures. Many of the released prisoners were required to sign "sea paroles" drafted by Ryan, who must have brought on board with him one of the popular handbooks of the law of nations employed by the masters of commissioned vessels of the day to guide them through the intricacies of prize law.<sup>39</sup> Of the two remaining prizes, one was brought safely into Morlaix and the other, *San Joseph*, commanded by Marchant's mate, Lieutenant Jonathan Arnold of Connecticut, was captured when she was driven into a Cornwall port by bad weather.<sup>40</sup>

By the third cruise, it was beginning to become apparent that Stephen Marchant was the master of *Black Prince* in name only. A bluff, hearty, but simple man, he had been manipulated by Ryan and Torris, men far more subtle than he. From their point of view, his principal asset was his American nationality, which enabled them to obtain a letter of marque and reprisal from Benjamin Franklin and the Continental Congress. Luke Ryan, by virtue of his natural leadership qualities, his long-standing relations with the Irish crew, and the backing of his French partners, gave commands and Marchant carried them out.

Ironically, it was Franklin who ended the charade. So impressed was he with the achievements of *Black Prince*, that he decided to present her captain with a night glass as a gift of the American people, and wrote to Torris to that effect.<sup>41</sup> Torris had no choice but to tell Franklin that he should send the gift to "The Hero Luke Ryan, a part owner & my particular & worthy friend, who is the Real Capt. of the Black Prince, Stephen Marchant is but the Ostensible one."<sup>42</sup> The good doctor, on whom subtlety was never lost, seems not to have resented the deception which had

been practiced on him and, still full of admiration for Ryan's achievements, sent off the night glass to Ryan with a glowing letter of praise.<sup>43</sup>

The four cruises of *Black Prince* under Ryan and Marchant between 12 June and 24 September 1779 took her through the Channel and up the west coast of Britain as far as the Hebrides and yielded thirty-four prizes.<sup>44</sup> Thereafter, Marchant left for the United States and Ryan fell ill, but the continuing enthusiasm of John Torris led him to purchase a second privateer. She was a cutter of sixteen guns which he named *Black Princess*, intending her to sail in company with *Black Prince*.<sup>45</sup>

With the help of Francis Coffyn, Torris, and Ryan obtained commissions from Franklin for Patrick Dowlin as captain of *Black Prince* and Edward Macatter as captain of *Black Princess*. Unable to accompany them, Ryan acquired a 1/12 interest in both vessels.<sup>46</sup> Joint cruising proved to be fruitful, and the two privateers captured twenty prizes in the Irish Sea between 21 December 1779 and 10 April 1780.<sup>47</sup> Thereafter, things took a bad turn. *Black Princess*, found to be unseaworthy, was laid up at Morlaix, and *Black Prince* was driven up on the coast of France by a frigate flying British colors, but which turned out to be the French privateer *Calonne*.<sup>48</sup>

The resourceful Torris quietly acquired another large cutter at Cherbourg to which he simply transferred the name, captain, commission and crew of the original *Black Princess* and sent her off to sea.<sup>49</sup> In three cruises in or about the Irish Sea between 23 May and 11 August 1780, under Macatter's command, she took a total of thirty-three British merchant ships.<sup>50</sup>

Although Ryan was too ill to participate in the joint cruises of *Black Prince* and *Black Princess*, Torris expected him to recover soon and proposed to have a privateer built for him at Boulogne.<sup>51</sup> Instead, he wrote to Franklin on 15 January 1780 that he had purchased a "Fine large cutter," with eight 6-pound guns and twenty swivels.<sup>52</sup> Ryan joined in Torris' plea to Franklin for an American commission for the new vessel, to be called *Fearnot* (*Sans Peur*).<sup>53</sup>

Ryan sailed from Dunkirk on 24 March 1780 with a crew of ninety men, of whom forty-five were Americans. Instead of sailing west to the entrance of the Irish Sea, as *Black Prince* and

*Black Princess* had always done, he crossed the North Sea and went “north about” Great Britain. Passing through the Pentland Firth, which separates Scotland from the Orkneys, and down through the Minches, he suddenly appeared among the Hebrides, to the consternation of the inhabitants and the dismay of ship owners in that remote stretch of British home waters. Ryan and his crew repeated this arduous voyage in a second cruise during the summer months with a total yield of sixteen prizes for both cruises.<sup>54</sup>

By the summer of 1780, the activities of Franklin’s Irish privateers had become a source of irritation to the French government and a burden to the aging statesman. Under the regulations prescribed by the French government, the courts of the French Admiralty inspected vessels brought into French ports by American privateers and produced the standard interrogatories (*proces verbal*) which are the raw material of the prize court decisions under the law of nations,<sup>55</sup> but the French Admiralty could take no action until a decision was rendered by Franklin, sitting as judge of an American prize court located in France. As long as he had the judicial responsibility, Franklin discharged it conscientiously, but when the French government suggested that he end his sponsorship of the Irish privateers, he was willing to comply.<sup>56</sup>

The end of U.S. commissions for Ryan and his friends, however, did not mean the end of their energetic privateering. Macatter continued to command *Black Princess* with a French commission, and Ryan made a highly productive cruise in *Mareschal*, a French-commissioned privateer, capturing fourteen British vessels in the North Sea.<sup>57</sup>

As the year 1780 wore on, it began to appear that the prosperity of the Dunkirk *armateurs* had passed its peak and, like a number of others, John Torris had over-extended himself financially. The liquidation of prize vessels and ransom notes was time-consuming, and bureaucratic delays in the French Admiralty, maddening. But while they awaited their money, the *armateurs* had to continue to bear the expenses of their fighting ships and the payment of their crews.

Luke Ryan’s personal claim for his share of prize money was massive, both against John Torris in Dunkirk and against his former clerk at

Morlaix, who now began to style himself “John Diot & Co.” Luke Ryan wanted another ship, and another ship he was to have. Once again, the Flemish connection came into play. Charles Alexandre de Calonne, intendant or agent of Louis XVI at Lille, capital of French Flanders,<sup>58</sup> had a financial interest in *Calonne* (ex-*Tartar*), a substantial ship of thirty-two guns and a crew of 250. By December of 1780, Luke Ryan had obtained command of this vessel, named in honor of his new patron, and gone cruising again. He appears to have taken at least a dozen prizes before the end came in the Firth of Forth.<sup>59</sup>

The cruises of Ryan, Macatter, and Dowlin left behind them an armada of captured vessels which were ransomed, retaken or made into prisoner cartels. As these vessels reached British ports, dramatic stories in the British press, government reports, and private correspondence enlarged Ryan’s reputation as a dashing, fearless, and effective foe. Henri Malo records that during his two years of active privateering, Ryan personally engaged in thirty fights and received many wounds.<sup>60</sup> A gentleman signing himself Mercator expressed the feelings of many people when he wrote from Inverness to the *London Chronicle* on 4 August 1780:

*On the west coast the Fearnought [sic] American privateer, Luke Ryan commander, reigns uncontrolled. It is not many days since he took all the shipping belonging to the town of Stornway, and laid the place under a very heavy contribution, for payment of which the principal inhabitants are carried away hostages, and on about the 2d of this month he took six vessels, part of which he ransomed on very high terms, and the others he burnt, because their masters could not agree to his exorbitant demands. Scarce a day passes without his making a descent on some part of the coast, and carrying away the cattle or plundering the houses, of the wretched inhabitants — unprotected and denied the use of arms to defend themselves.<sup>61</sup>*

The British press circulated freely in France, delivered by the Dover-Calais packet boats, and

the three Irish captains had ample opportunity to read their press notices. One senses that Ryan was playing to an unseen audience when he entered Portree on Skye and courteously purchased supplies from the astonished inhabitants. On that occasion, *Fearnot* sailed down the narrow loch past Kyle of Lochalsh, a dozen miles into the Scottish mainland, then turned around and sailed out again for no apparent reason except joyful bravado.<sup>62</sup>

As Eric Graham has written, "The terror created by his actions far outstripped the actual damage he managed to inflict."<sup>63</sup> There is no question that he was regarded with outrage at the Admiralty and with mixed fear and fascination by the British public. In France, Ryan was lionized. On 21 October 1780, he was elected a Burgess of Dunkirk. In February 1781, he was specifically naturalized by Louis XVI and later given the naval rank of *capitaine de vaisseau* (post captain).<sup>64</sup> In the United States, he was all but unknown while he was alive, but fifty years after his death, an American sailor of the Revolution wrote a detailed account of sailing with Ryan in *Calonne*. He concluded his account, "I have sailed with many brave men, Com. John Paul Jones, etc. yet none of them equal to this Capt. Luke Ryon [sic] for skill and bravery."<sup>65</sup>

In just over two years, Luke Ryan and his two lieutenants from Rush, Macatter, and Dowlin, commanded six privateering vessels, commissioned to sail under the flags of three different nations and on opposite sides in the same war. They took 140 recorded prizes in the home waters of the most powerful navy on earth. Theirs is a record unparalleled in four centuries of European and American privateering history.

#### EDINBURGH AND LONDON

Ryan's capture caused a considerable stir in the press and among the citizens of Edinburgh, where he was an object of great attention, not all of it unsympathetic.<sup>66</sup> His crew were released in prisoner exchanges, but he and his mate, Thomas Coppinger, remained in the castle under heavy guard from April until October 1781, when Deputy Marshall of the Admiralty John Cricket arrived to conduct them to London. The entourage consisted of three post chaises and a coach: in the first chaise were three heavily armed

soldiers; in the second, Luke Ryan and two soldiers; in the third, Thomas Coppinger and two soldiers; in the coach at the rear was the Deputy Marshall and his attendants.<sup>67</sup>

The Deputy Marshall and his prisoners arrived in London on 13 October, a Saturday. A journalist who saw Ryan described him:

*The person of Luke Ryan is by no means of the athletic frame which the character he has sustained seems to require. He is of small stature, rather approaching effeminacy; his countenance is pale and sickly; but marked with the strongest sensibility; and his address is perfectly that of a gentleman.*<sup>68</sup>

Ryan and Coppinger were lodged over the weekend in a house in Doctors' Commons, the institution which served as the inn of court for the doctors of civil law who practiced admiralty law. On Monday, 15 October 1781, Ryan was examined by Dr. William Wynne, the King's Advocate-General, at the Horn Tavern in Doctors' Commons. Dr. Wynne asked him whether his name was Ryan and whether the name Luke Ryan signed on the bond for the commission issued in February 1779 for *Friendship* was his signature; to both of which questions he answered in the affirmative. He and Coppinger were thereafter committed to the New Gaol, Southwark, until the next semi-annual meeting of the court of Admiralty Sessions to hear criminal cases arising at sea, such as murder, mutiny or piracy. Admiralty Sessions, convened by the King's special commission, was a court of *oyer and terminer*. This ancient phrase, in the legal French beloved by the British bar, indicated that the court was empowered to "hear and determine" the cases of all prisoners pent, so that, as Blackstone comments, "the gaols are in general cleared, and all offenders tried, punished or delivered twice in every year; a constitution of singular use and excellence."<sup>69</sup>

The Crown failed in its first effort to bring Ryan and Coppinger to trial. On 31 October 1781, they were brought before Sir James Marriott, judge of the High Court of Admiralty, and five other commissioners, together constituting the court of Admiralty Sessions at Justice Hall in



Captain Luke Ryan

Luke Ryan at the time of his trial. Unknown artist, *Hibernian Magazine*, 1782. Courtesy Eugene A. Coyle.

the Old Bailey. The tone of the court may be sensed from the opening remarks of Judge Marriott. He said that "the Kalendar [sic] was of a dreadful size, a size exceeding any that had ever come under his observation. If examples had earlier been made upon delinquents, such a Kalendar would not perhaps have presented itself now; it was now become highly necessary to make some examples for the sake of alarming the guilty."<sup>70</sup>

Ryan and Coppinger were indicted by a grand jury for piracy, but not piracy in the usual sense of the word. They were charged under a law designed to curb privateering against British subjects by other British subjects, rather than general piracy. The statute, adapted by Parliament during the turbulent era of shifting alliances which followed the overthrow of the Stuart dynasty in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, brought British privateers acting under enemy commissions to justice without imposing upon the Crown the burden and delay of a trial for high treason.<sup>71</sup> Admiralty Sessions, whose judges were always close to the throne, were likely to be more malleable than the common law courts with their parliamentary appeals.<sup>72</sup> Both Ryan and Coppinger pleaded not guilty.

Ryan's lawyer, Mr. Peckham, protested the tactics of the prosecution. Since his arrest the previous April, Ryan had been led to believe that he would be tried on a charge of high treason. Suddenly, within a week of the trial, the accusation was switched to piracy, a charge whose outcome under the statute depended upon the place of Ryan's birth. His attorney then submitted an affidavit as to Ryan's antecedents and argued that Ryan was entitled to time to produce witnesses and other evidence of his nativity. In the affidavit, Ryan swore that his grandfather had been one of the "Wild Geese," members of the Roman Catholic army of James II, who had left Ireland following their defeat by the army of the Protestant King William III at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 and formed the Irish Brigade of the French Army;<sup>73</sup> that his father, Joseph Ryan, a lieutenant in Dillon's Regiment of the Irish Brigade, had died six weeks after Ryan's birth;<sup>74</sup> that his uncle, James Ryan, also a lieutenant in Dillon's regiment, had been responsible for his support and schooling; and that following his father's death, his mother's

second husband brought him, in his infancy, to Ireland.<sup>75</sup> The affidavit said that funds from his uncle in France were forwarded to Ryan in Ireland through a French merchant, John Torris, of Dunkirk. The court agreed to Peckham's request for postponement until the next sitting of the court in six months' time, and Coppinger's case was postponed as well, despite his demand for an immediate trial. Both were denied bail.<sup>76</sup>

Mr. Peckham's accusation of unfair conduct on the part of the Admiralty was stronger than even he was aware. As early as 1 May, only two weeks after Ryan's capture, the Lords of the Admiralty had directed their secretary to obtain an opinion of counsel as to whether Ryan could be charged with piracy.<sup>77</sup> In September, Ryan's old nemesis, John Draper, Inspector of the Tide Duty of the Port of Dublin, was instructed to gather from Fingal witnesses who could testify as to Ryan's Irish birth.<sup>78</sup> The three witnesses he brought to London, Charles Rourke, James Morris, and Robert Echlin, did not testify against Ryan on 31 October, but were conveniently available in the courtroom to testify against James Sweetman and Matthew Knight, two other Fingalians tried the same day and convicted of piracy.<sup>79</sup>

Luke Ryan's long wait for the April trial was interrupted by the arrival at Newgate Prison, where he was now held, of his old friend and lieutenant, Edward Macatter. The latter had the bad luck of losing *Black Prince* on 9 October 1781 near the Scyllie Isles to the British 28-gun frigate *Medea*, Captain Henry Duncan, and was to stand trial on the same day as Ryan and for the same crime.<sup>80</sup>

### THE TRIAL

**T**he trial of Luke Ryan finally took place on Saturday, 30 March 1782, at Justice Hall in the Old Bailey, and attracted much attention. Sir James Marriott again presided, assisted by Sir William Scott, who was to be Marriott's successor as judge of the High Court of Admiralty, Judge William Henry Ashurst of the Court of King's Bench, and Dr. William Macham of Doctors' Commons.

At the prosecution's table were five lawyers, including the king's advocate, the attorney general, and the advocate of the Admiralty.<sup>81</sup>

The courtroom was crowded and the press well represented. The *London Chronicle* described Luke Ryan as “very genteelly dressed in a blue coat with brass buttons, scarlet waistcoat and breeches. He appeared to be about 25 years of age.”<sup>82</sup>

The disputed location of Luke Ryan’s birth was the central issue in the case. He was tried under a statute which declared it to be piracy for any “natural born subject” of the British King “to commit any Hostilities upon the Sea...against his Majesty’s subjects...under colour of any commission from any of his Majesty’s enemies....”<sup>83</sup> That he had utilized both French and American commissions to prey on British merchant ships was undisputed. If he was Irish-born, he was a “natural born subject” and he should hang; if born in France, he was not and he should go free.

On Ryan’s behalf, Hubert Cullen, a retired sergeant in Berwick’s Regiment of the Irish Brigade, testified to his knowledge of Lieutenants James and Joseph Ryan, and of the child born to the latter. He also produced a copy of a register of baptism of Luke Ryan at Gravelin, France, dated 1 May 1750, with reference to the child’s birth on 1 March 1750 to Joseph Ryan and Mrs. Mary Ann Chauvelle.<sup>84</sup> Gravelin is a small port ten miles east of Dunkirk, where Dillon’s regiment was then stationed. Two other witnesses testified to the mother and child leaving France for Ireland. One of these, James Long, was the most credible witness at the trial since he was not put forward by either party. He had read of the case in the newspaper and voluntarily presented himself to the court. He testified that his mother had been a servant on the farm of Michael Ryan, at Kenure, and that he remembered Luke Ryan being brought to the farm from France as a child. “He was an effeminate child,” Long said.<sup>85</sup>

In support of the Crown’s contention that Luke Ryan was a native of Ireland and therefore a “natural born subject” of the King, John Draper produced seven witnesses from the area of Rush who testified that they knew Ryan during his childhood, and that Michael Ryan and Mary Taylor of Rush were his reputed parents. The prosecution also presented officers of *Belle Poule*, who testified that Ryan had admitted to them that he was Irish or came from Ireland. Curiously, the British Admiralty, with the most powerful intelli-

gence organization on earth and six months to prepare for the case, was able to obtain no documentary evidence of Ryan’s Irish birth to submit to the court.<sup>86</sup> The jury found Ryan guilty. No evidence was presented against Coppinger and he was acquitted.<sup>87</sup>

Macatter and his shipmates, Nicholas Field and Edward Duffy, were thereupon indicted by the grand jury for piracy under the same statute. The witnesses from Rush testified as to their knowledge of the men. Macatter’s French commission was submitted in evidence, together with an affidavit signed by Macatter acknowledging that he had been captain of *Black Prince*. In vain, Macatter’s counsel protested the absence of any evidence of his having taken a prize under the commission. The jury found all three guilty.<sup>88</sup>

Eleven crewmen of the Irish privateer *Queen Charlotte* were then indicted and tried on a charge of mutiny. Three of the defendants, John Smith, Thomas Farrell, and Daniel Casey were found guilty; the other eight were acquitted, whereupon they all agreed to enlist in the Royal Navy.

Ryan, Macatter, and the three mutineers were then summoned to the bar and sentenced to death by hanging at Wapping on 14 May 1782.<sup>89</sup> All five were Fingallians. As the court adjourned, a reporter for the *Glasgow Mercury* commented that, “Ryan is a genteel young man, of a good deportment, and appeared to be perfectly indifferent at hearing the fatal verdict.”<sup>90</sup>

It is always presumptuous for any person who has not seen the evidence and heard the witnesses at first hand to question the decisions of a jury. In another country and two centuries later, it is preposterous.

Nevertheless, readers should be aware of how different were the circumstances in which Luke Ryan’s jury rendered their service from those of a modern jury in a century of defendants’ rights. Consider:

- They were a war-time jury in a nation suffering heavily from years of warfare with France. All of the defendants could be seen as opposing British national interests. All of those convicted were Irish.
- Under the constitution of Admiralty Sessions, the jury was drawn from the immediate vicin-

ity of the court house, viz. "the Parish of St. Sepulchre, in the Ward of Farringdon without in the City of London."<sup>91</sup> Thus, they were men from the commercial heart of a great empire whose life blood was maritime trade. Can such men have arrived at the court house innocent of prior knowledge or judgment of a maritime predator as notorious as Luke Ryan?

On 30 March 1782, the Court of Admiralty Sessions:

- read its ceremonial commission aloud;
- lectured the courtroom on the maritime law of nations;
- selected a trial jury;
- heard the testimony of twenty-three witnesses against Ryan and Coppinger and the English translation of his French commission;
- heard three witnesses in Ryan's defense;
- received the verdicts on Ryan and Coppinger, after the jury withdrew "a short time";
- received the indictment of Macatter and his shipmates from the grand jury;
- heard six witnesses against the defendants and one for them;
- received the verdict in the Macatter case after the jury deliberated "about five minutes";
- received the grand jury indictment of the eleven crew members of *Queen Charlotte*; heard four witnesses against them;
- received the verdict of the jury in the mutiny case after the jury deliberated "about ten minutes";
- arranged the enlistment in the Royal Navy of the eight accused mutineers who were acquitted;
- passed sentence on the five defendants adjudged guilty;

all at a single sitting beginning at 9:00 A.M. and ending at 8:00 P.M. George III could not complain of the prompt service which his interests received in Judge Marriott's courtroom.

#### RYAN'S FRIENDS

Following his conviction and sentencing, Luke Ryan was confined in Newgate, closely watched and heavily guarded, under sentence to

hang in six weeks' time. However, that did not mean that he was without resources.

In the first place, he had Macatter with him, and they had always been lucky together. In Newgate, they had either money or credit because the press commented on their generosity to their impoverished fellow prisoners, "clothing and feeding those who were most distressed."<sup>92</sup> Ryan's bills from his tailor could not have been insignificant; every time he appeared in public or in court, he seemed to be wearing a different suit of expensive new clothes.

During his two years of privateering from French ports, Ryan's wife and daughters had remained in Ireland, where he saw them only on the rare occasions of his return to Rush to recruit additional seamen. Some time after his conviction, they came to England and probably settled in one of the Hampshire ports.

Despite his close confinement, Ryan appeared to be in easy communication with his friends abroad. On 14 May 1781, less than a month after the capture of *Calonne*, Monsieur Le Hoc, head of the *Bureau des Prix et Echanges* at Versailles, wrote to his opposite numbers, the British Commissioners for Sick and Hurt, asserting that Ryan was a French subject and a burgess of Dunkirk and entitled to the status of a prisoner of war, including the right to be exchanged. The commissioners adamantly refused the French demand with the personal backing of George III, who had become quite familiar with the story of Mr. Luke Ryan.<sup>93</sup> In July of 1781, the Irish Solicitor General urged the English Admiralty to try Ryan "with all convenient expedition" for fear that Ryan's friends in Ireland would cause the disappearance of hostile witnesses.<sup>94</sup>

In France, John Torris implored the French government to intervene on Ryan's behalf and was rewarded with "repeated efforts at the Court of London."<sup>95</sup> Macatter's wife, Mary, believed that Benjamin Franklin had intervened on behalf of the two prisoners and wrote Franklin, expressing her thanks.<sup>96</sup> Robert Beatson thought that Calonne prevailed on Marie Antoinette to ask the French peace negotiators to request, in her name, a pardon for Ryan.<sup>97</sup>

On 19 May 1782, Pat Dowlin expressed his support of his two imprisoned friends by sailing to the coast of Fingal with two privateering

luggers. While the captain of his consort paid a conjugal visit to his wife, Dowlin went ashore at Skerries and burned the house of John Draper's local Revenue agent, a Mr. Connygham.<sup>98</sup>

Only one person appears to have let Ryan down. His obituary notices, published years later, indicate that at the time of his capture he had £20,000, the proceeds of his Morlaix prizes, on deposit with bankers in nearby Roscoff. This would have been either Jon Diot & Co. or a related firm. Ryan made the mistake of introducing his French mistress to the bankers as his wife, and when he was imprisoned, she withdrew the money and disappeared.<sup>99</sup>

### THE PARDON

By the end of 1781, the consequences of the victory of French Admiral de Grasse at the Battle of the Chesapeake Capes and the consequent surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown began to be clear in Britain: it was no longer possible for Britain to regain her lost colonies in North America. On 20 March 1782, eleven days before the trial of Luke Ryan, the North ministry, having failed in its principal purpose, resigned.

The Rockingham ministry, which succeeded to power, was a strange, weak, and temporary coalition, but its leaders knew that their role was to pursue peace. Somehow, in the midst of these high matters of state, Luke Ryan became the subject of official concern. The day before that scheduled for his execution, his fate was weighed at a meeting held at Rockingham's home,<sup>100</sup> and Lord Shelbourne, the Home Secretary, wrote to the king:

*It appears that there are a number of applications in favor of Luke Ryan. It was argued that if he were pardoned it would be unjust to condemn the other man with equal pretenses to mercy, and Lord Keppel insisted upon the hardship in such case of condemning the mutineers.*

The cabinet therefore expressed its "humble desire" that all of the condemned men should be respited for ten days, but promised the king that, whatever happened, they would hang one of the mutineers "for the example."<sup>101</sup>

On the same day, George III reluctantly acquiesced and the Lords of the Admiralty signed a warrant respiting the execution of all five of the prisoners.<sup>102</sup> On the 25th, another warrant respited four of the prisoners "until further notice," but permitted the execution of Daniel Casey to go forward as the king had been promised.<sup>103</sup>

The matter rested there for ten months while the peace negotiators of Britain, France, and the United States went about their work. All hostilities ended in February 1783, and on 2 March 1783, a "free pardon" was issued for Luke Ryan and Edward Macatter by command of George III.<sup>104</sup>

However, Ryan did not go free — at least not at once. He continued to be imprisoned for repayment of a judgment on the debts he had incurred while in jail, in accordance with the practice of the times. Once again, his French friends came to his rescue. The French Naval authorities tried to get Torris to pay him some of the money that was owed him by the *armateur*; failing that, they seized Torris' business and liquidated it. As part of the process, Ryan's personal debts were paid in England and he was released on 9 February 1784.<sup>105</sup>

For the next five years, Luke Ryan was a free man, able to live with his family in Hampshire. There is no record of any attempts to prosecute him for cutting *Friendship* out of the Poolbeg five years before. He spent much of his time vainly trying to collect money Torris owed him. Franklin came to his aid by supplying him with documents to show the French authorities.<sup>106</sup> His efforts were unavailing. Torris was hopelessly bankrupt.

On 25 February 1789, Luke Ryan was arrested once more — this time on order of the Sheriff of Hampshire for failure to pay a debt of £200 owed to physicians who had inoculated and cared for his children. His wife and children did not live with him in debtors' prison as was permitted by contemporary custom.<sup>107</sup> He died in King's Bench debtors' prison on 18 June 1789 of natural causes. He was thirty-nine years old.

### THE VINERIAN FOOTNOTE

Even after his death, Luke Ryan continued to inject himself into other people's conflicts. In 1792, his case became an issue in the debate

between the “naturalist” and “positivist” schools of legal scholarship. Like all good legal arguments, this debate has been going on for centuries, and further elaboration will not be indulged in this essay. Richard Woodeson, third Vinerian Professor of Common Law at Oxford University between 1777 and 1790,<sup>108</sup> raised Ryan’s case in support of his naturalist argument that conduct like that of Ryan simply was not “piracy” within that concept as used in man’s reason and nature’s law. A pirate is at war with all the world and treats the lives and property of all the world as his for the taking. Luke Ryan, on the other hand, attacked only the declared enemies of sovereigns whose commissions he carried, and he scrupulously brought his prizes and ransom notes before the appropriate prize courts for adjudication. Two centuries later, this aspect of Ryan’s case was still being discussed at the U.S. Naval War College by Professor Alfred P. Rubin, its Charles H. Stock-

ton Professor of International Law.<sup>109</sup>

Both Woodeson and Rubin erroneously described Luke Ryan as having a “Dutch” commission. One would have thought that his commissions from England, France, and the United States were quite enough.



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## Notes

1. Ryan’s commission for *Calonne*, dated 9 November 1780, from Louis Jean Marie de Bourbon, Duke of Perthièvre and Admiral of France, may be found in the Scottish Record Office (Edinburgh) AC 9/2974.
2. For a discussion of ransoming practices, see the author’s essay, “The Ransoming of *Eliza Swan*,” *American Neptune* (Spring, 1993) 55: 98-108.
3. Ryan got underweigh in such haste that he left behind a boat and ten men sent on board *Nancy*. Presumably, he planned to return when his additional prizes were in hand. Their actual fate is unknown. Affidavit of Luke Ryan, 21 April 1781, before Charles Wallace, Magistrate of the City of Edinburgh, Public Record Office of England, (hereafter cited as “PRO”), ADM 43/26. Beatson contends, without citing authority, that Ramsay intentionally misled Ryan. Robert Beatson, *Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain*, 6 vols., (London: Longman, 1804), 5:400-401.
4. Captain’s Log of *Belle Poule*, 17 April 1781, PRO ADM 51/101; Master’s Log of *Belle Poule*, 17 April 1781, PRO ADM 52/2171.
5. Philip Patton to Philip Stephens, 18 April 1781, PRO ADM 1/2306 XC 1841.
6. Philip Patton to Philip Stephens, 27 April 1781, PRO ADM 1/2306 XC 1841.
7. Joseph Shiels, “Captain Luke Ryan of Rush,” *Dublin Historical Record* (1971), 34:25-40.
8. Ibid.
9. See Duncan Fraser, *The Smugglers* (Montrose: Standard Press, 1971).
10. William Bell Clark, *Ben Franklin’s Privateers* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956) 5; G. Rutherford, “The King Against Luke Ryan,” *Mariner’s Mirror* (1957) 43:28; Shiels, “Captain Luke Ryan,” 27.
11. Shiels, “Captain Luke Ryan,” 26.
12. Dudley W. Knox, *History of the United States Navy* (New York: Putnam, 1936), 19-21.
13. Samuel Elliot Morrison, *John Paul Jones* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 168-202.
14. Despite the Act of Union, which united the parliaments of England and Scotland in 1707, the Scottish and English Admiralties remained separate at the time of the American


- War of Independence.
15. Shiels, "Captain Luke Ryan," 25.
  16. *Freeman's Journal* (Dublin), 23 February 1779; Shiels, "Captain Luke Ryan," 27.
  17. Shiels, "Captain Luke Ryan," 27.
  18. Rutherford, "King against Luke Ryan", 32.
  19. Franklin's Diary of Correspondence, 12 February 1779, *Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 28:510, (hereafter cited as BF). The publication of these letters is the work of many years past and some still to come. The current editor, Barbara B. Oberg, has graciously permitted the author access to letters scheduled for publication in future volumes. In such cases, the page numbers, not yet assigned, are indicated by the symbol ‡.
  20. Francis Coffyn to the American Commissioners, 10 July 1779, BF 27:69.
  21. Francis Coffyn to Franklin, 18 September 1779, BF 30:367.
  22. Sutton de Clonard to Franklin, 11 May 1779, BF 29:474.
  23. A description of the cutting out is found in a letter dated 18 June 1780 from Benjamin Franklin to the Count de Vergennes, French foreign minister, in Francis Wharton, ed., *Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence*, 4 vols., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1889), 3:801-803. It accords entirely with a contemporary account in the *London Chronicle*, 3-6 July 1779.
  24. The principal secondary sources, Clark, Rutherford, and Shiels, give an abundance of detail on the cutting-out expedition. Unfortunately, they contradict one another on such matters as whether the contraband was unloaded in Fingal before the seizure of *Friendship*; whether Ryan was on board at the time; whether the crew was arrested with the ship; whether revenue officers were killed in the re-taking of *Friendship*; and where and when the revenue officers were released. None of them cites authority for these details, and all three are now dead. Their sources appear to have been limited to fragmentary, confused and contradictory correspondence and press stories of the period. The portion of their narratives which the author has included in the text accords with the accounts of all three.
  25. *London Chronicle*, 11-13 April 1780.
  26. *London Chronicle*, 3-6 July 1779. The newspaper describes Ryan's haven as "Studdel Road."
  27. Henri Malo, "American Privateers at Dunkirk," *Proceedings U.S. Naval Institute* (1911) 139:934. Malo's essay is of great historical value because the local archives from which it was drawn were so heavily damaged in World War II.
  28. A modern example of reprisal is the Gulf of Tonkin resolution procured from Congress by President Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam conflict.
  29. In order to minimize confusion, the author will refer to letters of marque and reprisal simply as "commissions."
  30. Sutton de Clonard to Franklin, 11 May 1779, BF 29:474-5.
  31. PRO Admiralty I, Secretary In-letters, Intelligence, Ser 2d, vol. 3973, 412-419.
  32. The first public report of the fate of *Friendship* appeared in the *London Chronicle*, 3-6 July 1779, in which a traveler from Dunkirk described *Black Prince* being made ready to cruise, and identified her as the former Rush smuggler.
  33. Franklin was playing his own game. As William Bell Clark has so ably demonstrated in *Ben Franklin's Privateers*, he was using the Irish privateers to bring him British prisoners to exchange for Americans held in Britain.
  34. John Torris to Franklin, 28 May 1779, BF 29:571; Franklin to Torris and Coffyn, 18 June 1779, BF 29:100.
  35. George Farmer, captain of *Quebec*, to Philip Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty, 25 June 1779, PRO 1/1790.
  36. Stephen Marchant to Franklin, 23 June 1779, BF 29:718.
  37. Franklin to Marchant, 4 July 1779, BF 30:29.
  38. John Diot to Franklin, 28 July 1779, BF 30:155.
  39. Marchant to Franklin, 25 July 1779, BF 30:142.
  40. *San Joseph* was either armed or readily armable with guns from *Black Prince*. The audacious and imaginative Luke Ryan sent Jonathan Arnold off, not as a prize master, but as a separate privateer, carrying a purported sub-commission from Marchant. Ryan had a fair copy of Marchant's printed commission from Franklin copied out by hand, and then had Marchant endorse it on the back with the certification, "I do hereby certify that the Copy transcribed on the other side is a true Copy Verbatim of the Original Commission I have on Board my Privateer the Black Prince Cutter, which Copy I have this

- day delivered to Mr. Jonathan Arnold first lieutenant of my said Privateer." It is perhaps just as well that the gullible Arnold lost his ship before he had a chance to test the validity of this extraordinary document in a prize court. Fortunately for historians, it made its way to Philip Stephens and is now to be found at the PRO in Admiralty I, Secretary In-letters, Intelligence, Ser 2d, vol. 3973, 412-419.
41. Franklin to Torris, 19 September 1779, BF 30:373.
  42. Torris to Franklin, 23 September 1779, BF 30: 389.
  43. Franklin to Luke Ryan, 2 October 1779, BF 30:431. Franklin's letter reads "Sir, Being much pleased with your Activity and Bravery in distressing the Enemy's Trade, and beating their Vessels of superior force by which you have done honour to the American flag I beg you to accept my thankful Acknowledgments together with the present of a Night Glass, as a Small Mark of the Esteem with which I have the honour to be, Sir Your & c."
  44. Marchant to Franklin, 23 June 1779, BF, 29:718; Marchant to Franklin, 25 July 1779, BF, 30:142; Marchant to Franklin, 23 August 1779, BF, 30:254; Francis Coffyn to Franklin, 24 September 1779, BF 30:396
  45. Francis Coffyn to Franklin, 30 August 1779, BF 30:271.
  46. Malo, "American Privateers", 933. At 955 Malo sets out in full the "Contract for Armament of foreign Vessels" under which the venture was launched.
  47. Coffyn to Franklin, 21 December 1779, BF 31:‡; Diot to Franklin, 12 January 1780, BF 31:‡; Torris to Franklin, 15 January 1780, BF 31:‡; Dowlin to Franklin, 27 January 1780, BF 31:‡.
  48. Torris to Franklin, 15 April 1780, BF 32:‡. Torris wrote bitterly to Franklin of the conduct of *Calonne's* master, the "Ignorant Captain Guilman" and asked him to protest to Sartine. No explanation of Guilman's conduct has been found. All details of rig, dimensions, crew size and armaments indicate that this *Calonne* was the same vessel that Ryan commanded when he was captured.
  49. Torris notified Franklin of his intention to make the transfer and took his silence as consent. Torris to Franklin, 19 April 1780, BF 32:‡.
  50. Clark, *Benjamin Franklin's Privateers*, 132-135, 146-154, 155-156.
  51. Ryan to Franklin, 8 October 1779, BF 30: 500.
  52. Torris to Franklin, 15 January 1780, BF 31:‡.
  53. Ryan to Franklin, 29 January 1780, BF 31:‡.
  54. Torris to Franklin, 23 September 1779, BF 30:390, note 6; Clark, *Benjamin Franklin's Privateers*, 125-128, 157-163. Hebridean waters had not yet been surveyed or charted by the Admiralty, whose own vessels were at a disadvantage there against experienced smugglers with local knowledge. Eric Graham, "The Shipping Industry of Scotland, 1651-1791," Ph.D. diss., Strathclyde University, 1995, chap. 4.
  55. The standard proceedings in prize courts through the eighteenth-century maritime world are summarized in Appendix A of the author's essay, "Forbidden Prizes", *The American Neptune* (1994), 54:165, 173.
  56. Franklin to French Foreign Minister Count Charles Vergenne, 18 June 1780, Francis Wharton ed., *Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence*, 4 vols., (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1889) 3:880.
  57. Joseph Shiels, "Luke Ryan," 32.
  58. Charles Alexandre de Calonne (1734-1802) was finance minister of Louis XVI from 1782-1787. The failure of his efforts to compel the clergy and aristocracy to share the crushing tax burden of the nation caused him to flee to England in 1787 and led to the French Revolution. Robert Lacour Gayot, *Calonne* (Paris: Hachette, 1963).
  59. Ibid., 32, 33; Le Marquis de Granges de Surgères, *Prises des Corsaires Français Pendant la Guerre de L'Indépendance* (Paris: Chez L'Auteur, 1900), 33-37.
  60. Henri Malo, *Les Derniers Corsaires* (Paris: Emile-Paul Frères, 1925), 128.
  61. *London Chronicle*, 19-22 August 1780.
  62. Clark, *Ben Franklin's Privateers*, 158-162.
  63. Eric J. Graham, *The Shipping Trade of Ayrshire 1689-1791* (Ayr, England: Ayrshire Archeological and Natural History Society, 1991), 32. Graham recounts a slapstick episode in which two subscription warships, practicing artillery fire in a mock battle off the Clyde in preparation for Ryan's expected arrival, brought on a squadron of four warships of the Royal Navy who thought that *they* were Ryan and forthwith attacked and boarded one of them.
  64. Rutherford, "King against Luke Ryan," 31, 37.
  65. John Trevett, "Journal of a Naval Officer

- during the Revolutionary War,” *Rhode-Island Republican* Newport, RI, 5 June 1839.
66. *Calonne* was brought into Leith Roads on 18 April 1781 and there condemned as a prize of *Berwick* and *Belle Poule* on 4 May 1781, by the High Court of Admiralty of the “Kingdom of Scotland and Isles Thereof,” Scottish Record Office AC 7/58/2.
  67. Joseph Shiels, “Luke Ryan,” 34.
  68. *Ibid.*, 36.
  69. Sir William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 6 vols, ed. William Carey Jones, (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1916), 2:1907.
  70. *London Chronicle*, 30 October-1 November 1781.
  71. Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Wm. 3, c.7 (1700); 18 Geo. 2, c.30 (1745).
  72. Alfred P. Rubin, *The Law of Piracy* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1988) is a readily accessible and utterly invaluable modern source on the subject of privateers as pirates. The author discusses in detail such issues as privateers who sail with apparent, but not actual authority, attack neutrals or otherwise exceed their commissions. In pages 69-78, Rubin treats at length the case of eight privateers commissioned by James II after he had been deposed by William of Orange in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. All of them were Irish and all of them were hanged.
  73. John Dalton, *King James’ Irish Army List* (Dublin: Published by the author, 1855), 878.
  74. Dillon’s was the only regiment to serve under a hereditary colonel of the same family for the entire century (1690-1789) that the Irish Brigade formed a part of the French army. Dillon’s was by tradition the favorite foreign regiment of the French kings. While Luke Ryan was held in prison pending trial, a portion of Dillon’s regiment was fighting at Yorktown under the command of Lafayette. John Cornelius O’Callaghan, *History of the Irish Brigade in the Service of France* (Glasgow: Cameron and Ferguson, 1870), 46-59.
  75. Deposition of Luc [sic] Ryan, 31 October 1781, PRO HCA 1/24 149. See also G. Rutherford, “The King against Luke Ryan,” *Mariner’s Mirror* (1957), 43:32-33.
  76. Minutes of Admiralty Sessions, 31 October 1781, PRO HCA 1/61 XC6688.
  77. In the eighteenth century, it was the practice of the Secretary of the Admiralty to submit copies of communications from sea officers to the Lords Commissioners in full text. In 1781, the Secretary, Philip Stevens, sat at a table opposite the First Lord of the Admiralty, John Montagu, Earl of Sandwich, with the other Lords Commissioners ranged on either side of the First Lord. After the letter had been read aloud and discussed, the Secretary made notes, either on the reverse side or on the lower margin, of the disposition of their lordships. These notes, legible to a modern reader of photocopies, were never intended for publication and offer insights not available elsewhere. Captain Patton’s second letter of 27 April, reporting his compliance with their prior instructions to take measures to prevent Ryan’s escape, bears this note in the hand of Secretary Philip Stephens, “1st May. Send this letter and his letter of the 18th to Mr. Dyson with directions to report what steps may be proper to be taken to bring Luke Ryan the leader of the privateers to trial for fighting His Majesty’s ship *under a French commission* being himself a subject of His Majesty” (the italicized words, added by the author, are relevant only in a piracy case, not in a treason case.) And in a different hand, a later note reads “Mr. Dyson’s report dated 4 May 1781.” The burden of Mr. Dyson’s opinion may be gauged from his presence as an official at the piracy trial of Luke Ryan.
  78. Rutherford, “King against Luke Ryan,” 32.
  79. Minutes of Admiralty Sessions, 31 October 1781, PRO HCA 1/61 XC 6688.
  80. Rutherford, “King against Luke Ryan,” 34-35.
  81. Minutes of Admiralty Sessions, 30 March 1782, PRO HCA 1/61 XC 6688. Because the minutes were not taken by a professional court reporter, nor transcribed, it is sometimes necessary to clarify them or supplement them with newspaper reports.
  82. *London Chronicle*, 30 March-2 April 1782.
  83. Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Wm. 3, c.7 (1700); 18 Geo. 2, c.30 (1745).
  84. Cullen also testified that he personally knew the officiating clergyman, a Father Mackey, who had christened his own four children. He said that he had obtained the copy of Ryan’s birth register at the request of John Torris. *London Chronicle*, 30 March-2 April 1782.
  85. Minutes of Admiralty Sessions, 30 April 1782, PRO HCA 1/61 XC6688.
  86. At the previous meeting of the Admiralty

- Sessions, William Payne was convicted on the basis of an entry in the Registry of Births in Northrep, Norfolk. Minutes of Admiralty Sessions, 31 October 1781, PRO HCA 1/61 XC 6688; *London Chronicle*, 31 October 1781. A present-day historian is unable to locate birth records of Ryan in County Dublin, since all relevant records were destroyed in the violence which preceded independence in 1921, Eugene Coyle, Chairman of the Skerries Historical Society, to the author, 27 August 1994.
87. Minutes of Admiralty Sessions, 30 April 1782, PRO HCA 1/61 XC 6688.
  88. *London Chronicle*, 30 March-2 April 1782.
  89. Ibid. The Admiralty Warrant of 9 May 1782 to the Marshall of the Admiralty to carry out the executions, further told him that he was to hang the bodies of Ryan, Macatter, and Casey "in chains in some conspicuous place on the coast of Essex or Kent", PRO HCA 1/25 PEN/1346.
  90. *Glasgow Mercury*, 3 April 1782.
  91. Admiralty Warrant, 9 May 1782, PRO HCA 1/25 PEN/1346.
  92. Rutherford, "King against Luke Ryan," 35.
  93. Ibid., 31-32.
  94. Ibid., 31.
  95. Malo, "Privateers," 959.
  96. Mary Macatter to Franklin, 12 September 1782, BF 33:‡.
  97. Robert Beatson, *Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 1727 to 1783*, 6 vols (London: Longman, 1804), 6:314.
  98. *Dublin Journal*, 21 May 1782.
  99. Sylvanus Urban, ed., "Obituary of Considerable Persons," *Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle* (London: David Henry, 1789), 577-578. Eugene Coyle reports that the files of the Skerries Historical Society have long identified the lady as Evelyn de Moliers or de Molier, but do not reveal the source of that identification, Eugene Coyle to the author, 8 July 1994.
  100. *London Morning Herald*, 1 May 1782.
  101. Rutherford, "King against Luke Ryan," 36.
  102. Sir John Fortescue, ed., *Correspondence of George the Third*, 6 vols., (London: MacMillan, 1928), 6:21; Warrant to respite, 13 May 1782, PRO HCA 1/25 14.
  103. Warrant for further respite, 25 May 1782, PRO HCA 1/25 17. V. A. C. Cattrell, *The Hanging Tree* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) contains an excellent discussion in chapter 20 of the bizarre proceedings in which the Hanoverian kings reviewed all capital sentences from the Old Bailey and the arbitrary and capricious manner in which the names of men were selected for death or for pardon.
  104. Warrant for pardon of Luke Ryan and Edward Macatter, 2 March 1783, PRO HCA 1/25 54.
  105. Malo, "American Privateers," 959.
  106. Ryan to Franklin, 8 August 1784, BF 45:‡.
  107. Rutherford, "King against Luke Ryan," 37.
  108. The Vinerian Chair of Common Law was established by a prosperous, if single-minded, publisher of an abridgment of English Law, Charles Viner (1679-1756). His total devotion to his subject matter may be measured by the first action taken by representatives of Oxford who received his bequest at the time of his death: they made provisions for Viner's widow, whom he had neglected in his zeal. H. G. Hanbury, *The Vinerian Chair and Legal Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958) 11-12.
  109. Rubin, *Piracy*, 112.





## Debt-collector or Kingmaker? The Royal Navy in Mexico 1861-1862

FRANCIS I. W. JONES

Great Britain pursued a policy of strict neutrality during the American Civil War. The closest Britain approached to hostilities with the United States was at the time of the *Trent* affair in late 1861. Concurrently, as negotiations were being conducted to resolve this crisis, Britain was preparing for an offensive naval war against the United States, and was planning a joint expedition to Mexico with France and Spain. Ostensibly, the purpose of the expedition was to protect their citizens in that war-torn country and to enforce the payment of indemnities for property losses incurred there. It would appear that intervention by any European power in Mexico could be construed as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which would not only further antagonize the United States, but also dilute the strength of the Royal Navy's North American and West Indian Station. Why did Britain become involved in such an imbroglio at such a crucial time, and what effect did it have on her war preparations against, and future relations with, the United States?

It has also been insinuated that Britain took advantage of the American Civil War by: aiding and abetting France's imperial goals in Mexico to attain its own diplomatic ends; forestalling United States aspirations in Mexico; and fostering domestic discontent in France which would impede Napoleon III's ambitions in Europe.<sup>1</sup> Although it was realized that this was an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, Britain allegedly participated because of covert hopes for the triumph of the Confederacy. However, her majesty's government wished to withdraw at the first opportunity after Union successes occurred in the months following Britain's signing the Tripartite Treaty of London on 31 October 1861.<sup>2</sup> It has been claimed

that Britain was sympathetic to French designs in Mexico, and Britain's attempt to gain the concurrence of the United States has been peremptorily dismissed:

*At Great Britain's suggestion an article [of the Tripartite Treaty of London] provided for the accession of the United States. This article [article 4] was a gesture, an empty formality; the powers agreed to proceed toward their end without waiting for such occasion.*<sup>3</sup>

This argument does not hold up in the face of the evidence. Britain was reluctant to participate unless the United States was included, and did not wish to be involved in the internal affairs of Mexico. Britain was motivated solely by a desire to redress injuries committed by Mexico that affected British commercial interests.<sup>4</sup> Britain's recognition of Maximilian after he seized the Mexican throne has been cited as evidence of Britain's intent.<sup>5</sup> This is an historical anachronism which should be refuted.

The United States was invited to participate in the intervention but Secretary of State William Seward declined.<sup>6</sup> He declined for several reasons: the American Civil War; his plan to provide a loan to Mexico which would enable them to satisfy her obligations to Britain, France, and Spain; the traditional United States policy of avoiding foreign alliances; and reluctance to press its own claims against Mexico in the face of that country's political and military instability.<sup>7</sup> However, the United States acknowledged the

right of the allies to redress their grievances with Mexico. It was never suggested that the Monroe Doctrine violated the agreements.<sup>8</sup>

British foreign policy during the nineteenth century was dominated by the desire to promote and protect trade. Territorial expansion and intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign nations was avoided unless trade advantages could be gained or commercial interests were threatened.<sup>9</sup> This held true in Latin America, where the guidelines of British policy were rejection of territorial ambitions, non-intervention in internal politics, and opening markets to British trade.<sup>10</sup> The Royal Navy's foray into Mexico in 1862 was neither the first nor the last time that Britain used its naval might to protect the interests of British bondholders in Latin America.<sup>11</sup> However, economic imperialism did not always preclude territorial aspirations.

Mr. Otway, the British minister in Mexico, wrote to Lord Malmesbury, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on 2 August 1858, advocating the annexation of Mexico to the British Empire. Otway believed that Britain had a "good pretext for intervention, and a better right to it than any other nation" because half of Mexico's public debt was British and Britain had more capital invested there than any other country. He was convinced that foreign intervention was the only means of establishing an efficient government in Mexico. Other foreign powers came to Mexico to trade and speculate; Britain brought capital. Ergo, Britain was the logical and moral choice to restore Mexico to stability.<sup>12</sup> Despite Otway's altruistic imperialism, it was neither concern for the welfare of the Mexican people nor imperial ambition, but debt-collecting which caused Britain to intervene in the affairs of Mexico three and one-half years later. The motives of Spain and France, although disguised as debt-collecting were more imperial than either moral or monetary.

From 1858 to 1861, Mexico was ravaged by civil war between the liberal-republican forces of Benito Juárez and the clerical and conservative landowning faction of President Miguel Miramón. Both sides had committed hostile acts against Great Britain. One of Juárez's generals

had ambushed and robbed a silver convoy belonging to British subjects on 12 September 1860.<sup>13</sup> Later that year in November, Miramón's men robbed the contents of a strong-box at the British Legation in Mexico City.<sup>14</sup> In January 1861, the civil war ended with the installation of Juárez as the undisputed President of the Republic of Mexico.<sup>15</sup> George B. Mathew, the then British Minister to Mexico, recognized Juárez's government in return for an agreement signed on 24 February 1861 to reimburse the British for the September and November 1860 robberies.<sup>16</sup>

Mathew was relieved by Sir Charles Wyke on 9 May 1861. Wyke had been instructed to emphasize to the Mexican government that, although Britain had no intention of intervening in Mexico's internal affairs, outstanding British claims, particularly restitution for the September and November 1860 robberies, must be honored.<sup>17</sup> Juárez, attempting to restore economic health to Mexico, suspended interest payments on foreign debts for two years in July 1861.<sup>18</sup> Britain, France, Spain, and the United States had claims against Mexico totaling eighty million dollars. Britain was the largest creditor.<sup>19</sup> Wyke and Count Dubois de Saligny, the French representative, notified the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations that their governments were suspending official relations on 25 July.<sup>20</sup> France persuaded Britain and Spain to join in a punitive expedition against the ports of Tampico and Vera Cruz, which would be held until reparations were paid.<sup>21</sup> This concurred with Wyke's suggestion a month earlier to Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, that the only way "to compel obedience to Great Britain's just demands" was to employ the Royal Navy to seize customs-houses at Mexico's principal ports and appropriate a percentage of duties.<sup>22</sup>

Although Britain was Mexico's largest creditor, her naval intervention force was the smallest of the three allies.<sup>23</sup> Britain's motives were also the most overt and the least ambitious. The British government instructed Wyke and Commodore Dunlop, who was to lead the expedition, to demand "full satisfaction and reparation for the wrongs suffered" and to require the immediate surrender of Vera Cruz as a guarantee of

fulfillment but not to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico.<sup>24</sup>

Spain's intentions were much less discernible. They have been labeled "the product not of a plan but of a state of mind." Don Juan Antonio de la Fuente, the Mexican minister to Europe, asserted "no one knows exactly what Spain expects to do, and I believe that even its government does not know."<sup>25</sup> The Juárez government had refused to acknowledge an 1859 treaty which recognized long-standing Spanish claims and the Spanish minister had been expelled from Mexico.<sup>26</sup> It is unlikely that these grievances alone provoked Spain into intervention. It is more likely that Spain was still not reconciled to the loss of her American colonies and had visions of a Bourbon on the throne of Mexico.<sup>27</sup>

Louis Napoleon's ambitions were located in French chauvinism which envisaged France as the center of a Catholic, Latin empire which would rival the political power and economic prosperity of the United States and Great Britain.<sup>28</sup> A Catholic monarchy in Mexico would restrict the expansion of American Protestant republicanism and provide an example to other South American republics.<sup>29</sup> Convinced that the regeneration of Mexico was essential to this grand design, he intended to place Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria on the throne of Mexico regardless of international attitudes in general and the Monroe Doctrine in particular.<sup>30</sup> This became obvious early in November 1861, shortly after the Tripartite Treaty of London (sometimes referred to as the London Convention) had been concluded. Britain was firmly opposed and disassociated itself from Napoleon's scheme.<sup>31</sup> In the decade prior to the American Civil War, European statesmen firmly believed that any attempt at armed intervention in the internal affairs of Mexico would be vehemently opposed by the United States. The American Civil War gave Napoleon the opportunity to exploit Mexico's internal political chaos, and to violate the Monroe Doctrine with impunity.<sup>32</sup> He believed that he could turn his imperial dream into reality at little cost.<sup>33</sup>

Britain, France, and Spain signed the Tripartite Treaty of London on 31 October 1861. The

allies agreed to send a joint expedition to Mexico, ostensibly to enforce payments of debts and claims for the loss of lives and property of their citizens in Mexico, but each had "secret intentions, conflicting policies, and imperial aspirations."<sup>34</sup> Their declared excuse for their ulterior motives was:

*That the arbitrary and vexatious conduct ... of Mexico had compelled them to take steps to ensure that there should be more efficacious protection for the persons and properties of their subjects in that country.*<sup>35</sup>

As the intervention progressed, it became obvious that it was not only the conduct of Mexico which was arbitrary and vexatious.

Article III of the Tripartite Treaty of London specifically prohibited interference in the internal affairs of Mexico. Article IV expanded on Article III, emphasizing that the allies were not seeking territorial gains, nor did they wish to influence Mexico's choice of its form of government. Article I authorized the dispatch of a combined military and naval force sufficient to capture several coastal positions and to blockade the Gulf ports. Article II specified that, as soon as possible after the occupation of Vera Cruz, the allied commanders would address a joint communique to the Mexican authorities explaining their actions and inviting them to "redress the injuries" done to their subjects.<sup>36</sup> Officially, it was clear that the Mexican expedition was not an imperial adventure; unofficially, for at least one of the participants, it was undoubtedly so.

The Gulf of Mexico was the responsibility of the Jamaica Division of the North American and West Indian Station under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Alexander Milne.<sup>37</sup> Accordingly, Edward A. Seymour, Duke of Somerset, First Lord of the Admiralty, informed Milne on 5 October 1861 of the impending convention with France and Spain.<sup>38</sup> Lord John Russell wrote to the Admiralty on 30 October recommending:

*Her Majesty's squadron on the North American and West Indian Station should*

*...be reinforced and a detachment of 700 supernumerary marines should be embarked.*<sup>39</sup>

Russell suggested to the Admiralty the following day, on which the Tripartite Treaty was signed, that two ships-of-the-line, four frigates and a number of smaller vessels plus seven hundred marines would be sufficient for the Mexican expedition.<sup>40</sup> However, the Mexican expedition was fated to be affected by the impending *Trent* affair.

Never did the United States and Britain come as close to hostilities during the American Civil War than over the *Trent* affair. It has been called "one of the greatest crises in nineteenth-century British-American relations."<sup>41</sup> It began 8 November 1861, when Charles Wilkes, captain of USS *San Jacinto*, intercepted the British mail packet *Trent* in the Old Bahamas Channel, neutral waters near the coast of Cuba. Wilkes boarded *Trent* and removed James M. Mason and John Sidell, Confederate emissaries to London and Paris, respectively, and took them to the United States mainland as prisoners.<sup>42</sup> This violation of neutrality by the United States provoked outrage in British North America as well as in Britain, and sparked demands for an apology as well as the return of Mason and Sidell. They were returned on 26 December without apology, and the crisis was over.<sup>43</sup>

Resolution of the crisis on Boxing Day did not remove the threat of nor stop the preparations for war. Somerset wrote to Milne 15 December 1861:

*In the event of war...the first object would probably be to open the blockade of the Southern ports.*<sup>44</sup>

After annihilating the Union's blockading ships, he was to impose a blockade on the North, destroy Union shipping on the high seas and harass the coastal cities of the United States, especially Washington.<sup>45</sup>

The North American and West Indian Station had been reinforced from the Home and Mediterranean Stations, but Milne still did not have

sufficient ships to execute his war plans. He believed fifty-four ships were necessary to enforce a blockade of the North with sixteen colliers to provide coal and enable them to remain on station without returning to Halifax or Bermuda. Twenty-five ships were required to protect the trade of the British West Indies from privateers. A squadron of ironclads was needed to attack the commercial ports of the United States. On 1 January 1862, the strength of the station was forty-two ships totaling 70,456 tons, with 1,391 guns and 14,551 men. The Union Navy could muster 264 ships totaling 218,016 tons, with 2,557 guns and manned by 22,000 men. Milne did have the advantage of being able to draw on the resources of the entire Royal Navy, which numbered 339 ships, 324,063 tons, 5,304 guns and 61,342 men.<sup>46</sup>

Milne was preparing to leave Halifax for Vera Cruz to command the British contingent of the Mexican expedition on 16 November 1861 when Lord Lyons, the British minister in Washington, who himself had only learned about it the day before, informed Milne of the *Trent* affair. Milne decided to proceed to Bermuda to await expected mail from the Admiralty, which arrived four days later. Milne was instructed to remain at Bermuda to await further orders because of the *Trent* affair. That same day, he ordered Commodore Dunlop to take command of the Mexican expedition.<sup>47</sup>

The British contingent of the allied expedition to Mexico was the smallest. It consisted of two ships-of-the-line, four frigates, four smaller vessels, and 700 marines.<sup>48</sup> Milne was short of available ships in the latter part of December 1861, with as few as five at Bermuda. Dunlop had only ten ships in his squadron at Havana. Accordingly, although Milne had originally planned for thirteen ships to take part in the expedition, he reduced it to ten because of the *Trent* affair. In the event of war, Dunlop was to curtail his efforts in Mexico in order to attack and destroy Union blockaders in the Gulf of Mexico.<sup>49</sup>

Dunlop arrived at Vera Cruz from Havana on 6 January 1862. The Spanish fleet landed three weeks earlier with a force of 6,500. The French Admiral Jurien de la Gravière arrived with his

squadron three days after Dunlop. The following day, 10 January 1862, the allies issued a joint proclamation announcing their intent to settle their claims and protect their subjects, but not to interfere with the government of Mexico.<sup>50</sup> The representatives of the European powers: Wyke and Dunlop of Britain, Saligny and Jurien of France, and the Spanish General Prim met again on 13 January 1862. At this meeting, the British drew up a list of demands on Mexico:

*The Mexican Government should agree to abide by the terms of existing treaties, should repay with interest the sums stolen from the British Legation and from the silver conducta in 1860, should appoint British nominated Customs-collectors at the ports, and should at once pay all such claims by British subjects as had been recognized as valid.*<sup>51</sup>

It was never intended that the battalion of Royal Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S. Netterville Lowder, should march into the interior of Mexico.<sup>52</sup>

Dunlop wrote to the Admiralty from his flagship *Challenger* at Vera Cruz on 15 January. He informed the Admiralty that upon his arrival, he had found the town occupied by approximately 6,000 Spanish troops and reported the arrival of Prim in company with the French squadron under Jurien.<sup>53</sup> Dunlop also asked for additional forces to enable him to march inland with the French and Spanish.<sup>54</sup> The Mexican government offered to pay all requested indemnities, and to give security for their payment at Soledad 19 February 1862. Britain and Spain were satisfied with Mexico's offer and signed the agreement, but France refused on the grounds that the indemnities were inadequate. This served as a pretext for further action.<sup>55</sup> France, of course, had designs more grandiose than mere repayment of debts. It appeared for a while that Dunlop also became bedazzled by imperial visions.

Unlike Jurien and Prim, Dunlop was expressly forbidden to advance into the interior of Mexico,<sup>56</sup> and contrary to the orders of his superiors, he prepared the marine battalion for the field.

After augmenting the battalion with marines from the normal ships' complements, he divided it into a brigade of two battalions totaling 860 men. He acquired transport and rations from Havana. By 2 March 1862, Dunlop was able to tell Milne that the marines "are now ready and able, if required, to march from one end of Mexico to the other."<sup>57</sup>

Russell was aghast when he learned of Dunlop's intention to advance with the allied land forces. The last thing he wanted was a British military involvement in Mexico.<sup>58</sup> The Foreign Office wrote to the Admiralty on 10 March:

*Commodore Dunlop must not suppose that Her Majesty's Government have undertaken to inaugurate a new era or to attempt the regeneration of Mexico. The object of Her Majesty's Government is definite, and is limited to the protection of British persons and British property.*<sup>59</sup>

The following day, the Admiralty instructed Milne to counsel Dunlop accordingly. Milne was also ordered to reembark the marines as soon as possible for Bermuda, to maintain a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico for the protection of British persons and property, and to go to Vera Cruz himself or to send Admiral Dacres to see that these orders were properly carried out.<sup>60</sup> The marines were reembarked for Bermuda on 13 March, 1862 with the exception of 113 retained for garrison duty at Vera Cruz.<sup>61</sup>

At the close of the allied conference at Orizaba 9 April 1862, the British and Spanish Commissioners announced their intention to withdraw from the intervention because of their inability to agree on how to proceed. This was principally caused by the French insistence on advancing on Mexico City, contrary to the London Convention.<sup>62</sup> Dunlop wrote to the Admiralty:

*The British and Spanish Commissioners have considered it their duty to withdraw from the intervention in Mexican affairs, and as soon as possible to embark their troops, and to leave the country.*<sup>63</sup>

The last two marine companies departed on 17

April from Vera Cruz for Bermuda in *Challenger* on 17 April 1862.<sup>64</sup> The flags of Britain and Spain were hauled down at Vera Cruz at sunset a week later.<sup>65</sup>

Dunlop rejoiced in his letter to the Admiralty:

*We have this day concluded and signed a Convention that I trust will in all respects meet the approval of Her Majesty's Government.*<sup>66</sup>

Wyke had signed at Puebla a treaty with Mexico which secured everything Britain desired. The settlement was guaranteed by a \$11,000,000 loan from the United States. Dunlop's rejoicing was premature. Incredibly, Russell rejected it in the face of French objection!<sup>67</sup> Dunlop must have been forgiven for his temporary imperial delusions because, when Wyke became ill and had to be transported to Bermuda, Russell wrote to the Admiralty that Dunlop "will remain sole Commissioner for Great Britain."<sup>68</sup> Russell wrote again to the Admiralty on May 17, asserting that Milne must be informed of the suspension of the execution of the London Convention and, in the absence of further instructions, it would remain suspended. However, Milne should hold himself in readiness to carry out any further orders which could be sent to him concerning Mexico.<sup>69</sup> This was rather an ambiguous end to a rather dubious participation in a risky enterprise at an inconvenient time, the gains of which were relinquished once achieved.

Why, then, did Britain become involved? What effect did the Royal Navy's Mexican interlude have on Britain's relations with and preparations for war against the United States at this crucial time during the American Civil War? A British journalist in Mexico commented, "fortunately we have blundered out as we have blundered into the imbroglio."<sup>70</sup> This assertion was as unfair as the accusation of imperial intentions was inaccurate. Britain neither blundered in nor out, although an inopportune diplomatic crisis on the high seas and the ulterior motives of her allies on land may have given that appearance.

The *Trent* affair did not occur until eight days after the London Convention had been signed.

Britain was committed and could not very well desert her allies. Milne was ordered to relinquish command of the expedition and to prepare for war with the United States. Milne ordered Dunlop to take command of the Mexican adventure, reduced the number of ships allocated to Dunlop, instructed Dunlop what to do in the event of war with the United States, and to prepare for war himself. British North America, as well as the North American and West Indian Squadrons, were reinforced. If there was a deficiency, it concerned the shortage of troop transports. Between 12 December 1861 and 4 January 1862, extensive reinforcements were dispatched to British North America in a motley assortment of available ships. *Himalayan*, the only Admiralty troop transport, was detached to the Mexican expedition.<sup>71</sup>

Britain gained goodwill in the United States by inviting the Union to participate in the intervention, by appearing to act only to ensure their legal rights, and by withdrawing when it became apparent that France had other designs. Put succinctly: "The British won all around."<sup>72</sup> France was not as fortunate. Maximilian, the tool of his brother, the Emperor of Austria, and Napoleon III, the Emperor of the French, flouted the Monroe Doctrine and accepted the crown of Mexico 10 April 1864, after French troops had occupied Mexico City.<sup>73</sup> In 1867, the United States invoked the Monroe Doctrine and France was forced out of Mexico, when it positioned an army, commanded by General Philip H. Sheridan, on the Mexican border.<sup>74</sup> Maximilian remained in Mexico, was defeated by Juárez, court-martialed, and shot at Querétaro on 19 April 1867.<sup>75</sup> "King-making and debt-collecting had proved to be quite incompatible aims."<sup>76</sup>



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47. Ibid., 40 and 68-69.
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The ten ships allocated to Dunlop were:  
*Challenger*, *St. George*, *Mersey*, *Sans Pareil*,  
*Phaeton*, *Jason*, *Barracouta*, *Plover*, *Desperate*,  
and *Ariadne*.
50. Ibid., 56, 70 and 73.
51. Dawson, *The Mexican Adventure*, 160-161.
52. Courtemanche, *No Need of Glory*, 71.
53. *State Papers: Mexico*, 299.
54. Courtemanche, *No Need of Glory*, 72.
55. Hoskins, "French Views," 680. Although Hoskins  
did not specify, presumably it was Soledad de  
Doblado in the state of Vera Cruz.
56. Corti, *Maximilian*, 1:129.
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60. Ibid., 312-313.
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62. Hanna, *Napoleon III and Mexico*, 43; Dawson,  
*The Mexican Adventure*, 244; Crook, *Diplomacy*,  
156.
63. *State Papers: Mexico*, 397.
64. Courtemanche, *No Need of Glory*, 80.
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66. Ibid., 429.
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Power in North America 1815-1908* (Berkeley  
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## Anglo-American Naval Logistic Cooperation in World War I

WILLIAM N. STILL, JR.

On 14 April 1917, a few days after the United States declared war on Germany, a squadron of six destroyers departed Boston for the war zone, the first units of the U.S. Navy to be deployed in European waters during World War One. Even as these small vessels were plowing through the North Atlantic, Rear Admiral William S. Sims, who within a few weeks would be designated commander of U.S. naval forces in European waters, was warning the Navy Department that logistical support for these vessels and others that would follow was a priority: "I cannot exaggerate the importance of our forces being followed immediately by adequate repair and supply facilities, particularly for all special repairs and needs peculiar to our ships."<sup>1</sup> The British Admiralty and later the Allied Naval Council made it absolutely clear to Sims and other representatives of the U.S. Navy that the American naval forces operating in British waters would have to be as self-sufficient as possible.

Nonetheless, self sufficiency was an ideal rather than a realistic objective, a situation understood by naval officials in both countries. Although the U.S. initially deployed only six destroyers to European waters, by the end of the war there were nearly 400 vessels, including battle-ships, cruisers, destroyers, subchasers, submarines, gunboats, minelayers, minesweepers, converted yachts, auxiliary vessels, and Coast Guard cutters. There were also bases, air stations, hospitals, supply depots, and the London headquarters, altogether manned by more than 50,000 men. Approximately half of the ships operated out of British home and colonial bases.

Fortunately, when the United States entered the war, the Navy's initial logistical requirements,

including the support of overseas operations, could be met. The Navy already had a substantive force of tenders and repair ships, refrigerator and store ships, colliers and tenders, and other auxiliary vessels. Others were under construction. In 1916, the Chief of Naval Operations created a "logistical committee" to examine the needs of the Navy "in case of war." As a result of its recommendations, the Navy began to stockpile fuel, repair parts, clothing, and other supplies. Congress was also asked to significantly increase the auxiliary force. The result was that the Navy had considerable success in supporting its forces deployed in European waters throughout the war.<sup>2</sup>

The first American base was established at Queenstown (Cobh) Ireland, because of its proximity to convoy routes from North American ports to the British Isles. The Queenstown base consisted of a small dockyard and repair facility supporting Royal Navy anti-submarine craft. There was also an advance base in Bantry Bay on the southwest tip of Ireland, all under the command of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly R.N. Within a few months, thirty-five U.S. destroyers were operating out of Queenstown and the advance base. With the arrival of the additional American ships, the British vessels were deployed elsewhere. To handle minor repairs and act as depot ships, the Navy Department ordered the tenders *Melville* and *Dixie* to Queenstown. Gradually, the U.S. navy expanded the shore facilities there. A large repair shop for torpedoes was established on Haulbowline Island, buildings and wharves were taken over in the nearby city of Cork for a huge supply center, a hospital was created on the grounds of a nearby estate, two naval air stations were constructed in the vicinity,



USS *Melville* (AD-2) with three destroyers alongside at Queenstown, Ireland, in 1918, during the British First Sea Lord's visit to the American forces. U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph.

and, finally, two large granaries were requisitioned and converted into barracks for a training facility.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to Queenstown, bases for U.S. surface vessels were established at Plymouth, Cardiff, Invergordon, and Inverness, in the British Isles as well as Gibraltar and Malta in her colonies. At some of the sites, such as Queenstown, the U.S. Navy took over from the British bases that were already established. At other localities, naval bases were created by acquiring new property from private owners through requisition by the Admiralty at the request of the American force commander, Admiral William S. Sims. This is the procedure that was followed at Plymouth.

Admiral Sims' staff originally recommended Plymouth as the site for a supply depot, principally for food, but in May 1918, it was decided to establish a base for submarine chasers, the small

110' anti-submarine craft that were beginning to arrive in the war zone. The United States wanted to base some seventy of these vessels at Plymouth to conduct anti-submarine operations in the English Channel. At the request of Admiral Sims, the Admiralty requisitioned a privately-owned waterside complex known as the Victoria Wharf Co., including a large deep water basin, wharves, railroad tracks, storehouses, office building, and vacant land. Adjacent to the complex a number of private residences, public buildings, and a small hotel were also taken over.<sup>4</sup>

Cardiff, Wales, was the site of a small but vital base. This base was responsible for shipping coal to France for the American Expenditures Forces. Altogether, the Navy anticipated operating some seventy colliers out of Cardiff, and nearby small ports to carry coal for the Army. As at Plymouth, the base was established by requisi-

tioning private property. Small private shipyards and coaling facilities were taken over along with other private buildings, but efforts to acquire a women's teaching institute to convert into a hospital met with considerable resistance from local officials. At the time of the Armistice, negotiations were still in progress to acquire the institute or another suitable property.<sup>5</sup>

The two most remarkable bases established by the U.S. Navy in Great Britain during the war were in Northern Scotland, near the picturesque and historical towns of Inverness and Invergordon. In October 1917, after months of deliberation, the Admiralty agreed to laying an immense minefield across the North Sea. These two Scottish towns were selected because of their close proximity to the proposed minefield, and the availability of transportation facilities, suitable buildings and other structures. Invergordon was already the site of a major naval base, but outside the town was a large whiskey distillery which was considered ideal for a mine assembly plant. The distillery was requisitioned and, after extensive renovations and expansion, became an American naval base. A second distillery was requisitioned near Inverness. "The only disadvantage attached to these Distilleries," reported an Admiralty committee investigating the sites, "is the large amount of bonded whiskey in casks...which must be removed. It is not thought advisable to leave this whiskey...with so many men on the premises."<sup>6</sup>

On 8 October 1917, American and British naval officials agreed to the establishment of four seaplane and one kite balloon stations in Ireland. The south coast of Ireland was selected because U.S. naval units in British waters were concentrated in that area at that time, and perhaps more importantly, the British had no aviation units there. The stations would have to be built. The Admiralty agreed to construct shipways, wharves, foundations, and public works, but buildings, hangers, and most of the equipment and material were shipped in from the United States. Despite considerable difficulty, including strikes by British workman, delays in the arrival of construction materials and equipment, and transportation problems, the stations were completed. However, it was September 1918 before they were operational, and by that date there was little need for aircraft to patrol the convoy routes out

from Ireland.<sup>7</sup>

Despite recommendations from U.S. naval aviators, there was little interest in the British Admiralty establishing American naval air stations in England and Scotland. However, at the end of 1917, the Admiralty did agree to the idea of establishing an American air station to bomb the German naval base at Heligoland. The Killingholme Royal Air Force station was then turned over to the American Navy for this purpose, although it was not until late July 1918 that an American took command of the station.

Eastleigh, approximately five miles north of Plymouth, was the only other U.S. naval air station established in England during the war. It was an assembly and repair base for the navy's bombing squadrons in France. It was ideal for this purpose, as the British had used it as a reception and storage park for aircraft before they were sent to France. The base had a large number of hangers and storehouses, but few accommodations for personnel. The navy planned to man the station with approximately 5,000 personnel, a far cry from the British complement of approximately one hundred. Although a large number of buildings were constructed, primarily by American enlisted personnel with materials sent from the U.S., the base did not become operational until a few weeks before the Armistice.<sup>8</sup>

**I**n early June 1917, the Bureau of Surgery and Medicine recommended establishing naval hospitals in Great Britain and France, to be located in or near the two major designated bases, Queenstown and Brest (France). Neither the British Admiralty nor Admiral Sims initially favored locating a hospital at Queenstown or elsewhere in the British Isles; they considered medical services there to be satisfactory. Their attitude, however, changed towards the end of the year, primarily because of the decision to establish mine laying bases in Scotland and the deployment of an American battleship squadron with the Grand Fleet. Medical services were not considered adequate in Scotland, particularly for potentially dangerous work such as mine laying, nor were they adequate to handle heavy casualties if a major engagement occurred between the Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet. The

Bureau agreed to send self-contained hospital units to Scotland (self-contained included all the equipment and personnel needed to function), provided that suitable sites could be acquired. Two were recommended, one at Edinburgh close to the Grand Fleet's base at Rosyth, and the other at Strathpeffer, approximately half way between the two mine-laying bases at Invergordon and Inverness. Strathpeffer was the site of a health resort with "hydro-therapeutic" facilities, as well as two large hotels to accommodate guests and patients. Despite considerable local opposition to establishing a hospital in the resort town and depriving it of its income, the Admiralty requisitioned the facility and turned it over to the United States Navy.

The Admiralty persuaded the British Army to turn over to the U.S. Navy a hospital at Leith near Edinburgh and close to the Firth of Forth. In order to obtain the British Army's permission, the United States agreed to provide up to 250 beds for soldiers in both of the naval hospitals in Scotland. For additional quarters and facilities, the Admiralty requisitioned a local hotel for nurses' quarters, and several residential houses. The Navy planned a thousand bed hospital, but it was still being renovated when the Armistice was signed.

In February 1918, the Admiralty agreed to the establishment of a 200-bed hospital near Queens-town. An old estate known as "White Point" was taken over, which included a large house, several smaller buildings, and eleven acres of land. The work of preparing the grounds, laying water, sewage and electricity lines, drainage, plumbing and road work was at first contracted by local labor, but the tardiness in completing the work resulted in U.S. personnel taking over much of it.

In addition to these large naval hospitals, smaller ones were established in London, Plymouth, and Cardiff. Also, the air stations had dispensaries.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, the Navy established a receiving station in Liverpool, and supply depots at Aberdeen, Scotland, for naval support in Scotland, Queens-town, Plymouth, and Dublin (aviation). In all of these, the Admiralty requisitioned the necessary buildings.

Two bases were established at Malta and Gibraltar. The Malta base had just been designated when the Armistice was signed. The U.S.

naval base in Gibraltar, however, would become one of the most important established in European waters during the war.

Gibraltar was a strategic point for Mediterranean convoys and for convoys to and from British and French Atlantic ports. At the Admiralty's request, U.S. naval vessels were deployed to Gibraltar early in August 1917. By the end of the war, more than forty American warships were operating out of Gibraltar escorting convoys. For most of the war, Rear Admiral Albert P. Niblack was in command of this force. Despite extensive occupancy and use by British forces, the U.S. Navy was allotted adequate structures for its shore facilities; Niblack and his staff were assigned offices in the Royal Naval headquarters at the Dockyard; an unused seaplane hanger was converted into repair shops, storerooms, dispensary, and dentist's office. Later, other buildings were requisitioned for storehouses, a magazine turned over to the Navy for ammunition and depth charges, and a British army barrack assigned to enlisted personnel.<sup>10</sup>

British help was crucial, not only in the establishment of U.S. naval facilities, but also in making them operational. This required extensive modifications, even to existing military installations, to meet American demands. For example, at Queenstown, Ireland, the site of the first American naval base in the British Isles, the Royal Navy had a small dockyard and fueling depot. There were no quarters for U.S. shore-based personnel, storage facilities, or hospital. Warehouses were leased, barracks built, and a medical center established before the war ended. The same was true at Plymouth and the air station at Eastleigh.<sup>11</sup> Whenever possible, building materials such as lumber, concrete, galvanized metal, and pipe were purchased locally, but usually the materials had to be shipped from the U.S., creating delays in completion. A majority of new buildings erected on these facilities were pre-fabricated in the U.S. and shipped to the sites for assembly.

U.S. logistical activities, including construction work on these facilities, were seriously affected by both the scarcity of skilled workers and labor unrest. Although Professor Jon Sumida has pointed out that the British armament indus-

tries (including naval) protected by the government actually saw an increase in the labor force in 1917-1918, U.S. naval officials frequently complained that the scarcity of skilled labor resulted in delays. Labor unrest, especially strikes, also contributed to delays. Strikes became so severe in Ireland that U.S. officers in charge of construction at various sites, including the Queenstown hospital and the air stations, were ordered to discharge local labor and replace them with American personnel.<sup>12</sup>

To alleviate the labor crisis in Britain, the American government suggested the importation of U.S. labor. This, however, was firmly opposed by the British. Sims wrote the Navy Department indicating that such a move would affect industrial production in the United States, take up space on vessels badly needed to carry troops and

supplies, and, most important, cause labor unrest in Great Britain because of the different wage scales.<sup>13</sup>

The labor problem was particularly acute in ship repair yards. British dockyards and private ship repair establishments were overworked, and strikes and other labor problems were a frequent problem. Admiral Sims wrote the Navy Department that the "English laboring man not only strikes at pleasure, but takes all of the usual holidays, and is not infrequently incapacitated for work on the day following the holiday."<sup>14</sup> Repairs were a major concern to both American and British naval officials. The U.S. Navy deployed eleven destroyer and submarine tenders and repair ships to the War Zone, including the two to Queenstown. In addition, small portable repair shops were established at nearly all the shore



USS *Maumee* (AO-2) refueling USS *McCall* (DD-28) during Atlantic convoy operations, circa mid-1917. Note red "Baker" refueling flag flying from the DD. Collection of Hubert C. Rickert, Courtesy of Daniel Rickert, 1981. U.S. Naval Historical Center photograph.

installations. However, for extensive repairs and major overhauls, the U.S. had to depend upon British facilities or send the ships back to the States. The Admiralty was so concerned over this problem that it assigned the entire Cammell Laird shipyard to the repair of U.S. destroyers. Royal dockyards and private repair establishments scheduled American ships along with British naval and merchant ships throughout 1917-1918. For example, the American battleships operating with the Grand Fleet were rotated to yards at Newcastle along with their British counterparts. The increasing demand caused by the steady expansion of U.S. naval presence in British waters resulted in Admiralty officials searching for some relief from the United States. The Admiralty suggested exchanging merchants ships for repairs to U.S. warships, but this form of compensation was opposed by the Navy Department. The repair problem would persist until the end of the war.


Fuel was another problem, especially oil. Coal, however, was not a serious problem. British coal resources for naval use were adequate to take care of American coal burners as well as their own. British coal fueled the U.S. battleships with the Grand Fleet, the minelayers based in Scotland, the auxiliary vessels that serviced the U.S. forces, and transports engaged in carrying troops and supplies to Great Britain. An article in the *Pall Mall Gazette* claimed that the U.S. naval force consumed some 2,000,000 tons of coal during the war.<sup>15</sup> The oil situation, however, was quite different.

At the time the United States entered the war, the Allies' oil supply was considered critical. In July 1917, British Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur Balfour cabled the British Commissioner in the United States that unless 300,000 tons of fuel oil could reach Britain, immobilization of the Grand Fleet was threatened. This condition was caused by the dramatic rise in the consumption of oil by the Royal Navy during the war, and also by the loss in tankers to German U-boats, averaging one a day during the early months of 1917. The American oil burning destroyers that began arriving in the summer of 1917 were a godsend in one respect, but their presence threatened to further erode oil reserves. Nonetheless, the Admiralty agreed to provide fuel for these vessels with the understanding that the oil would be replaced.

The bulk of the world's oil supply at that time was in the western hemisphere, with the United States as the leading source for Great Britain.

The problem was transportation, which was tankers. The British government strenuously sought additional tankers from the United States, but this conflicted with the growing needs of the U.S., especially the Navy, with its expanding commitment in European waters. The Navy Department agreed to use its tankers to replenish the Royal Navy's oil reserve. The Admiralty was assured that the department would requisition as many tankers as were needed to do this. In May 1918, the Admiralty informed Admiral Sims that the fleet oil reserves were still far too low, but because of the increasing delivery by U.S. Navy oilers, imports were greater than consumption by American naval forces in British waters.<sup>16</sup> The tanker controversy was not resolved during the war and, towards the end, contributed to the ill-feeling that retarded wartime cooperation. Despite this, American oil burning ships encountered little difficulty in obtaining fuel.<sup>17</sup> The British also supplied most of the gasoline used by U.S. Naval sources in European waters.

General stores, including food, were not a problem. Food was rationed in Great Britain, but not for the military. The Admiralty agreed to provide the American Navy with stores that could not be obtained from the U.S. The Director of Victualing, equivalent to the Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, informed the various Royal naval commands that American warships, "from a victualing point of view...[were to be treated] in exactly the same way as H.M. ships..."<sup>18</sup> American supply officers were permitted to purchase fresh provisions on the open market, including beef and mutton. Availability, however, varied. In Ireland, vegetables, eggs, and dairy projects were generally obtainable, but not in England and Scotland. Meat was difficult to obtain everywhere. The U.S. Navy, which first used a refrigerator ship in the Spanish-American War, was able to provide adequate meat supplies by refrigerator ships. From the U.S., dry stores that were in short supply in Great Britain, such as flour, sugar, and cereals, were also brought in by supply ships.



Admiral Earl Beatty, R.N., Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, U.S. Navy, King George of England, Vice Admiral William S. Sims, U.S. Navy, and the Prince of Wales on Board USS *New York* (BB-34), 1918. U.S. Naval Historical Center photograph.

In the final assessment, considering the lack of experience in large scale overseas logistical requirements before the war and the magnitude of the support required, the U.S. Navy did a commendable job in maintaining its naval forces in European waters during World War One. There was no noticeable shortage of general stores and dry goods. American warships never were able to not sail because of a lack of fuel. Food was, at times, in short supply, particularly on the escorting vessels, but overall was adequate. The major complaints concerning food came from personnel attached to the U.S. battleships serving with the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow who were put on Royal Navy rations. Spare parts proved to be the most serious problem. Ships deployed to European waters carried as many spare parts, such as propellers, as they could. Nevertheless, break-

downs occurred and, at times, needed parts were not available. This was equally true for aircraft.

Without Allied, particularly British support, American warships and air squadrons could not have carried out their responsibilities in European waters during World War One. These missions included the convoying of troops and supplies to Europe, anti-submarine operations by air and surface units, and even by submarines, the North Sea mine barrage, the battleships deployed with the British Grand Fleet, medical facilities, ground and air support for the American Expeditionary Force, and later activities in Russian waters. A basic factor determined U.S. logistical policy in European waters. Administratively, the American naval forces were under U.S. control; operationally, however, U.S. warships and naval air squadrons were assimilated into Allied naval units.

This was especially true in cooperating with the British Navy, where U.S. naval units frequently came under British command. For practical reasons, U.S. naval forces operating with Allied units generally received logistical support from the same source as their British counterparts.<sup>19</sup>

Clearly, the support given the U.S. Navy in European waters severely strained the Royal Navy's own logistical needs. Great Britain's strained labor situation was additionally burdened by U.S. naval requirements, especially in base construction work and ship repairs at both Royal dockyards and private shipyards, despite an eighteen percent growth in the Admiralty-employed labor force between July 1917 and July 1918.<sup>20</sup> Even before the United States entered the war, refit and repair of naval vessels and commercial transport were an enormous drain on British shipbuilding resources. New construction had to be curtailed. The heavy losses in merchant ships due to German U-boats, plus the build-up of U.S. naval activities in Great Britain, overtaxed an already unsatisfactory situation. British efforts to persuade the American government to compensate in the form of merchant tonnage failed.<sup>21</sup> Fuel, especially oil requirements, generated the most concern by the Admiralty and the most controversy between the two governments over logistical support. No statistical information has been located to indicate U.S. naval fuel oil requirements that had to be taken from Royal naval stocks, but clearly it was a factor in British entreaties for additional tankers.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, Prime Minister Lloyd George's government considered their sacrifices to support American naval activities acceptable, and in fact necessary, as the United States assumed an increasing responsibility in the war at sea. Both the British and the Americans believed that the war would continue for the foreseeable future. The large scale expansion of bases, air stations, hospitals, and other facilities was based on that assumption. The

United States and the British were still planning and carrying out this program when the Armistice was announced in November 1918. Obviously, much of this expansion would not have been needed if it had been determined that the war would end when it did.

Although the U.S. Navy's objective was to be as self-sufficient as possible in the war zone, it was neither possible nor practical. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels stated in his 1918 annual report that "Every effort has been made to utilize existing facilities whenever possible rather than to duplicate the machinery of supply." Finally, in a memo prepared after the war was over, a member of Admiral Sims' staff wrote, "Throughout the war we have been practically entirely dependent upon England for all repairs, supplies and assistance not obtainable from home .... England[']s...resources...[were] available to assist in administering our scattered forces.... Our forces in the Baltic, Adriatic, Salonika, Murmansk Coast, Gibraltar, etc. [were]...all fueled by arrangement with the Admiralty. Similar remarks apply to important [repairs]...docking, transportation of supplies, issues of naval supplies, lubricating oil, obtaining tugs, barges, floating equipment, etc."<sup>23</sup> British cooperation and support were vital.



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16. Murray to Sims, 19 May 1918, Reel 4, ME-11, Naval Records of World War One, The Navy Department Library, Washington Navy Yard, Washington DC. This is a large collection of official records taken from Navy Department files and microfilmed for the purpose of publishing a documentary series similar to those for the Barbary War, Undeclared War with France and the Civil War. See also Admiralty to DeChair, 25 May 1917, in *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917-1919*, Michael Simpson ed. (Aldershot, England: Naval Records Society, 1991) 67-68;

- Sumida, "British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914-1918," 470.
17. Sumida, "British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914-1918," 468-472.
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  19. The U.S. Navy established bases, air stations, hospitals, etc. in France, the Azores and on Corfu. In France, the policy concerning the logistical support was generally the same as that with Great Britain. However, the problems concerning materials, labor and repair facilities were worse. On Corfu, despite the presence of British, Italians and French, the U.S. Navy generally provided its own logistical support. The exception was oil and gasoline which was supplied, as in the British Isles, by British sources. In the Azores, the U.S. provided its own logistical support. Considerable information concerning this topic can be found in P file, Subject File 1911-1927, RG45, NARS.
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


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# God, Leadership, Flemings, and Archery: Contemporary Perceptions of Victory and Defeat at the Battle of Sluys, 1340

KELLY DEVRIES

Most historians of the Hundred Years War see the battle of Sluys, fought on June 24, 1340, as the first major onslaught of this late medieval conflict between France and England. A victory for the English, this naval battle allowed Edward III to land on the continent, to gather his Low Countries' allies to him, and to besiege the town of Tournai, the nearest major French-controlled enclave. For the French, the battle of Sluys was also significant. Although militarily it was only a minor setback, the English siege of Tournai failing as it would, the French fleet had been destroyed and it would take a number of years before France could once again challenge the English for control of the Channel. What caused this English victory and French defeat? After a brief look at modern historical explanations of the causes for victory and defeat, this article will examine contemporary perceptions of what led to Sluys' result. It will show that for English, French, and Low Countries' authors, there are different reasons given for victory and defeat at Sluys. Finally, it will show how Jean Froissart, in three different redactions of his *Chroniques*, used all three "nationalistic" perceptions.

## MODERN HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS

The battle of Sluys has excited the pens of many modern historians. Indeed, much more has been written about the battle in our own century than was ever written about it in the fourteenth century. Modern historians seem to have analyzed every aspect of the battle. Great historical discoveries have been made, and nearly,

it is fair to say, as many unsubstantiated leaps of historical faith have been taken. However, one thing cannot be agreed on. What was the cause of victory and defeat at the battle of Sluys? They either blame the French for the defeat, credit the English for the victory, or see the intervention of the Flemings on the side of the English as the reason for victory.

In blaming the French for the loss, we may hearken to the words of French naval historian Johannes Tramond, who blames the successors of Philip IV for allowing the navy to fall into ruin thus awarding Edward an easy victory at Sluys. Other modern historians who also blame the French for this defeat cite the poor quality of the French sailors as the cause of their loss at Sluys. For, although they fought bravely, they were no match for the more experienced and more "noble" English sailors. Claude Farrère, for example, insists that the reason behind the disparate fighting ability of the English lies in the fact that poor, instead of good, French sailors had been pressed into duty. And Ferdinand Lot sees this as a problem due to the refusal of the French gentry to man the ships in this battle.

However, most historians who recognize the French as the cause of defeat rather than the English as the cause of victory conclude that the incompetence of the French commanders was the ultimate reason for the defeat at Sluys. While Desmond Seward dismisses the French admirals, Hugh Quiéret and Jean Béhuchet, merely as "no seaman,"<sup>1</sup> and Jean Favier writes that "the weakness of the French navy, excellent in all other regards, was its command,"<sup>2</sup> other modern historians note the incompetence of these French leaders

by recording the inept tactics which the French navy displayed that day. Michael Packe sees the French ships "too densely packed together,"<sup>3</sup> with Robin Neillands adding that this tight formation "therefore sacrificed their advantages of superior seamanship and manoeuvre."<sup>4</sup> David Hannay claims that "as the French were drawn up along the bank of an estuary, and the English fleet was coming in from the sea, there was nothing to force King Edward to make a front attack,"<sup>5</sup> and William Ledyard Rodgers agrees, noting that Sluys was "a poor place for a hostile fleet to lie in wait, as the shores were unfriendly and it was difficult to get supplies. Consequently, the French fleet was obliged to anchor somewhat off shore, although within the entrance to the bay."<sup>6</sup> Jonathan Sumption alters this thesis slightly to include the drifting of ships, chained together, into the shore, thus "reducing the searoom further;" when the French admirals responded to this crisis by casting off the chains between the ships, it was too late to regroup and defend their position. Finally, Charles de la Roncière, recalling Vegetius 1. IV. 46, adds:

*The opinion of what was responsible for our misfortune must be left with the navy. It remained in place, sails stored, in contempt of the military manual of their time, which prescribed to them to guard the sea and to push the enemy towards the coast.*

Yet, even the French admirals at Sluys have their own modern defender in Admiral G. A. J. P. Auphan who, indicting instead the poor ship-building technology of the day, writes:

*...the admirals of then were no worse than those of today. When one commands two hundred vessels and thirty thousand men in such decisive circumstances, one cannot choose his tactic lightly. The ardor with which the French fought, all the way to the death for twenty thousand of them, demonstrates that this tactic was understood, approved and followed. In reality...the ships then were not capable of confronting the open sea.*

In crediting the English with the cause of victory at Sluys, most often modern historians point to the competence of the English king and his naval tactics. Three historians, C. D. Yonge, Scott L. Waugh, and Timothy J. Runyan, primarily credit the character of Edward for the victory. Yonge cites Edward's courage in the battle as the stimulus under which his sailors fought so well. Waugh notes that the English king, "when his navy came into sight of the huge French fleet," appealed "shrewdly" to the base attitude of soldiers to look on war as an enterprise, boosting morale by promising them "not only God's blessing but whatever they were able to lay their hands on as well."<sup>7</sup> Runyan sees Edward's competence shown in the gathering of a fleet capable of even competing, let alone defeating, a large French navy.

As for the tactics Edward used at Sluys, modern historians have arrived at several different interpretations in crediting the English with the victory. Michael Packe credits the English with a feigned retreat which caused the French, in an effort to follow them, to break ranks and confusedly "to foul each other in the harbour mouth," thereby allowing Edward to "come back on their half-beam with the wind and tide behind them."<sup>8</sup> This same effort, according to Hans van Werveke, was not a feigned retreat but merely Edward "wisely" attempting to gain the wind and sun behind him before attacking the French. Above all, C. F. Richmond avers, the English fleet caught the French at rest, and they were able to defeat them before they could get underway.

The most often recognized tactical cause for the English victory, however, is the English inclusion of archers on board their ships leading to the long bow's first great victory in the Hundred Years War. As Robin Neillands writes:

*Edward sent his ships against the enemy line in units of three, two ships crammed with archers and one full of men-at-arms. This gave the English immediate local superiority and the French ships began to fall into their hands with ever-increasing rapidity. The two ships with archers would come alongside, and from the towering castles hose the enemy decks with arrows until the decimated crews*

*could be overwhelmed by a boarding party of men-at-arms, which swarmed on board from the third vessel.*

Alfred H. Burne is even more colorful in his description of the role of archery in the victory:

*The long-bowmen had "sitting targets," each arrow found its billet in the massed ranks on the French decks, and the lusty and expert men-at-arms carried on the slaughter, pushing back their opponents step by step across the decks and into the sea. It must have been an extraordinary sight.*

Some French historians accept this as the cause of the French defeat in the battle. Johannes Tramond, for example, attributes the loss to the English archers noting that "our sailors succumbed to the number and the superiority of the enemy archers."<sup>9</sup>

Finally, there are some modern historians, among them Henri Pirenne and Charles de la Roncière, who follow a third route in commenting on the cause of victory and defeat at Sluys; they neither blame the French for the loss, nor do they give credit to the English for the victory. They recognize a third party, the Flemings, who assisted the English in the latter stages of the battle. Prior to the battle, Edward had put to shore the Bishop of Lincoln and Sir Reginald de Cobham as emissar to the Flemish towns to arouse support. The Flemings had responded by gathering in large numbers at Sluys. There they filled whatever sea-worthy craft they could find and sailed against the rear of the French fleet. Some also remained on shore to cut off any retreat which the French tried to make on land. To them, this was the true source for Edward's victory.

In looking at contemporary or near contemporary perceptions of victory and defeat at the battle of Sluys, it becomes necessary to split the sources into three separate groups. Certainly the English and the French sources are included in two of these categories, but, unlike other battles when only the sources concerned with the victors and the sources concerned with the defeated need to be analyzed, a third group of historical sources must be looked at when studying the battle of Sluys: those written by authors living in lands

which were allied with the English forces. This group, as we shall see, often differed in its analysis of the battle and the reasons for victory.

#### CONTEMPORARY "FOREIGN" PERCEPTIONS

Sources outside those mentioned above can largely be discounted when looking at the battle of Sluys, for very few "foreign" perceptions of this battle exist. Except for the German Heinrich de Diessenhoven's *Chronicon* and the Italian Giovanni Villani's *Istorie Fiorentine*, no major contemporary foreign commentator on Sluys is found. Moreover, Diessenhoven's work contains no analysis of why the English defeated the French. He simply notes that the English overcame the French at Sluys with many thousand French sailors being killed or drowned, and that Edward triumphed "gloriously."<sup>10</sup>

Thus, it is left up to Villani to be our sole major non-Allied/French commentator to discuss this battle. Villani certainly favors the English in this affair, a sentiment which may be judged easily from his acclamation of Edward as "buono Adoardo Terzo," and this praise for the English ruler extends later in Villani's chronicle as Edward is described as the reason for the English success. In describing the reluctance of some of the allies in facing the powerful French navy, Edward's prompt action makes him victorious. By this quick action, after a battle which lasted into the night, Edward is able to defeat the strong French force bringing glory and booty to himself and his allies.

#### CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH PERCEPTIONS

While modern English historians have devoted much time and writing to the details of the battle of Sluys, the same cannot be said for their medieval counterparts. Only one or two of these contemporary or near contemporary authors seem interested in recording many details of the battle,<sup>11</sup> while several, including the anonymous authors of the *Annales de Bermundeseia*, the *Chronicon Angliae Petriburgensis*, the *Debat des herauts — d'armes de France et d'Angleterre*, and *Gregory's Chronicle*, as well as the *Gesta*

*Edwardi de Carnarvan* and John Hardyng, contain no information about the battle other than a record of English victory and the mention of the great number of French dead.

As well, often the details of the battle which are given by English authors are not substantiated by any other contemporary source. For example, only Robert of Avesbury and the unedited *Historia Roffensis* mention the pre-battle warnings given to Edward by his Chancellor, Archbishop John Stratford; Edward by disregarding these warnings forced Stratford's resignation. (He was later reinstated in the position.)<sup>12</sup>

As for the events occurring directly after the battle, we only have a patchwork of interesting anecdotes to lead us to any conclusions. Certainly, most of the English sources describe the large number of French dead and drowned, but only Thomas of Burton's *Chronica monasterii de Melsa* reports the now-famous "fish-story" of Sluys:

*There was such an infusion of blood that for three days after the battle in all the water of the Zwin all the way to the sea there seemed to be more blood than water. And there were so many dead and drowned French and Normans there that it was said, ridiculing them, that if God had given the fish the power of speech after they had devoured so many of the dead, they would have spoken fluent French.*

Moreover, when the news of the victory was reported to London, only Robert of Avesbury records that "on account of the distance of the place, it was believed to be a lie."<sup>13</sup> And, it is only Thomas Walsingham who reports the amusing anecdote of the delivery of the news to Philip VI:

*...since no one dared to report the loss of the battle to the king of France, familiars of the king employed a certain fool to tell him, that in some way through his words the king might know what had happened. This fool, placed in the presence of the king, began vehemently to indict the insanity of the English, and he began to multiply his words concerning*

*this matter. However, the king, ignoring what the words of this moron wished to say to him, asked why he said that the English were so insane. The fool said to him: "Because they are timid and do not dare to dance in the sea as our generous Normans and French do." Through these words, the king understood that they had been the victims and that the English were the victors.*

When it comes to tactical maneuvers at Sluys, on either the French or the English side, the English chroniclers are equally reticent. Indeed, what few tactical details we do get often contradict other authors' details. While it is true that Adam Murimuth, Robert of Avesbury and Geoffrey le Baker all mention the French order of battle<sup>14</sup> with Robert of Avesbury also noting that the French ships were chained together,<sup>15</sup> only Murimuth and Baker detail the English order of battle.

Some English writers also discuss the problems the English faced both in manning their fleet and in the small size of their ships when compared to the larger French vessels. Adam Murimuth, for example, reports that the battle lasted very long "on account of the fortitude and the magnitude of the Spanish and French ships."<sup>16</sup> Laurence Minot, on the other hand, takes an entirely different view of the size of the English ships, remarking that their small size made them so quick in the water that their Norman opponents could not keep up with them.

Several English commentators note that the English surprised the French. Indeed, this seems to have been Edward III's plan at Sluys. As Geoffrey le Baker writes:

*[The king of England] said that they would not be expecting them, and arming himself and his men, and preparing them quickly, after the hour of nine, when he had the wind and the sun at his back and the flow of the river with him, having divided into three lines, he made a great assault on the French.*

The French simply did not see them, notes Thomas Otterbourne. Even Edward himself was

convinced that the French were confused by this tactic, and that this confusion led to an early English advantage. In a letter written to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the king of England writes: "...by the arduous attack which we followed, they were put completely in ruin, so that we and our ships were most able to prosper from the peril of this great confusion."<sup>17</sup> But if this assault on the French was a feigned retreat, we must rely only on the word of Robert of Avesbury and the *French Chronicle of London*. Avesbury writes:

*Then the English judging the French ships to be chained together in one line with iron chains so that no one might penetrate their line, they sailed a little to the rear. Meanwhile, the French, deceived by this action, broke their line and, as they believed the English to be fleeing, strived to follow.*

Finally, the English battlefield tactic which most medieval sources, like their modern counterparts, want to accept as the cause for victory was the adept English archery which easily mowed down an enemy unaccustomed to such a weapon. Thomas Otterbourne, Ranulph Higden, Thomas of Burton and the anonymous *Vita Edwardi II* all determine that the English archers were the reason for an English victory. This may not show overwhelming agreement for archery as the cause of victory, however, as these sources all seem to use exactly the same wording: "Wherefore, God favoring them, the French and Normans were conquered harshly by the English archers."<sup>18</sup> Other English chroniclers of the battle of Sluys mention the longbow only in a list of weapons used in the battle without comparatively determining its effectiveness in any way. Thomas Walsingham, for example, also lists the two-edged sword and both throwing and battle axes with the bow,<sup>19</sup> and Geoffrey le Baker mentions the use of spears, battle axes, swords, iron quarrels from crossbows, arrows from longbows and stones thrown from the ship's towers as the weapons used by the English.

Most English sources also fail to mention the Flemish reinforcements who aided the English fleet by blocking the shore so that the French were unable to escape on land. Only the

*Chronicon Lanercost*, *The Anonimale Chronicle* and a letter from Edward to the people of London note the Flemish participation in the battle. The former two chronicles remark merely that the Bishop of Norwich and Lord Reginald de Cobham were sent ashore to stir up the Flemings,<sup>20</sup> while the letter from Edward reports little more, saying only that "the Flemings were of good will to have come to us in battle from the beginning to the end."<sup>21</sup>

Many late medieval English writers also do not regard Edward as the cause of victory at Sluys. Certainly, the English king is seen as a pivotal and important character in this battle, with many contemporaries praising him in the manner of the fifteenth-century William of Worcester who calls him the "most famous knight of renomme,"<sup>22</sup> but only Laurence Minot records Edward's presence as crucial to the final outcome:

*Sir Edward, oure gude king wurthi in wall  
Faght wele on pat flude, faire mot him fall;  
Als it es custom of king to comfort pam all  
So thanked he gudely þe grete and þe small,  
He thanked pam gudely, God gif him mede,  
þus come oure king in þe Swin till þat gude dede.*

Minot also mentions other particularly valiant warriors in the battle devoting a verse to Robert of Morley, the earl of Northampton, Sir Walter the Mawney, the duke of Lancaster, Sir William of Klington, the earl of Gloucester, John Badding and John of Aile.

What or whom then do the English perceive as the cause of victory in this naval battle? Many English authors give credit solely to God. If nothing else, there was an effort among the English to show that the battle was just and that defeat of France somehow benefitted the English or their allies. Edward himself claims, in a letter written to the people of London, that his only intention in fighting the French was to restore peace and to bring independence to Flanders. Furthermore, in a letter he wrote to the English

Parliament after the battle, the king claims that the battle was "just" as France had frequently attacked England, and that they had allied themselves with the dreaded enemy of England: Scotland. Finally, Ranulph Higden adds yet another justification for the battle. The English attacked France in order to gain retribution for the towns of Gascony which France had stolen from them.

Most of the English sources tell us that God was on their side, often using only the phrase "Deo favente," and that this was the reason for the English victory. Some of these chroniclers, however, are more direct in their citations of God's aid. The *Anonimale Chronicle*, for example, reports: "The king of England with 412 ships attacked the great mass of French ships, and by the grace of God he defeated them."<sup>23</sup> Henry Knighton adds more to this discussion when he writes: "And having commissioned a naval battle and having fought there exceptionally and strongly, finally Christ conceded the victory to King Edward, and thus the French were defeated."<sup>24</sup> Moreover, the poet Laurence Minot after pleading several times for prayers on behalf of Edward in his undertaking against the French writes happily:

*Pis was þe bataile þat fell in þe Swin,  
Whare many Normandes made mekill  
din;  
Wele war þai armed vp to þe chin;*

*Bot God and sir Edward gert þaire boste  
blin,  
Þus blinned þaire boste, als we wele ken:  
God assoyle þaire sawls, sais all, Amen.*

Other English commentators are even more specific in remarking on God's role in the English victory. Robert of Avesbury notes that it was by the "gift of God" that the wind blew favorably for Edward,<sup>25</sup> while the *Chronicon de Lanercost* gives Edward himself god-like qualities. Describing the feeling of Edward's followers after the victory this anonymous chronicler writes:

*After this victory the king of England and  
France remained at sea for three days,  
and then landed in Flanders, all men  
shouting: "Long live the king of the*

*French and of England! Blessed is he  
that comes in the name of the Lord!" And  
although there were some who were  
incensed a little because of his long stay  
in England, the queen remaining in  
Ghent exposed to many risks, together  
with the English who were there in Flan-  
ders supporting the king of England and  
France, yet all those afflicted with the  
king's evil who came near him were  
immediately made whole by his touch.*

The most explicit commentator on God's role at the battle of Sluys is the king of England himself. Already in the manifesto made by Edward upon assuming the title of the king of France, the English king had expressed his belief that God was on the side of the English, and that He would give them victory over the French so that in peace they might go on a crusade to the Holy Land. After Sluys, Edward again reiterates the belief that God was with the English. Three letters, all written just after the battle was fought, remain from Edward, and all rest on the presumption that England was victorious over the French solely because of God's aid. In the letter written to the Archbishop of Canterbury Edward reports that he believed that God was with the English when He converted "a storm into a breeze" which allowed the English to sail to Sluys and to victory. Furthermore, God granted to Edward not only His presence, but also the tax subsidy, soldiers and favorable wind to pursue the battle. In the same letter he writes:

*But the God of mercies, seeing us or-  
dered in such danger, more graciously  
and more quickly than human reason can  
judge, sent to us a great naval subsidy,  
an unforeseen number of soldiers and  
always a favorable wind as He had pro-  
mised. And thus, under the hope of celes-  
tial aid and the faithfulness of our jus-  
tice, with our fleet coming to Sluys, we  
discovered the French fleet and our en-  
emy having prepared for battle in a copi-  
ous number. In which on the day of the  
nativity of Saint John the Baptist, He,  
Our Hope, Christ the Lord, in the strong*

*and able conflict allowed us to prevail  
having made not a small slaughter of  
French and capturing even all of their  
fleet, with only a small attack having  
been made on us.*

So, Edward praises and thanks God for the victory at Sluys, and at the end of his letter to the Archbishop he urges his people to do the same.

This view of God aiding the English at the battle of Sluys does not disappear in the English annals. As late as the reign of Henry V this perception is still observed. In a speech made before Parliament by the Bishop of Winchester in 1416, and recorded in the *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, he cites the victory at Sluys as God's first favorable "verdict" for the English over the French in the Hundred Years War.

Finally, almost as a postscript to this perception, as witnessed by Geoffrey le Baker, who otherwise mentions nothing about God at Sluys, was that Merlin prophesied this victory.

#### CONTEMPORARY SOUTHERN LOW COUNTRIES PERCEPTIONS

In analyzing the perceptions of victory and defeat at the battle of Sluys, it becomes necessary to study the writers from the Low Countries separately from those of England. Although they do not see the conclusion of the battle in any different way, nor do they rejoice in the victory any less, they do have their own perceptions of the battle and of what caused the outcome. Perhaps the proximity of Sluys gives this battle a greater importance for these writers, for most of the contemporary or near contemporary writers from Brabant, Hainault and Flanders record more details about the victory at Sluys than do English authors.

There are some similarities between the English and allied authors' accounts. Certainly the large number of French dead at Sluys impresses the Low Countries' chronicler to the same degree that it does the English writer, although the heavy English death toll also impresses these authors, a statistic often missed or softened by the English writer. There is even the hint of descriptive narrative in Jan de Klerk's *Brabantse yeesten*

which hearkens back to Thomas of Burton's account given of the French dead: "The French left there / thirty thousand (that was many) / the sea was colored red with blood / In many ships men stood / with blood rising above their ankles."<sup>26</sup> Equally impressive to these authors is the large number of French soldiers who willingly drowned at the end of the battle. The *Van den derden Eduwaert*, a poem written in medieval Dutch by Jan de Klerk, author of *Brabantse yeesten*, says that "they were so defeated / the French, and they knew it so well / that they leaped from the ships / and with all hope lost they drowned."<sup>27</sup>

These chroniclers mention little about the tactics employed at the battle of Sluys, less even than the contemporary English writers. Even Jean le Bel of Hainault, despite his praise for the "prowess" of the English soldiers, calling them "the most noble and most gallant fighters ever seen," fails to discuss the battlefield tactics employed by them. Moreover, the only references to Edward's attack of the French with the sun and wind at his back or the role of the English archers found in the accounts of the allies are found in the *Chronique de Flandre*.

Some of the Low Countries' commentators also agree with the view held by Laurence Minot that Edward III was the reason for victory at Sluys. Edward is seen by most of the Low Countries' chroniclers as the savior of their region. Indeed, Jan de Klerk's poem, *Van den derden Eduwaert*, is meant as a paean to the majesty of this foreign king. His victory at Sluys merely confirmed that idea. The anonymous author of the *Chronicon comitum Flandriae*, who had described Edward earlier in his work favorably as "young and spirited," comments that he was "more glorious through the victory which he made."<sup>28</sup> The fifteenth-century Flemish chronicler Adrien de Budt is equally impressed, especially because Edward himself was wounded in the thigh during the battle; still "the victory fell to him."<sup>29</sup> Most eloquent in this regard is Jean le Bel who writes: "But King Edward held himself so bravely, and he did so many feats of valor [during the battle] that he rallied and gave courage to all the others."<sup>30</sup> All this praise for Edward is justified, claims the *Breve chronicon Flandriae*, simply because "he freed Flanders."<sup>31</sup>

Most frequently, however, the contemporary commentators from the Low Countries differ from the English in what they view as the important occurrences at Sluys. For example, it seems of little importance to these writers to know the circumstances behind the gathering of an English fleet or that the Archbishop of Canterbury warned Edward against fighting the French fleet. Instead, it is the question of Edward's intent in coming to the Low Countries to attack the French which is discussed. The *Rijmkroniek van Vlaenderen*, for example, reports that Edward wanted to come to Flanders in "groeter macht" to impress both the French king and the most populous area of his realm. Besides, Edward had to return to Flanders, says Jan de Klerk in *Van den derden Eduwaert*, because he had promised to do so:

*Edward and his men came/over the sea/  
with two hundred or more ships,/any ship  
which would hold together,/believing in  
himself./And the first thing that he did/  
when he came to the land of Flanders,/*  
*heedless of anything else,/was to set  
himself on Flemish land./Believing in  
God, he said,/“when I left this land,/I  
believed with great faith/that I would  
return here/before St. John’s day./And I  
have done so/because here I stand.”*<sup>32</sup>

There was another aspect to this return of the English king. As the *Chronicon comitum Flandriae* reports, it was important for the economic well-being of the Low Countries that they keep a friendship with the English. Having recently been driven to massive hunger by the English embargo on account of their allegiance to the French crown, the Flemings had felt compelled to align themselves with Edward, despite the avid protestations of Philip VI against it. Edward's return to Flanders had shown that this friendship was a dual affair.

The Low Countries' authors also spend more time in describing, always in negative terms, the French at the battle of Sluys. They identify the French as consisting mostly of Normans, traitors to England, and of renegade Flemings, traitors to Flanders. Moreover, according to these writers, the Normans at Sluys were pirates before the

battle, sailors who had terrorized the coasts of the Low Countries illegally before being legitimized by war. Nevertheless, the quality of these French soldiers was poor, and their leaders were also corrupt.

Above all, it was the French purpose in fighting this battle which frightened the allies. For not only did Philip VI wish to stop Edward on his return to Flanders by anchoring his fleet at Sluys, he also intended to capture and destroy Flanders and Brabant. In particular, Jan de Klerk in *Van den derden Eduwaert* notes, the French king intended to attack Antwerp, the pride of Brabant.

All of this leads to the further and greater complaint of French wickedness. Jan de Klerk's *Van den derden Eduwaert* reports that the French were proud,<sup>33</sup> and the *Rijmkroniek van Vlaenderen* describes their leaders as evil men "without feelings."<sup>34</sup> Philip ruled "unduly and without justice," avers the *Chronicon comitum Flandriae*,<sup>35</sup> but it is Adrien de Budt who makes the harsh claim that the French king had even tried to influence some of the Flemish leaders with bribes, offering "to forget all their debts" and to return to their control "the villages of Douai and Lille with their castellanies." But these bribes were refused.

If the French were evil, then the English at Sluys were good; some of the allied authors, like the English writers, saw the hand of God in the English victory. Jean le Bel records that victory was obtained "par la grace de Dieu princepaument,"<sup>36</sup> and the *Van den derden Eduwaert* reports: "But God sent his mercy / in order to undo the evil / because this evil here he / would no longer stand for."<sup>37</sup> In addition to this, the *Chronicon comitum Flandriae* reports that Sluys merely fulfilled part of the prophecies of the prophetess Hildegard who prophesied that in the year 1340 "there would be much slaughter and destruction."<sup>38</sup>

Finally, as is to be expected, several Low Countries' writers credit the Flemings with the victory, for they came to the aid of the English when their allies from across the Channel were about to falter. The mid-fifteenth-century *Chronique des Pays-Bas* is certainly the most direct in

this perception. This chronicle reports: "The English began to lose at the beginning, but they were aided by the Flemings and the French were defeated."<sup>39</sup> Attached to this perception is an interesting anecdote mentioned by Jan de Klerk in his *Van den derden Eduwaert*. Apparently, a man from Flanders named Jan van Eyle, who had fled to the French before the battle tried to come ashore during the battle, but he was blocked by the Flemings who, despite being tempted by his monetary bribes, "cut off his head."<sup>40</sup>

### CONTEMPORARY FRENCH PERCEPTIONS

Like the authors of the Low Countries, the contemporary or near contemporary French chroniclers who write about the reign of Philip VI devote much commentary to this first great defeat suffered by the French king. Most of these commentators add many details to their accounts which give us interesting perceptions of the battle and of the cause of French defeat. Only Gilles li Muisit records nothing about the battle, although his reticence is understandable as he writes from within the besieged town of Tournai. Under the dire circumstances of the siege of Tournai by the English and their allies following their naval victory, the battle of Sluys was quickly forgotten.

Some of the French perceptions are not unlike those seen before in the accounts of the English and Low Countries writers. Still, it is apparent that they view the activity at Sluys through the eyes of a loser trying to rationalize defeat. For example, although many of these authors discuss the nature and size of the English fleet, at least three French sources, the *Chronicon* of Richard Lescot, the *Continuatio chronici* of Guillaume de Nangis and the *Grandes chroniques de France*, claim that Philip gathered his fleet only after learning that Edward had gathered first his own large navy. Moreover, the *Grandes chroniques* reports that by the time Philip was able to gather his fleet together, Edward "had already arrived at Sluys."<sup>41</sup>

The French contemporaries commenting on the battle of Sluys give little credibility to the English perception of a victory based on their superior tactics. Only the *Grandes chroniques* mention Edward's use of the sun and wind to

sweep down onto the surprised French ships, but this in no definitive way leads to their victory. And while several French chronicles mention the presence of English archers at the battle, it is only an indication of their impressive numbers, a "grant planté" says the *Grandes chroniques*, and not their role in the French defeat.

While these sources seem to dismiss the English perceptions of victory and defeat at Sluys, much more credence is given to the Low Countries' perception that the Flemings present in the battle awarded the victory to the English. For, although Jean de Venette reports only that the Flemings were present, and that they were "slain in large numbers by the French,"<sup>42</sup> other French chronicles record the important role played by the Flemings in support of their English allies. For example, the *Chronographia regum Francorum* reports that the French were unable to flee to the shore because of the large number of armed Flemings who awaited them. Some French chroniclers are even more emphatic in their perception of the worth of Flemish aid to the English. The *Chronique Normande* reports "there was a great and marvelous battle, and many English were killed in the beginning, but they were rescued by the Flemings, and the French were defeated."<sup>43</sup> Richard Lescot adds: "Our soldiers, holding themselves well at first, were afterwards repulsed by means of a multitude of oncoming Flemings."<sup>44</sup>

The year 1340 was not good for the French, and their own perceptions of the defeat at Sluys take on a sense of finality; it was not only they who suffered, it was all of Christianity. The *Continuatio chronici* of Guillaume de Nangis leaves a very philosophical entry:

*In this year of calamity and misery, of ignominy and confusion, nothing laudable was achieved between the two kings of France and England, because whatever was done during this year was not from the Holy Spirit, but ought to be supposed to have proceeded from the angel of Satan. For, although in the two or three years preceding many grave things had been done to the paupers of the Church, besides the most grave exactions done to the common people, in this*

*year the highest confusion prevailed; however, it occurred not in any way for the utility of the republics of the aforementioned kings, but, alas, for the degradation and confusion of all Christianity, and of the holy and universal mother Church, for whom the said princes ought to be the sustenance and the support.*

Jean de Venette blames this all on the appearance of a comet which was seen, he says, "about A.D. 1340."<sup>45</sup> But Jean de Hocsem finds a more human fault. Quoting from the *Eunuchus* of Terence (IV.7), he comments on the activities of the year: "All ought to be tempted by wisdom rather than by war."<sup>46</sup>

The French commentators do not see any gallantry or valor performed by Edward III at Sluys. For most of these authors, the English king was nothing other than a pure example of evil. Cuvelier, the author of the *Chronique de Bertrand de Guesclin*, for example, describes Edward simply as "moult de maulx."<sup>47</sup> To these writers, it was not enough that Edward had broken his own oath of homage to the French king, and, after Philip had already reigned for twelve years, that he had declared himself the king of France as well as of England forbidding anyone under the pain of death from referring to Philip VI as the French king,<sup>48</sup> but he also aided the loyal Flemish subjects in breaking their oaths of fealty to the French crown. Richard Lescot, for example, notes that Edward "extorted money to aid the Flemings who intended to do homage to him."<sup>49</sup> Above all, in fighting at Sluys, the English king caused many of his troops to die, not to mention the large number of French who also were slain in that battle. Jean de Hocsem writes: "The king of England wasted many of his troops, and it is said that the greatest condemnation was sustained in these things."<sup>50</sup>

So, on what or on whom should the blame for this defeat fall according to the French chroniclers of the battle of Sluys? If neither the English tactics nor the actions of the English king should be credited with the victory, and if only a few chroniclers believed that the Flemings played the decisive role at Sluys, what then is the perception of defeat for the French in this battle? It seems

that the blame for this defeat, according to these authors, must be placed at the feet of the French admirals, Béhuchet, and Quiéret, who ineptly, and possibly corruptly, failed to follow the advice of those who were more experienced in this type of warfare.

Although almost all of the French writers contend that their soldiers who were at the battle of Sluys displayed courage and fought well, and despite the contention of Jean de Venette and of the anonymous author of the *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois* that the French leaders "went against the English with good heart and with good courage,"<sup>51</sup> most writers look upon the French admirals as poor judges of naval tactics. Moreover, when they were offered sound advice by the more experienced naval captain, Barbaveria, advice which would later prove to be prophetic, they refused to follow it. The *Chronographia regum Francorum* relates the story:

*Moreover, Barbaveria, who was in his galleys, perceiving the advent of the English, said to the admiral [Hugh Quiéret] and to Nicholas Béhuchet: "My lords, you now see the king of England with his fleet approaching us. If you believe me, the whole fleet ought to be moved onto the open sea; for if you remain here, the English who have the wind, the sun and the flow of the water with them in so much that they will confine you because you will be able to help your ships only minimally." However, Nicholas Béhuchet who knew better how to make a calculation than to fight naval battles, responded to him: "He is a coward who retreats from here and does not stand ready for the onset of battle."<sup>52</sup>*

This is added to by both the *Grandes chroniques* and the *Chronographia regum Francorum*, who claim that Béhuchet, being a treasurer and not a soldier, was taken by greed to fill his ships not with fighting men, but with poor fishermen and sailors.

These contentions lead many French authors writing about the battle of Sluys to conclude that the cause of defeat was the ineptitude of the French admirals. The anonymous author of the

*Grandes chroniques* writes:

*And this defeat came about because of the pride of the two admirals as the one was unable to tolerate the other, and all because of envy. And so they did not wish to believe the counsel of Barbarveria...so the evil came upon them as so many witnessed.*

To this same conclusion, almost as a postscript, the continuator of Guillaume de Nangis's *Chronicon* adds a passage from Lucan's *Pharsalia* (I.95) which the continuator interprets for us: "Wishing to say and to agree that whatever is said or supposed, no one wishes to have a companion in authority, but only to attribute all authority to himself."<sup>53</sup>

#### JEAN FROISSART'S PERCEPTIONS

There is one final author whose perceptions of victory and defeat at the battle of Sluys should be analyzed. Jean Froissart deserves to be separated from the groups of commentators mentioned above because he clearly does not fit into any of the three categories noted above. It is true that he was born in the Low Countries and that his source for most of his early *Chroniques* is Jean le Bel. Still Froissart in his description of this battle does not fit the pattern of his mentor. Indeed, much of Froissart's narrative on the battle of Sluys is original and seems to be derived from sources which do not exist today. In addition to this, there are three main redactions of Froissart's *Chroniques*, and all three differ in many details of the battle and in their conclusions as to what caused victory and defeat there. The three different conclusions put forth in Froissart's versions fit neatly into the three perceptions which we have already discussed: those of the English chroniclers, the Low Countries' chroniclers and the French chroniclers.

First, it should be pointed out that Froissart does not like to describe the events of this battle. For him it has no violent equal, certainly not in comparison with the land battles which he has described. Indeed, in the middle of the narrative found in his second redaction (Luce's order),

Froissart stops and relates why naval battles are worse than land battles:

*This battle which I describe for you was very foul and very horrible; battles and attacks on the sea are longer and larger than those on land, because one is unable to flee, or to retreat. So they agree to defend and to sell and to demonstrate their prowess.*

This said, Froissart describes the battle in greater detail than any other author. He notes the numbers of French men and ships, describing the latter as "such a great number of vessels that their masts looked exactly like a forest,"<sup>54</sup> as well as the number of English soldiers who were present at Sluys. He declines to mention, however, the number of English ships there, saying in the second redaction of his *Chroniques* only that the French ships outnumbered the English in a four to one ratio. Despite the presence of a large force on both sides, neither the French nor the English fled from their positions. The French wished to defend Sluys "bien et hardiment,"<sup>55</sup> and the English relished the opportunity finally to meet the French in battle. Froissart records the oration given by Edward to his men before the battle:

*I have long desired to fight the French, so let us fight them if it pleases God and St. George. Because truly the enemy has done so much against us that I wish to take vengeance against them if I can.*

Edward then ordered his ships in lines, alternating a ship full of men-at-arms with two ships of archers. Also present in the English ranks, Froissart reports, was a ship filled with noblewomen set to join their queen at Ghent. They were protected by a guard of archers instructed by Edward to "guard their honor."<sup>56</sup> The English king then took advantage of the wind, and he turned to face the French with the sun behind him. Froissart's second redaction describes this maneuver:

*When the king of England and his marshal had ordered well and wisely their lines of battle, they made to submit and*

*draw their sails against the wind. And they came to the right to take advantage of the sun which in coming there was in the face [of the French].*

The French prepared to meet the English, believing themselves to be more experienced and superior fighters. They attacked first with the large captured English ship, the *Christofle*. English and Norman/Genoese archers "very savagely and very harshly" traded "very strong and very vigorous" archery fire, but ultimately the English longbowmen proved to be superior to their crossbow counterparts and the *Christofle* returned to English hands. But this setback did not stifle the fighting spirit of the French who fought on for the entire day. In his final redaction, Froissart comments on the fighting capabilities of each side:

*And this was a very large and very perilous battle because the Normans and the Genoese were all proven and accustomed to the sea, and they withstood fatigue well because in all their lives they had done nothing else except pursue armed adventures on the sea. Also it was said that the English were good men of the sea for they were made and nourished in it, and they too could withstand the fatigue.<sup>57</sup>*

As far as prowess and bravery shown by both armies, Froissart is blunt. "It is not difficult to come upon great feats of arms," the chronicler writes. Several English nobles are singled out for their prowess in battle,<sup>58</sup> but no one is as impressive to Froissart as Edward III, as the following passage from the third redaction shows:

*The king of England was there in the flower of his youth, and he did not try to save himself, but he ventured into the battle as adventurously as any of his knights, and he demonstrated himself well in fighting with weapons if the need was shown.*

The French admirals also earn his praise as Froissart writes: "It was good to see that Hugh Quiéret was a good and hardy knight, and that

Pierre (sic) Béhuchet also performed marvels of arms."<sup>59</sup> Eventually, however, both were captured and executed.

When Froissart arrives at his reasons about what caused victory for the English and defeat for the French at Sluys, each of the three redactions of his work come to different conclusions. The first redaction, for example, regards the superior tactics and valor of the English soldiers, specifically Edward III, as the determining factor in the battle. Edward's strategic use of the sun and wind against the French is highlighted, and added to this is a description of the effective fighting capabilities of English archers and men-at-arms:

*And the archers and the arbalestriers commenced to draw their bows one against the other diversely and rapidly, and the men-at-arms approached and fought hand to hand harshly and hardily...But the English proved so good and so brave...that they obtained the place of battle and the French ships, and the Normans and all those who had fought against them were dead and defeated, slain and drowned. No one was able to escape and all were put to death.*

Froissart repeats this perception at the end of the second redaction of his *Chroniques* indicating that the English valor and tactical superiority were still an important factor in the victory. It was, however, not the only factor in the defeat of the French. Froissart adds a further comment at the end of this account, absent from his first redaction, which makes clear that the arrival of Flemish reinforcements at the end of the battle ultimately marked the defeat of the French:

*And the battle lasted from the first hour to the evening, and finally a great number of Flemings arrived because early in the morning the bailleux of Sluys had sent signals to Bruges and to the nearby villages. So all the villages came and arrived at Sluys on foot, on horse, or along the Roe river, coming to aid the English. And there assembled at Sluys a great number of Flemings, and they entered into boats and barges and large*

*Spanish vessels, and they came to the battle all fresh and invigorated, and they gave great comfort to the English.*

The third redaction of the *Chroniques* presents an altogether different perception of what led to the French defeat at the hands of the English at Sluys. Removing almost entirely any mention of English tactical superiority and referring to the Flemish involvement — including a previously unmentioned tally of 8,000 Flemish participants — only as a subsidiary cause of the defeat, Froissart turns to an analysis of the poor French naval position as the cause of their defeat. Edward simply took advantage of this poor positioning, the French ships at rest and locked together, to gain victory:

*Finally the English obtained the sea and the place of battle; and those who were present — Normans, Picards, Genoese, and those from Provençal — all were defeated, and very few were saved because they were unable to flee from the defeat. What was the cause of this? I will tell you. The English in coming there had enclosed the French between themselves and Sluys. They [the French] were unable to recoil, as did their enemy, nor to go forward, nor to break the English navy which had blocked all passage to the sea. They and any who wished to save themselves by coming to Sluys were killed at once because the Flemings, who had a great hatred for those who in each and every season had harassed and harried the passage to Sluys and had robbed and pillaged on the sea, took care to kill*

*without pity anyone whom they came upon on land or on the sea.*

In analyzing the perceptions of victory and defeat at the battle of Sluys, we see that it is impossible to study only the versions of the victors and the defeated, for a third party's perceptions must also be studied: those of the allies aligned with the English. Although these writers do not deny the English victory, nor do they rejoice in the victory any less than their English allies, they do have their own perceptions of victory which emphasize the role of the Flemings in the battle. These perceptions are unlike the English ones which perceive victory to have come from Edward, his tactics or his archers, or the French which see defeat arising from the incompetent and divisive actions of the French leaders. In the battle of Sluys then we may conclude that the perceptions of victory and defeat take on a more geographically-oriented side than they have in any other fourteenth-century battle.



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## Notes

1. Joannes Tramond, *Manuel d'histoire maritime de la France* (Paris, 1916), 32.
2. See, for example, William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy*, 7 vols. (London, 1897), 1:254.
3. Claude Farrère, *Histoire de la marine Française* (Paris, 1934), 30.
4. Ferdinand Lot, *L'art militaire et les armées au moyen âge en Europe et dans le proche orient* (Paris, 1946), 1:337-38.
5. Desmond Seward, *The Hundred Years War: The English in France, 1337-1453* (New York, 1978), 43.
6. Jean Favier, *La guerre de cent ans* (Paris, 1980), 97: "La faiblesse de cette marine française, excellente à tous autres égards, c'est son commandement." See also Edouard Perroy, *The Hundred Years War* (London, 1962), 106; Clowes, *Royal Navy*, 1:257-58; and Roy Martin Haines, *Archbishop John Stratford: Political Revolutionary and Champion of the Liberties of the English Church ca. 1275/80-1348* (Toronto, 1986), 270-71.
7. Michael Packe, *King Edward III* (London, 1983), 93.
8. Robin Neillands, *The Hundred Years War* (London, 1990), 83.
9. David Hannay, *A Short History of the Royal Navy*, 2 vols. (London, 1898), 1:21.
10. William Ledyard Rodgers, *Naval Warfare Under Oars, 4th to 16th Centuries: A Study of Strategy, Tactics and Ship Design* (1940; rpt. Annapolis, 1967), 97.
11. Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle*. (Philadelphia, 1991), 325.
12. Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine Française* (Paris, 1899), 446: Pour notre malheur, l'opinion du comptable prévalut sur celle du marin. On resta sur place, les voiles carguées, au mépris du manuel militaire du temps, qui prescrivait de garder le large et de pousser l'ennemi à la côte.
13. G. A. J. P. Auphan, *La marine dans l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1955), 6: ...les amiraux d'alors n'étaient pas plus bêtes que ceux d'aujourd'hui. Quand on commande à deux cents vaisseaux et trente mille hommes dans des circonstances aussi décisives, on ne choisit pas sa tactique à la légère. L'ardeur avec laquelle les Français combattirent, jusqu'à la mort de vingt mille d'entre eux, montre que cette tactique fut comprise, approuvée et suivie. En réalité...les navires d'alors n'étaient pas capables de s'affronter au large.
14. C. D. Yonge, *The History of the British Navy*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (London, 1866), 1:14.
15. Scott L. Waugh, *England in the Reign of Edward III*. (Cambridge, 1991), 128.
16. Timothy J. Runyan, "Ships and Mariners in Later Medieval England," *Journal of British Studies* 16 (1977), 8-9.
17. Packe, *Edward III*, 93.
18. Hans van Werveke, *Jacques van Artevelde* (Brussels, 1943), 61. See also Rodgers, *Naval Warfare*, 99-100 and Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300-c. 1450* (Cambridge, 1988), 13.
19. C. F. Richmond, "The War at Sea," *The Hundred Years War*, ed. K. Fowler (London, 1971), 97.
20. Neillands, *Hundred Years War*, 84.
21. Alfred H. Burne, *The Crecy War* (London, 1955), 55. See also Rodgers, *Naval Warfare*, 99-100; Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 326; May McKisack, *The Fourteenth Century*, Oxford History of England (Oxford, 1959), 129; Henry Stephen Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War, 1326-1347* (Ann Arbor, 1929), 399-400; Michael Prestwich, *The Three Edwards: War and State in England, 1272-1377* (London, 1980), 173; and William Longman, *The History of the Life and Times of Edward the Third*, 3 vols. (London, 1869), 1:172-73.
22. Tramond, *Manuel*, 33: "...nos navires succombèrent sous le nombre et la supériorité des archers ennemis." See also Auphan, *La Marine*, 6 and Eugene Deprez, *Les préliminaires de la guerre de cent ans: Le paupauté, la France et l'Angleterre (1328-1342)*, (1902; rpt. Geneva, 1975), 322.
23. Henri Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, 7 vols. (Brussels, 1903), 2:115 and Roncière, 1:452. See also Sumption, 327. For opposing views see Lucas, *The Hundred Years War, 1326-1347* (Ann Arbor, 1929), 401 and Clowes, *Royal Navy* 1:252.
24. Heinricus von Diessenhoven, *Chronicon de Heinricus Truchsess von Diessenhoven*, in *Fontes rerum Germanicarum*, vol. 4, ed. J. F.

- Bohmer (Stuttgart, 1868), 34.
25. Giovanni Villani, *Istorie Fiorentine*, in *Scriptores rerum Italicarum*, xiii, ed. L. Muratori, c. 837.
  26. See Robert of Avesbury, *De gestis mirabilibus Edwardi III*, ed. E. M. Thompson, Rolls Series (London, 1889), 310-14; Geoffrey le Baker, *Chronicon*, ed. E. M. Thompson (Oxford, 1889), 142-45; and Adam Murimuth, *Continuatio chronicorum*, ed. E. M. Thompson, Rolls Series (London, 1889), 105-07.
  27. *Annales monasterii de Bermundeseia*, 1042-1432, in *Annales monastici*, iii, ed. H. R. Luard, Rolls Series (London, 1866), 474; *Chronicon Angliae Petriburgensis*, ed. J. A. Giles (London, 1845), 168; *Debat des herauts-d'armes de France et d'Angleterre*, ed. L. Pannier and P. Meyer (Paris, 1877), 83; *Gregory's Chronicle, 1189-1469*, in *Historical Collections of a Citizen in London in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. J. Gardiner, Camden Society (London, 1876), 81; *Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvan auctore canonico Bridlingtoniensi*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, ii, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series (London, 1883), 149; and John Hardyng, *Chronicle*, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1812), 325. This could, however, indicate how very interested the English were in this battle if so many small monastic chronicles at least mentioned it.
  28. See Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 310-11 and *Historia Roffensis* (British Library, Cotton mss. Faustina B. v. fol. 84v). The *Historia Roffensis* was brought to my attention in a footnote in Haines, 270.
  29. Thomas of Burton, *Chronica monasterii de Melsa a fundatione usque ad annum 1396*, ed. E. A. Bonds, Rolls Series, 2 vols. (London, 1868), 2:45. Tantaque fuit ibidem effusio sanguinis quod tota illa aqua de Swynn, et usque in mare, per 3 dies sequentes magis apparuit sanguis quam aqua; tantique fuerunt ibidem Franci et Normanni interfecti et submersi quod de eis ridicule dicebatur, quod, si Deus piscibus maris loquelam dedisset, ex ipsorum mortuorum devoratione, ydioma Gallicum profecto in posterum habuissent.
  30. Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 312: "...et propter loci distantiam mendacium credebatur."
  31. Thomas of Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, ed. H. T. Riley, 2 vols. (London, 1863), 1:227: Unde...cum nullus auderet referre belli praesentis exitum Regi Franciae, familiares quemdam stultum ejusdem Regis subornaverunt, ut per ejus verba quoddammodo Rex intelligeret quod factum fuit. Nempe dictus fatuus, in Regis praesentia constitutus, coepit vehementer vituperare vecordiam Anglicorum, et hujusmodi materia multiplicare verba. Rex autem ignorans quid sibi vellent verba morionis, interrogat quare dicit Anglicos tam vecordes. Cui ille, "Quia," inquit, "timidi sunt, et in mare saltare non sunt ausi, ut fecerunt nostri Normanni et Gallici generosi;" per quod verbum illico Rex suos intellexit fore devictos, et Anglicos fore victores.
  32. Adam Murimuth, *Continuatis*, 106-07; Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 312; and Geoffrey le Baker, *Chronicon*, 143.
  33. Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 312.
  34. Adam Murimuth, *Continuatio*, 106 and Geoffrey le Baker, *Chronicon*, 142.
  35. Adam Murimuth, *Continuatio*, 106: "Ubi fuit magnum proelium navale commissum, propter fortitudinem et magnitudinem navium Hispaniae et Franciae ad proelium paratarum."
  36. Laurence Minot, *Poems*, ed. J. Hall (Oxford, 1887), 17.
  37. Geoffrey le Baker, *Chronicon*, 142: [Rex Angliae] dixit non esse ulterius expectandum, se et suis ad arma currentibus, et cito paratis, post horam nonam, quando habuit ventum et solem a tergo et impetum fluminis secum, divide in tres turmas, hostibus dedit optatum insultum. See also Minot, *Poems*, 15 and *The French Chronicle of London*, in *Croniques de London*, ed. G. J. Augier, Camden Series o. s. 28 (London, 1864), 76.
  38. Thomas Otterbourne, *Chronica regum Angliae*, ed. T. Hearne, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1732), 1:129.
  39. Edward's letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury is found in Froissart, *Chroniques*, in *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Henri Marie Bruno Joseph, Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove [hereafter Kervyn de Lettenhove], 29 vols. (Brussels, 1874), 18:165-66: "...ardua negotia quae prosequimur, fuissent penitus in ruina, quinimmo nos et nostri fuisset verisimiliter periculo confusionis magnae subiecti."
  40. Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 312. Tunc Anglici, perpendentes navigium Francigenarum fore cum catenis ferreis in una acie adeo colligatum quod non potuit penetrari, retro paululum navigarunt. Francigenae vero, per

- hoc decepti, suum navigium dissolverunt et Anglicos, ut credebant fugientes, insequi nitebantur. See also *French Chronicle*, 76.
41. Thomas Otterbourne, *Chronica Regum Angliae*, 1:129; Ranulph Higden, *Polychronicon*, ed. J. R. Lumby, Rolls Series, 9 vols. (London, 1882), 8:336; *Vita Edwardi secundi*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, ed. W. Stubbs (London, 1882), 293; and Thomas of Burton, *Chronica Monasterii de Melsa*, 2:44: "Ubi, Deo favente, Franci et Normanni acriter sagittati per Anglos sunt devicti."
  42. Thomas of Walsingham, *Ypodigma Neustria*, ed. H. T. Riley, Rolls Series (London, 1876), 279.
  43. Geoffrey le Baker, *Chronicon*, 142-43.
  44. *The Anonimalle Chronicle, 1333 to 1381*, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927), 16 and *Chronicon de Lanercost*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1839), 333-34.
  45. This letter may be found in Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 18:167: "Les Fflemengs estoient de bone volenté d'avoir venus à nous à la bataille du comencement tanque à la fin."
  46. William of Worcester, *The Boke of Noblesse*, ed. J. G. Nichols (London, 1860), 12.
  47. Minot, *Poems*, 17. See also *French Chronicle of London*, 77.
  48. Minot, *Poems*, 17.
  49. Found in Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 18:167.
  50. This letter may be found in Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 18:168.
  51. Ranulph Higden, *Polychronicon*, 8:332.
  52. See Thomas of Burton, *Chronica Monasterii de Melsa*, 2:44-45; Thomas of Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, 1:226-27; *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, 292-93; *Eulogium Historiarum sive temporis*, ed. F. S. Haydon, Rolls Series, 3 vols. (London, 1863), 1:205; *The Brut, or the Chronicles of England*, ed. F. W. D. Brie, Early English Text Society, 2 vols. (London, 1908), 2:295; and Thomas Gray, *Scalachronica*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1836), 169.
  53. *Anonimalle Chronicle*, 16: "Le roi Dengleterre ovesqe ccccxii neofes assailla la graunt maas des neofes de Fraunce et par la grace de Dieu les discomfitrent et ascunes priste-rount."
  54. Henry Knighton, *Chronicon*, ed. J. R. Lumby, Rolls Series (London, 1895), 18: "Commissoque navali bello et hinc inde egregie et fortiter pugnato, tandem Christus concessit victoriam Edwardo regi, sicque Franci protriti sunt."
  55. Minot, *Poems*, 17.
  56. Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 312.
  57. Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 333-34: Qua habita victoria, rex Angliae et Franciae remansit super mare per triduum, et tunc in Flandriam applicuit, omnibus acclamantibus, "vivat rex Francorum et Angliae, benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini!" Cum tamen ante contra ipsum propter suam moram diutina in Anglia fuerant minime provocati, et regina apud Gandavum existens plurimus periculis exposita, cum suis Anglicis inibi qui fuerunt ad regem vero Angliae et Franciae in Flandria existente, omnes regio morbo vexati accedentes ipsius tactu continuo sunt sanati.
  58. This manifesto is printed in Walter of Hemingburgh, *Chronicon*, English Historical Society, 2 vols. (London, 1848), 2:336-340.
  59. The letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury can be found in *Foedera, conventiones, etc.*, ed. T. Rymer, 20 vols. (London, 1739), 2:79; Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 312-14; and Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 18:165-66. It is dated 28 June 1340. The letter to the people of London, dated also 28 June 1340, is found only in Jean Froissart, 18:165-67. And the letter of Edward to Parliament, written two days later, can be found in *Foedera*, 79-80 and Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 18:167-70.
  60. See Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 312.
  61. See Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 313: Sed Deus misericordiarum, videns nos in tantis periculis constitutos, gratius et citius quam humana ratio judicare poterat, misit nobis magnum navale subsidium et insperatum numerum armatorum ac semper ventum prosperum juxta votum; et sic, sub spe coelestis auxilii et justitiae nostrae fiducia, dictum portum navigio venientes, invenimus dictam classem et hostes nostros ibidem paratissimos ad praelium in multitudine copiosa, quibus, in festo Nativitatis Sancti-Johannis Baptistae proximo praeterito, ipse, spes nostra, Christus Deus, per conflictum fortem et validum, nos praevalere concessit, facta strage non modica dictorum hostium, capta etiam quodam modo tota classe, cum laesione gentis nostrae modica respective. See also Edward's letter to the people of London and to the Parliament found in *Froissart* (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 18:166-68.

62. Found in Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis*, 313-14.
63. *Gesta Henrici quinti regis Anglie*, ed. and trans. F. Taylor and J. S. Roskell (Oxford, 1975), 122-24.
64. Geoffrey le Baker, *Chronicon*, 142.
65. Jan de Klerk, *Brabantse yeesten of rijmkroniek van Braband*, ed. J. F. Willems and J. H. Bormans, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1839), 1:564:
- Der Franchoise bleven daer dan  
Dertich durent (dat was groot):  
Die zee was van bloede root;  
In menich scip men woet  
Toten enkele in dat bloet.
- See also Jan de Klerk, *Van den derden Eduwaert*, ed. J. G. Heymans (Nijmegen, 1983), 122.
66. Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 124:
- Doe so worden gescouffiert  
Die Fransoise ende so begrepen,  
Dat sij sprongen uten scepen  
Ende verdroncken mit hoepen groet.
67. Jean le Bel, *Chroniques de Jean le Bel*, ed. J. Viard and E. Duprez, Société de l'histoire de France, 2 vols. (Paris, 1904), 1:156: "Que ce sont plus nobles et les plus frisches combastans qu'on sache."
68. *Chronique de Flandre*, in *Istore et croniques de Flandres*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1879), 2:383.
69. Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 93-142.
70. *Chronicon comitum Flandriae*, in *Corpus chronicorum Flandriae*, i, ed. J. J. de Smet (Brussels, 1837), 213: "Post hanc victoriam gloriosus rex Anglorum, gloriosior per victoriam jam effectus..."
71. Adrien de Budt, *Chronicon Flandriae*, in *Corpus chronicorum Flandriae*, i, ed. J. J. de Smet (Brussels, 1837), 327: "...cessit tamen sibi victoria."
72. Jean le Bel, *Chroniques*, 1:179: "Maiz le roy Edowart se maintint sy vassaument, et faisoit de si grands proesses de son propre corps que il resbaudioit et donnoit cuer à tous les autres."
73. *Breve chronicon Flandriae*, in *Corpus chronicorum Flandriae*, iii, ed. J. J. de Smet (Brussels, 1856), 8: "atque Flandriam liberavit."
74. *Rijmkroniek van Vlaenderen*, in *Corpus chronicorum Flandriae*, iv, ed. J. J. de Smet (Brussels, 1865), 831.
75. Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 122:
- Quamen Eduwaert ende siin liede  
Getogen over de zee  
Mit ij. c. scepen of mee  
Also die ghene die woude volstaen  
Int gelof dat hij hadde gedaen.  
Ende ten iersten dat hij vernam  
Dat hij bij tlant van Vlaenderen quam,  
Dede hi hem sonder letten  
Opt lant van vlaederen setten.  
Geloeft sij God, dat hij sprac.  
Doen ic uut desen lande trac,  
Geloefdic mitter trouwen mijn  
Dat ic hier weder soude siin  
Eer Sint Jans dach sonder waen  
Ende dat so hebbic gedaen,  
Want ic hier sta opt sant.
- See also Edmond de Dynter, *Chronicon ducum Brabantiae*, ed. P. F. X. de Ram, 3 vols. (Brussels), 2:631-32.
76. *Chronicon comitum Flandriae*, 210.
77. See, for example, Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 122: "Een deel Vlaminge te waeren,/die uten lande gebannen waeren."
78. See Jan de Klerk, *Brabantse yeesten*, 1:564-65; Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 122; *Breve chronicon Flandriae*, 8; and *Récit d'un bourgeois de Valenciennes*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1877), 181.
79. *Chronique de Flandre*, 2:383-84.
80. Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 120. See also *Chronicon comitum Flandriae*, 212.
81. Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 123.
82. *Rijmkroniek van Vlaenderen*, 831.
83. *Chronicon comitum Flandriae*, 210: "...qui interim regit indebite et injuste..."
84. Adrien de Budt, *Chronicon Flandriae*, 326: Rex Francorum, intelligens Flandrenses Anglicis adhaerere velle, misit solemnes suos nuntios, offerens omnia quitare debita, ratione restarum et resignare villas de Duaco et Insula cum castellaniis; sed monitis regis acquiescere propter lanificium nolebant.
85. Jean le Bel, *Chroniques*, 1:179.
86. Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 123:
- Maer God sender sine genade,  
Om wech te doene die quade,  
Want hij haerer quader daden

Niet langhre en woude gestaden.

See also Edmond de Dynter, *Chronicon ducum Brabantiae*, 2:631-32.

87. *Chronicon comitum Flandriae*, 212: Et finaliter in portu de Slusa applicuerunt dictae naves et galeae universae anno sequenti, videlicet MCCCXL, de quo propheta erat dudum Hildegardis prophetissa, quod caedes et incendia multa fierent ipso anno.
  88. *Chronique des Pays-Bas, de France, d'Angleterre et de Tournai*, in *Corpus chronicorum Flandriae*, iii, ed. J. J. de Smet (Brussels, 1856), 151: Moul't y pierdirent li Englais, au commencement; mais il furent secourus des Flamens, et furent li Franchois desconffis.
  89. Jan de Klerk, *Van dan derden Eduwaert*, 124.
  90. *Continuatio chronici* of Guillaume de Nangis, in *Chronicon*, ed. H. Geraud, 2 vols. (Paris, 1843), 2:168; Richard Lescot, *Chronique*, ed. J. Lemoine, Société de l'histoire de France (Paris, 1896), 51-52; and *Les grandes chroniques de France*, ed. J. Viard, Société d'histoire de France, 10 vols. (Paris, 1937), 9:181.
  91. *Grandes chroniques*, 9:180: "...pour ce qu'il avoit oy nouvelles que le roy d'Angleterre devoit arriver à Escluse..."
  92. *Grandes chroniques*, 9:182.
  93. *Grandes chroniques*, 9:182 and *Chronographia regum Francorum*, ed. H. Moranville, 2 vols. (Paris, 1897), 2:120.
  94. Jean de Venette, *Chronique*, ed. and trans. R. A. Maxwell (New York, 1953), 33. (For the Latin edition of this work see *Continuatio chronici* of Guillaume de Nangis, 2:183).
  95. *Chronographia regum Francorum*, 2:122.
  96. *Chronique Normande de xiv siècle*, ed. A. and E. Molinier (Paris, 1882), 45: "Fut celle bataille grande et merveilleuse, et moul't perdirent Anglois au premier, mais ilz furent rescoux par les Flamens et furent Franchois desconfiz."
  97. Richard Lescot, *Chronique*, 52: "Nostri bellatores, bene primitus se habentes, sed postea repulsi pre multitudine supervenientium Flamingorum."
  98. *Continuatio chronici* of Guillaume de Nangis, 21:166: Hoc anno calamitatis et miseriae, ignominiae et confusionis, inter duos reges Francorum et Angliae nihil laudabile patratum est, quia quidquid in eo factum est non de Spiritu sancto, sed ab angelo Satanae credendum est processisse.
- Nam cum duobus seu tribus annis praecedentibus multa gravamina pauperibus ecclesiis fuerint illata, necnon et exactiones gravissimae communi populo, hoc eodem anno maximae confusiones convaluerunt, no tamen ad utilitatem rei publicae praedictorum regnorum in aliquo; sed, proh dolor! ad dedecus et confusionem totius christianitatis, ac sanctae et universalis matris Ecclesiae, cujus praefati principes principaliter et maxime deberent esse sustentamentum et fulcimen, hoc notum est accidisse. See also Jean de Venette, *Chronique*, 32 and the *Grandes chroniques*, 9:175.
99. Jean de Venette, *Chronique*, 32-33.
  100. Jean de Hocsem, *La chronique de Jean de Hocsem*, ed. G. Kurth (Brussels, 1927), 294: "...dicente Terentio: Omnia prius quam bellum temptare sapientem decet."
  101. Cuvelier, *Chronique de Bertrand Guesclin par Cuvelier, trouvere du XIVe siecle*, ed. E. Charriere, 2 vols. (Paris, 1839), 1:24.
  102. See *Chronographia regum Francorum*, 2:89-93 and Jean de Venette, *Chronique*, 32-33.
  103. Richard Lescot, *Chronique*, 50-51: "...rex Anglie, ut pecunias extorqueret pro auxilio Flamingorum qui sibi homagium facere cogitabant in Angliam transfre tasset." This may be a double insult. Certainly Lescot thinks an evil has been committed by the English king in turning the Flemings away from their homage vows. But, it is possible that he also means to indict Edward for "extorting" money from his subjects, giving the word a decidedly illegal sense. In medieval legal French, however, the verb *extorquere* does not always carry such an illegal connotation. (See J. H. Baker, *Manuel of Law French* (Avesbury, 1979), 107.)
  104. Jean de Hocsem, *Chronique*, 295: "Rex Anglie tamen multos de suis perdidit, et in rebus maxima dampna sustinuisse narratur."
  105. *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois*, ed. S. Luce, Société de l'histoire de Française (Paris, 1862), 10-11: "Et comme vint à l'assembler, les Genenois s'en fuirent. Monseigneur Pierre d'Estelant, Hue Kerest et Beuchet alerent de bon cueur et de bon courage contre les Angloix." See also Jean de Venette, *Chronique*, 33.
  106. *Chronographia regum Francorum*, 2:121-22: Prenominatus autem Barbavaria qui erat in galeis suis, percipiens Anglicos venientes, dixit prefatis admiraldo et Nicholao Bahucheti: "Domini mei, jam videtis regem

- Anglie cum suo navigio venire super nos. Si michi credatis, omne navigium divertatur in mare altum; si enim hic remaneatis, Anglici qui ventum, solem et aque fluxum habent pro se, in tantum vos coartabunt quod minime vos poteritis juvare." Nicholaus autem Bahuceti, qui melius sciebat unum compotum quam guerras marinas facere, respondit ei: "Hesibundus enim sit qui recedet ab hinc et non prestolabit eventum belli."
107. *Chronographia regum Francorum*, 2:120-21. See also *Grandes chroniques*, 9:182.
108. *Grandes chroniques*, 9:184: Et avint ceste desconfiture par l'orgueil des II admiraux, car l'un ne pooit souffrir de l'autre, et tout par envie; et si ne voudrent croire le conseil de Barbevaire...si leur en vint mal, si comme pluseurs le tesmoignent.
109. *Continuatio chronici* of Guillaume de Nangis, 2:169-70:
- Nulla fides regni sociis, omnisque potestas  
Impatiens consortis erit, nec gentibus ullis  
Credite, nec longe fatorum exempla petantur  
Fraterno primi maduerunt sanguine muri.
- Volens dicere et annuere quod quidquid dicatur seu fingatur, nullus vult habere socium in auctoritate, sed totam sibi attribuere auctoritatem.
110. The edition of Froissart's *Chroniques* by Kervyn de Lettenhove presents a side by side edition of the three Froissart redactions which differ in many respects.
111. Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 3:196: Ceste bataille dont je vous parolle, fu moult felenesse et moult orible; car batailles et assaux sur mer sont plus durs et plus fort que sus terre, car on ne puet fuir, ne reculer: si se convient deffendre et vendre et montrer se proëce.
112. Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 3:194: "Li roys d'Engleterre et li sien qui s'en venoient tout singlant, regardèrent et veirent deviers l'Escluse si grant quantitet de vaisiaux que des mas che sambloit droitement ung bois." See also 3:199, 203-04.
113. Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 3:202.
114. Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 3:194.
115. Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 3:200: Dont respondi li rois engles: "J'ai de lonch temps désiré que les puisse combatre; si les combaterons, s'il plaist à Dieu et à saint Jorge; car voirement m'ont-il fait tant contraires que j'en voeil prendre le vengeance, se j'i puis avenir." Edward's speech in the first redaction of Froissart's work is entirely different (3:194): Lors dist li roys: "Il les nous fault combattre, et se nous les poons desconfire, nostre guerre en avant en sera plus belle; car voirement sont-il moult resongniet de nos amis et ont ete depuis qu'il se missent sur mer, et nous ont fet pluseurs contraires. Si les combaterons s'il plect à Dieu et à saint Jorge."
116. Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove ed.), 3:194, 200, 204.
117. Ibid., 3:195: Et ces dames fist li roys bien et songneusement de CCC armures de fer et de Ve archers. Et puis pria li roys à tous que il volsissent pensser dou bien faire et garder sen onneur, et chascun li eult en convent. See also 3:200.
118. Ibid., 3:195.
119. Ibid., 3:195: Quant li roys d'Engleterre et li marescal eurent ordonnet bellement et sageement leurs batailles, il fisent tendre et traire les voilles contremont, et vinrent sus destre pour avoir l'avantaige du soleil qui en venant leur estoit ou visiage.
120. Ibid., 3:195-96.
121. Ibid., 3:196, 201, 204-05.
122. Ibid., 3:205: Et là fu la bataille très-grande et très-périlleuse; car chil Normant et chil Génevois, estoient tout esquumeur et costumiers de la mer, et trop bien en prenoient la painne, car en tout lor vivant il n'avoient fait aultre cose que poursiervir les aventures d'armes sus la mer. Aussi, au voir dire, Englois sont bons gens de mer, car il en sont fait et nourri, et trop bien en prennent la painne.
123. Ibid., 3:205: "Considérés se la en ce terme et espase, il n'i peurent pas avenir des grans fais d'armes."
124. Ibid., 3:202 lists the names of these gallant English soldiers. See also 3:197.
125. Ibid., 3:205: Pour lors li rois d'Engleterre estoit en la flour de sa jonèce et point ne s'espargnoit, mais s'aventuroit en la bataille aussi aventureusement comme nuls de ses chevaliers, et monstroient bien en faisoient armes que la besongne estoit sienne.
126. Ibid., 3:196: "Bien est voirs que messires Hues Kiérès estoit bons chevaliers et hardis, et messires Pierres Bahucès, et y fisent merveilles d'armes."
127. Ibid., 3:197. In the second version of this battle, Froissart reports that both admirals were executed. Quiéret was beheaded and Béhuchet was hanged from a mast. (See III:206.)

128. Ibid., 3:201-02: Là se commença bataille dure et forte de tous costés, et arcier et arbalestrier commencierent à traire l'un contre l'autre diversement et roidement, et gens d'armes à approcier et à combattre main à main asprement et hardiment...Mais il s'esprouvèrent si bien et si vassaument... qu'il obtinèrent le place et l'yaue, et furent li Normant et tout cil qui là estoient encontre yaus, mort et desconfi, péri et noyet, ne onques piés n'en escapa que tout ne fuissent mis à bort. See Ibid., 3:197.
129. Ibid., 3:196-97: Et dura le bataille del heure de prisme jusques a revelée, et adont vinrent grant gent de Flandres, car très le matin li bailleux de l'Escluse l'avoit fet segnefyer à Bruges et ès villes voisinnes. Si estoient les villes toutes esmutes et acouru à piet et à cheval et par le Roe, cheminans qui mieux pour aidier les Englés, et s'asamblèrent à l'Escluse grant quantité de Flammens et entèrent en nefes et en barges et en grans vaissiaux espangnols, et s'en vinrent jusques à le bataille tout fresk et tout nouvel, et grandement reconfortèrent les Engles.
130. Ibid., 3:206: Finablement li Englois obtinrent la mer et la place, et furent chil esqumeur, Normant, Piquart, Gènevois, bidau et Provençiel desconfi, et trop petit s'en sauvèrent, car à la desconfiture, il ne porent. Cause pourquoi, je le vous dirai. Les Englois en venant les avoient enclos entre eus et l'Escluse. Se ne pooient requeler, fors sus lors ennemis, ne aler avant, ne rompre la navie d'Engleterre qui qvoit poupris tout la passage de la mer. Chil et auqun qui se quidièrent sauver par venir à l'Escluse, furent mort davantage; car li Flamenc qui avoient grant haine à euls pour tant que toute la saison il avoient cuvryet et héryet le passage à l'Escluse et robé et pilliet sus la mer et n'avoient en cure à qui, les tuoient otant bien sus la terre que en la mer et n'en avoient nulle pité.



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
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## The Frigate Strikes Her Colors

DANA M. WEGNER

This note offers some observations on W. M. P. Dunne's 1993 article, "'The Frigate *Constellation* Clearly Was No More': Or Was She?"<sup>1</sup> Specific elements of that article are scrutinized but the findings may be of general interest and apply to other writings. The note will conclude with an account of how *The American Neptune* has figured in the chronology of recent events relating to the *Constellation* controversy. It ends with a brief review of what has happened to the ship and to the question surrounding its lineage.

Professor Dunne's article provided rebuttal to a two-hundred-page Navy technical report written in 1991 by Colan Ratliff, and Kevin Lynaugh, and me. The report found that the then available architectural, artifactual, and documentary evidence showed that the U.S. warship *Constellation*, at that time exhibited since 1955 as a frigate built in Baltimore in 1797, was really a sloop-of-war built in Norfolk in 1855. Titled *Fouled Anchors: The Constellation Question Answered*, the report was limited to about one hundred copies. It has not been published in *The American Neptune*.<sup>2</sup>

### SHIP DESIGN

#### *Designer's Half Model*


One important clue to the identity of the *Constellation* was her 1853 designer's model. Half hull models were regularly employed by the U.S. Navy in the ship design process from about 1820 until about the 1950s. That is a basic principle commonly recognized by maritime curators and knowledgeable scholars. The half model's role in warship design was considered uniquely American, "a proud emblem of American skill." Stephen B. Luce wrote in 1863, "The Ohio, 74,

was built from a model under the supervision of Mr. Henry Eckford, at the Brooklyn Yard in 1820, and since that time the model has been considered an indispensable feature in the designing of a ship." Today, the Department of the Navy's ship model collection contains over 230 half hulls, and many of them are nineteenth century designer's models.<sup>3</sup>

Five contemporary American technical treatises described the design and building of wooden ships and now liberally document the use of half models in the nineteenth century. They were written by Lachlen McKay (1839), John W. Griffiths (1852), Samuel Pook (1866), Richard W. Meade (1869), and Theodore Wilson (1878). Pook and Wilson were naval constructors. McKay and Griffiths were leading commercial ship designers and Meade was a Naval Academy instructor.<sup>4</sup>

Together with drawings, the dimensions and shape of each warship were developed by making a half model. The model was taken apart, measured, and the readings were enlarged and transferred onto the mould loft floor ("laid off"). Used as tools, design models had several distinct and unmistakable physical characteristics. One common attribute was the inclusion of some means to disassemble the completed object.

A question of whether the offset measurements of the sloop *Constellation* were taken from the half model or whether the model was made later from the offsets has been raised by those unfamiliar with American half model usage and mould loft process. The question is answered "neither." The full-sized drawing on the mould loft floor was laid off using the model and preliminary drafts. Offset measurements were recorded ("taken") from the floor drawing. For example, the sloop *Constellation*'s 1853 offset tables bear the label, "...taken from the mould loft floor."<sup>5</sup>



Lift-style designer's half model of USS *Ohio* (1820) designed by Henry Eckford. 46.125"x10.125"x5.75" half breadth, scale 1:48, Department of the Navy model 979. "The Ohio 74, was built from a model under the supervision of Mr. Henry Eckford, at the Brooklyn Yard in 1820, and since that time the model has been considered an indispensable feature in the designing of a ship." Stephen B. Luce, *Seamanship* (1863), 229. Similar models were used in the Navy's design process until the 1950s. Griffiths, *Treatise on Architecture* (1851), 92, wrote that the first lift-style designer half-models in America appeared about 1790. Perhaps the earliest surviving example of the ketch *Eliza* (1794) is in the collection of the Peabody Essex Museum, publishers of this journal. Courtesy Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division.

After the full-sized drawing on the floor was faired, adjusted, and then approved by the architect, the loftsmen made the moulds. Moulds were full-sized templates used to cut the ship's timbers. Afterward, moulds were sometimes stored for years anticipating the need for sister ships or heavy repairs. Moulds were usually made from  $\frac{3}{4}$ "x4" ripped pine boards. For durability, they were not particularly thin, were not flexible, and could not be bent to shape. Bevels were the geometrical angles to which the moulded, or outside, faces of the frames were cut. Bevels or bevelings (that is, angles) were computed from the floor or half model and marked indelibly on ten-inch-wide planks of wood called bevel boards. Bevel boards were also kept with the moulds.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Provenance of Constellation Half Model*

Some have questioned the authenticity of the sloop *Constellation* design model by requiring substantiation of its whereabouts (provenance) since creation. Here was confused artifactual

provenance with the so-called "chain of custody" idea applied to evidence in criminal cases.<sup>7</sup> To establish the authenticity of the *Constellation* model, only two questions needed to be answered. First, was it a designer's model? Second, was it *Constellation*? The answers to both questions were affirmative. The model stands as tangible evidence that the sloop *Constellation* was a new design and incorporated none of the hull form of its predecessor.

#### *What Is a Sharp Ship?*

The frigate *Constellation* was frequently described as a "sharp-built" vessel. Some presume that Joshua Humphreys' 1795 design for the frigate *Constellation* was not sharp and therefore the sharp-built *Constellation* was not built to Humphreys' plans.<sup>8</sup>

"Sharp" was a common phrase used to describe the rise of the floors of a vessel, that is, the tendency toward a v-shaped bottom. All large vessels were commonly classified as either "full"

(flat bottomed) or “sharp” (v-shape bottomed.) *Constellation*, *Constitution*, and all their sisters were considered sharp. The v-shaped bottom substituted hold space for some improved sailing characteristics. *Constellation*’s floors were sharp, not her lines. Sleek entrance lines were called “clean.” The frigate *Constellation* was constructed as a sharp-built vessel following Humphreys’ plans.<sup>9</sup>

### Round Sterns

Two seemingly innocuous paragraphs in our 1991 report have led to unexpected confusion. For simplicity, some knowledgeable authors have considered the structurally rounded ship’s stern and the elliptical stern “variations of the same theme.” Other authors have considered them as different styles. While both styles outwardly appeared similar, there were differences in underlying ship structure. In chronologically assigning the sloop *Constellation*’s stern style, we chose to consider each variant, round and elliptical, as a distinct design phase. The round stern was introduced in Britain by Robert Seppings in 1817. It was not popular. In 1827, while a sub-surveyor, William Symonds produced one vessel with an elliptical stern. The elliptical stern incorporated some better characteristics of the new round stern and the older flat stern. When Symonds replaced Seppings as surveyor in 1832, the elliptical stern became standard in the British Navy. Progression of the British stern from flat to round to elliptical, and back to round is well defined and illustrated in several fine sources.<sup>10</sup>

Examination of plans for the ships described by American ship designer William Doughty in 1821 and British Lt. F. Fitzgerald De Roos in 1826 as having rounded sterns showed that they had what would later be called elliptical sterns. All of the so-called “river class” (*Potomac* class) American frigates, and the *Boston* and *Portsmouth* class sloops of 1821 and 1843 had elliptical sterns. In summation, the structurally rounded stern was introduced in 1817, first in Britain. The elliptical stern was reportedly introduced in America by William Doughty first in USS *Brandywine*, launched 1825. The British then generally adopted the elliptical stern in 1832. Both nations returned to the structurally round “steamboat” stern by the 1850s.<sup>11</sup> It is the later

structurally rounded stern that *Constellation* has had since 1855.

### REPAIRS TO CONSTELLATION BEFORE 1853

In general, records regarding all repairs to the frigate *Constellation* are not very complete. For example, the mysterious heavy repair done at the Washington Navy Yard in 1812 is, so far, documented by only a few descriptive sentences. Repairs in 1829 and 1834 are better documented, but even these straightforward events have been sources of unwarranted speculation.<sup>12</sup>

### 1801 Repairs

After discharging men in Philadelphia, before sailing to Washington, DC to place *Constellation* in ordinary, on April 8, 1801 Captain Alexander Murray wrote that the frigate needed but little repair. On the night of April 10, the ship ran aground on a rocky bottom and when the tide fell uncommonly low, the vessel rolled over nearly to her beam ends. Unable to right herself, she rapidly flooded with the incoming tide. She was fully loaded with provisions and guns, but had previously landed her powder and sails at Philadelphia. The ship remained on her side and totally engulfed in water. Writing on April 26, 1801 Captain Murray expressed relief that his ship, though on the bottom, so far did not appear to suffer any material (structural) damage. She could be pumped out for \$5,000 in about three days.<sup>13</sup>

Requiring a Herculean effort by Joshua Humphreys, the vessel was not righted and dewatered until about May 3. Murray believed it was Humphreys’ expertise that prevented complete loss of the *Constellation*. The ship was towed to Philadelphia and everything was hauled from her. Sections of her planking were removed and she was thoroughly cleansed inside. All of her rigging except the lower masts were removed. Though not delineated in Murray’s self-protecting correspondence, there is little doubt that *Constellation* had been previously at least partially dismasted and stripped to right her.

In June 1801, it was decided to repair *Constellation*. Planking was replaced and she was nearly rebuilt from the waterline upward. Repairs



Refurbished designer's half hull model of the sloop-of-war *Constellation* (1853), designed by John Lenthall, 61.5"x10"x7" half breadth, scale 1:36, U.S. Naval Academy model. Contemporary technical treatises, enhanced by several physical characteristics described in *Fouled Anchors*, positively attest to the authenticity and relevance of the *Constellation* half model. Courtesy Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division.

to the ship were not completed until about December 26, 1801 — some eight months after her unfortunate accident. Except sails and powder, the entire contents of the ship, including the officer's baggage was submerged for three weeks in mud and filth. Rolling on beam ends was a significant disaster for any ship. Indeed, it would appear that the *Constellation* had been severely damaged and extensively repaired in 1801.<sup>14</sup>

#### 1812 Repairs

On October 15, 1814, Captain Thomas Tingey reported that in 1812 *Constellation* had been repaired and extended "...fourteen inches more beam at the main breadth." The phrasing meant that work was done that resulted in an increase of fourteen inches in her extreme breadth. Main, or extreme, breadth was the maximum width of the ship including at least planking and perhaps wales, back strakes, and any appurtenances protruding from the sides. Moulded breadth, which generally related to the design of the vessel, was measured to the outside of the frame (or inside of the plank.) A change in moulded beam might have signaled a change in hull form but *Constel-*

*lation's* moulded beam remained unchanged in 1812. If Captain Tingey meant *Constellation's* moulded or designed beam was increased he would have said it.<sup>15</sup>

Tingey's report said that she was "...stripped down to the lower futtocks." However, the entire document must be examined in context to learn what Tingey meant by "stripped down." The full report shows that in 1812, *Scorpion* was "cut down," *Adams* was "stripped down" and *Enterprise* was both "cut down" and "stripped to her floor timbers."<sup>16</sup> Cutting and stripping were clearly different operations, and it is likely "stripping" meant removing internal planking and decks to replace frames.

#### 1829 Repairs

Did *Constellation* receive a new bow and stern in 1829? Repair records mention in one brief phrase that workers were "dubbing off stern." Her galleries, quarterpieces, and taffrail were replaced and the surrounding planking was likely dubbed smooth before priming and painting. Quarterpieces were ornamental boards forming the aft edge of the quarter galleries and

bending up to form the taffrail.<sup>17</sup> The repair records do not mention the bow nor the plumbing, planking, keelson piece, knees, deadwood, inner post, stern post, cant frames, and transoms that would be required for a new stern. Light work done on *Constellation* in early 1829 centered on carving, priming, and painting, not rebuilding.

#### *1838-39 Repairs at Gosport*


Repair records specify that in the bow area, only a new apron, a piece of keelson, and a piece of stemson were replaced. The apron was a single timber mounted to the stem and used as a foundation for affixing planking at the bow. These three ordinary inboard components were subject to decay and were regularly replaced many times during a vessel's life without altering the hull form. The records do not mention the new cant frames, rising wood, stem, gripe, and general effort required to design, apply, and fair-in a new bow. They simply say that in 1838-39 the apron, a piece of stemson, and a piece of keelson were replaced.<sup>18</sup>

## TWO CONSTELLATIONS AT GOSPORT, 1853-55

### *1853 Docking Plans*

Just before the frigate *Constellation* was broken up in 1853, measured hull drawings were made for bracing her while in dry dock. Dated 1853, these plans showed an aged ship, twisted and hogged. However, modern computer programs could reconfigure the data and measure, depict, and analyze the undistorted hull form. The hull form in these drawings was shown by computer studies in *Fouled Anchors* to conform to Joshua Humphreys' 1795 plans for the ship.

The docking plans showed that between 1795 and 1853, the shape of *Constellation*'s hull below the waterline was not altered. No portion of the hull form of the old frigate was carried over to the new sloop in 1853. Unless this evidence is controverted, speculation about changes to the frigate *Constellation*'s hull form before 1853 is largely pointless.<sup>19</sup>



Wooden locking keys from the 1853 designer's model of the sloop *Constellation*. Designer's models were usually made from layers of boards called "lifts." Tapered wooden keys were used to help hold the lifts together while the model was worked. Later, at the mould loft, the keys were removed to disassemble the model into separate lifts for tracing and measuring. Decorative models did not employ keys. Courtesy Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division.

### *Gosport Store Records*

The store records for the Gosport Navy Yard when the sloop-of-war *Constellation* was built are abundant, complete, and clear. There is no need to speculate about the source of materials. The records concisely list all the materials turned in from the old frigate. They concisely list all of the materials dispensed to the new ship. They do not list any salvaged material from the old ship dispensed to the new ship. The Gosport store records previously have been discussed exhaustively, but apparently require further clarification.

Gosport store records had two distinct components. The returns were organized by the month. Each month had two separate reports — one journal and one ledger.<sup>20</sup>

- The first monthly report, a true ledger, was a printed-form balance sheet. It was an exact accounting of all of the yard's stores. It listed every type of material and the amount on hand on the first day of the month, plus the total of materials added to stock that month, minus the total of materials withdrawn from stock that month, ending with the balance of material remaining in stock on the last day of the month.
- The second monthly report was the chronological journal of the sources, descriptions, and quantities of all materials received. Materials were purchased from contractors and received from ships being overhauled and broken up. Interspersed between entries of materials received were those listing outgoing materials. These formed the chronological journal of materials dispensed to various projects including *Constellation*. This portion of the journal has been the only record recognized by some authors.<sup>21</sup>

As an accounting procedure, both reports balanced at the end of each month. In the bound copies of the Gosport store records, there are then twenty-four reports comprising thirty-six records for each year. All material received from the old *Constellation* was detailed in the journal and added to the monthly balance ledger of material on hand. All material dispensed to the new *Constellation* was detailed in the journal and deducted from the balance ledger of material on

hand. This exact accounting system enables the researcher to trace the source and destination of all material used in building the new *Constellation*. There was no evidence found in the Gosport records suggesting that any material was transferred directly from the old ship to the new.<sup>22</sup>

Highlighting an April 1854 disbursement entry from the journal, some speculate about how timbers listed as coming from "old frigate" might have come from the old *Constellation*. The original journal consistently referred to wood withdrawn from "frigates." "Frigates" was plural. In the April 1854 entry the portion, quoted as "old frigate" by some, actually reads "frigates" with the word "old" written over it. The journal refers to the old timber stockpile for frigates. The full record, which includes both the journal and the ledger, shows that none of the timber in that stockpile came from the old *Constellation*.<sup>23</sup>

### *Timber Surplus*

Some suppose that, since the supply of live oak timber had been expended on the Sea Islands around 1825, there could be no surplus live oak timber on hand at navy yards in 1853: Building and repair programs depleted the supply of live oak at yards and live oak timber was so rare that every scrap was preserved for reuse. This appears an unsubstantiated presumption. While live oak growth was known to be finite, the product was still available, and as early as 1849, the Navy regularly replenished its stockpiles simply by purchasing more timber.<sup>24</sup>

*Fouled Anchors* found that the frame for the new sloop *Constellation* was built primarily from timber stockpiled for the construction and repair of frigates and ships-of-the-line. A smaller amount of wood was taken from the steamer stock and less yet from the sloop reserve. Why did not the new sloop match the shape and dimensions of the precut stockpile? About 78% of the timber used in constructing the new *Constellation* in 1853 was promiscuous, that is, stockpiled timber that was not precut to frame shape.<sup>25</sup>

*Fouled Anchors* postulated that in July 1853, the Gosport Yard alone had over 90,400 cubic feet of precut framing timber and ten full sets of beams for ships-of-the-line. Gosport was one of seven naval ship yards with similar stockpiles. In 1852, the Navy had no combat-ready ships-of-the-



Loftsmen laying off the battleship *Maine*, New York Navy Yard, 1889. The kneeling worker in the foreground is holding the end of a batten that will be used to scribe a sweeping line on the floor. Nearby, two figures adjust a measuring tape. Ceiling joists are adorned with plaques commemorating previous designs laid off in the loft. ("Sloop No. 1" became USS *Lexington*.) Sturdy moulds are stored overhead. Two old half models are mounted on the far bulkhead. *Harper's Weekly*, March 9, 1889.

line, and the future prospects of building any new liners or sailing frigates was nil. Live oak timber stockpiled for construction of these obsolete vessels was, indeed, potentially surplus. The USS *Franklin* and all five *Merrimack* class screw frigates were also built from obsolete timber.<sup>26</sup>

A recently discovered newspaper article revealed that four floors and four third futtocks of the sloop *Constellation* were made from the frigate's 1853 floors.<sup>27</sup> The news article showed that the transfer occurred informally and probably outside the Gosport records system. The amount of wood reported transferred would amount to about ninety-three net cubic feet of more than 16,500 gross cubic feet of timber consumed by the new sloop. Unidentified in the ship's structure, it is unlikely much of this wood has survived until today.

### SHIPS NOT BUILT TO PLAN

#### *Wandering Dimensions*

Using general dimensions to identify ship designs is a risky premise. The chart in "The Frigate *Constellation* Clearly Was No More': Or Was She?"<sup>28</sup> is an example of combining data accrued from different sources, comparing that data,

and then drawing broad conclusions. The general conclusion was that Navy ships were not built according to their plans and specifications. One would therefore judge that the Navy Department did not know how big its ships were nor what they looked like.

For the large Table 1 appearing in that article, the gun deck lengths specified by Humphreys in 1795 were to be measured from the rabbet of the stem to the post. In 1806 Fox measured the gun decks of ships listed on Table 1 from the fore part of the stem rabbet to the after part of the wing transom. The 1795 and the 1806 gun deck measurements appearing in that table were taken from different places and were not comparable.<sup>29</sup>

In this chart, the peculiar variation of *Congress* deserved attention. The listed spar deck length of *Congress* was derived from a third source, a September 1799 report. The remaining dimensions in the column were from Josiah Fox's 1806 measurements. Using two different sources diminished the difference between *Congress*'s gun deck and spar deck lengths. Mixed-source measurements increased the disparity between *Constellation*'s gun deck length compared to *Congress*'s. Based upon the mismatched figures and a significant error in subtraction, much was

speculated about *Constellation*'s "raking stem" compared to the Charles Ware drawing of *Congress*.<sup>30</sup>

Other measurements of *Congress* certified correct in the September 1799 report are equally valid, but were not employed in Table 1. In that document her gun deck was the same length as the design specifications. Her moulded breadth probably measured one inch more in 1799 than designed. Further, a journal kept aboard *Congress* 1815-20 recorded that then the length of *Congress*'s gun deck was still the same and her extreme breadth was two inches less than the original 1795 Humphreys design. According to either the 1799 or the 1815-20 figures, *Congress* conformed well to the original important dimensions. According to the Fox 1806 measurements, *Constellation*, the subject of discussion, very nearly matched Humphreys' 1795 major dimensions.<sup>31</sup>

Sweeping conclusions based upon a small variation of only inches, measured by different people years apart would be ill-advised. Gross dimensions might vary many inches because of measuring accuracy, normal structural deformation over time, tune of the rig, temperature, humidity, and even declination of the sun. We would strongly discourage sole reliance upon dimensions to make conclusions about design variations. Drafts, offset tables, or designer's models would be superior sources.

#### *Government Controls*

A popular view holds that the frigate *Constellation* of 1797 was not built according to the official plans issued by the Secretary of War. This idea is occasionally applied to other vessels by authors and curators stymied by apparently otherwise unexplainable inconsistencies between ships' measurements and their plans.<sup>32</sup>

For *Constellation*, the War Department issued several directives ordering that the 44- and 36-gun frigates be built as ordered.<sup>33</sup> Changes were permitted if approved and several design changes were excellent examples of how the controls functioned properly. Each example was an approved deviation. For identical reasons, the system of proposed and approved change orders is still used in shipbuilding today.

The Fox to Truxtun letter of April 2, 1795,<sup>34</sup>

reinforced the fact that the government was suspicious of builders like Stodder. Fox wrote, warning Truxtun to remain alert regarding unapproved changes to the design. There is no reason to believe that controls were largely bypassed and each builder secretly created his own new unrecorded design.

British observer Lt. F. Fitzgerald De Roos noted about American warships in 1826, "On the model of every ship a committee is held — the draft determined on, and transmitted to the builders of the dockyards; and as periodical inspections take place, no deviation from the original model can occur. This system of classification and admirable adherence to approved models have been attended by the most beneficial results, which are visible in the beauty and excellent qualities of the ships of the United States."<sup>35</sup>

#### PROMISCUOUS MATTERS

##### *Oozing Mud Flats*

Suggesting that substantial portions of her were destined for reuse in the new sloop, the question has been raised whether the frigate *Constellation* was more gently torn apart than other ships at Gosport. It has been claimed that, unlike the frigate *Constellation*, other vessels like *Guerriere*, *Java*, and *Congress* had been uncereemoniously taken out to a marsh near Gosport, hacked down, and abandoned to sink into the ooze.<sup>36</sup>

By September 1840, *Guerriere* was taken out to a mud flat near Gosport and cut up. The process consumed over 5,036 man-days of labor, cost the Navy \$6171.72, and spanned ten months. The record shows that a great deal of time and effort was expended to cut up *Guerriere*. She was not rebuilt and she was not abandoned to sink into the ooze.<sup>37</sup>

In 1853, the *Constellation* was carefully brought into a building slip; at that time, the Navy was considering converting her into a sloop. The idea was abandoned and the old ship was cut up, probably when John Lenthall drew his plans for a new ship in May 1853.<sup>38</sup>

##### *Armament in the 1856 de Simone Painting*

The painting of the sloop *Constellation* in 1856 by de Simone has been described as show


ing her armed with "ten carronades in broadside."<sup>39</sup> Unusual armament for an 1856 sloop to be sure; the U.S. Navy began to phase out carronades in 1844. They were all but gone from the fleet by 1850 and failed to be listed in the 1852 naval ordnance manual. Bauer suggests that *Constellation* probably had two 10", sixteen 8", and four 32-pounder guns at the time.<sup>40</sup>

#### Sail Plan of Congress

Sailmaker Charles Ware's renderings should be approached with caution. Categorized as sail plans, further aspects of the drawings should not be accepted without confirming data from other sources. The late Merritt A. Edson, Jr. believed that the Ware drawings were created, but not used, as general illustrations for the Navy's 1826 Tables of Allowances. He believed the Ware drawing-set depicted the recommended rig of existing and anticipated types of ships. Edson thought the drawings were not intended to reflect the rig of specific vessels at exact mo-

| <i>Rising of Sheer in the Fore</i>              |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                    |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
|                                                 | ⊗                   | A                   | B                   | C                   | D                   | E                   | F                   | G                   | H                   | I                   | J                   | K                  |
| Plank sheer                                     | 30.10               | 30.10 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 30.10 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 30.11 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 30.11 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 30.0 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 31.1                | 31.1 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 31.2 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 31.3 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 31.4 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 31.5 $\frac{3}{8}$ |
| deck beams                                      | 29.9                | 29.9 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 29.9 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 29.10 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 29.10 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 29.11 $\frac{3}{8}$ | 30.0                | 30.0 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 30.1 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 30.2 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 30.3 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 30.4 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Port sill                                       | 28.1                | 28.1 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 28.1 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 28.2 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 28.2 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 28.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 28.4                | 28.4 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 28.5 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 28.6 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 28.7 $\frac{1}{2}$  |                    |
| Port sill                                       | 25.1                | 25.1 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 25.1 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 25.2 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 25.2 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 25.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 25.4                | 25.4 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 25.5 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 25.6 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 25.7                |                    |
| rig line                                        | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 0.4                 |                    |
| line                                            |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                    |
| <i>Rising on Vertical Sections above the c.</i> |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                    |
|                                                 | ⊗                   | A                   | B                   | C                   | D                   | E                   | F                   | G                   | H                   | I                   | J                   | K                  |
| middle line                                     | 0.9 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 0.9 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 0.9 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 0.9 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 0.9 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 0.9 $\frac{7}{8}$   | 0.10                | 0.10 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 0.10 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 0.10 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 0.10 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 0.11               |
| do                                              | 1.5 $\frac{7}{8}$   | 1.5 $\frac{7}{8}$   | 1.6                 | 1.6 $\frac{1}{16}$  | 1.6 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 1.6 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 1.6 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 1.7 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 1.7 $\frac{1}{2}$   | 1.8                 | 1.8 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 1.9                |
| do                                              | 2.2 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 2.2 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 2.2 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 2.2 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 2.2 $\frac{1}{2}$   | 2.2 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 2.3 $\frac{1}{2}$   | 2.4 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 2.4 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 2.5 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 2.5 $\frac{3}{4}$   |                    |
| do                                              | 2.10 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 2.10 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 2.11                | 2.11 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 2.11 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 3.0                 | 3.0 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 3.1 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 3.2 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 3.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 3.6 $\frac{1}{4}$   |                    |
| do                                              | 3.7 $\frac{7}{8}$   | 3.7 $\frac{7}{8}$   | 3.8 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 3.8 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 3.7                 | 3.9 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 3.10 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 3.10 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 4.1 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 4.3 $\frac{1}{2}$   | 4.6                 |                    |
| do                                              | 4.5 $\frac{7}{8}$   | 4.5 $\frac{7}{8}$   | 4.6 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 4.6 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 4.7 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 4.8 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 4.10                | 4.11 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 5.1 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 5.4 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 5.7 $\frac{3}{8}$   |                    |
| do                                              | 5.5 $\frac{1}{2}$   | 5.5 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 5.6 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 5.6 $\frac{1}{8}$   | 5.8 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 5.9 $\frac{1}{2}$   | 5.10 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 6.11 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 6.4 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 6.7 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 6.11 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 7.4                |
| do                                              | 6.8 $\frac{1}{2}$   | 6.8 $\frac{3}{4}$   | 6.9 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 6.10 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 6.11 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 7.1 $\frac{3}{8}$   | 7.4                 | 7.6 $\frac{7}{8}$   | 7.11 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 8.3                 | 8.8 $\frac{1}{4}$   | 9.2 $\frac{1}{2}$  |
| <i>Half-breadths of Square Frames</i>           |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                    |
|                                                 | ⊗                   | A                   | B                   | C                   | D                   | E                   | F                   | G                   | H                   | I                   | J                   |                    |
| Plank sheer                                     | 18.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 18.3                | 18.2                |                    |
| Port sill                                       | 19.1 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 19.1 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 19.1                | 19.0 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 19.0 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 19.0 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 19.0                | 18.11 $\frac{7}{8}$ | 18.11 $\frac{1}{8}$ | 18.10 $\frac{7}{8}$ | 18.10               |                    |
| do                                              | 19.10 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 19.10 $\frac{1}{8}$ | 19.10               | 19.9 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 19.9 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 19.9                | 19.8 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 19.8                | 19.7 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 19.5 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 19.5                |                    |
| Water line                                      | 20.1                | 20.0 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 20.0 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 20.0 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 20.0 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 20.0 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 19.11 $\frac{1}{8}$ | 19.11 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 19.10 $\frac{3}{8}$ | 19.9 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 19.8 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 19.1               |
| do                                              | 20.4 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 20.4 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 20.4                | 20.3 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 20.3 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 20.2 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 20.1 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 20.0 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 19.11 $\frac{3}{4}$ | 19.10 $\frac{3}{8}$ | 19.8               |
| do                                              | 20.5 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 20.5 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 20.5 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.5 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 20.4 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 20.4                | 20.3 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.2 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 20.1 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 20.0 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 19.11               | 19.1               |
| do                                              | 20.6                | 20.5 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 20.5 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 20.5 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 20.4 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 20.4                | 20.3 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.2 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 20.1 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 20.0 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 19.10 $\frac{1}{8}$ |                    |
| do                                              | 20.6                | 20.5 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 20.5 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.5                | 20.4 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.3 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 20.3                | 20.2                | 20.0 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 19.10 $\frac{7}{8}$ | 19.1                |                    |
| do                                              | 20.4 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.4 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 20.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 20.3 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 20.2 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.1 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 20.0 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 19.11 $\frac{1}{8}$ | 19.9 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 19.6 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 19.1                |                    |
| do                                              | 19.11 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 19.11 $\frac{3}{8}$ | 19.11               | 19.10 $\frac{3}{8}$ | 19.9 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 19.8 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 19.6 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 19.4 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 19.1 $\frac{3}{4}$  | 18.10 $\frac{1}{8}$ | 18.1                |                    |
| do                                              | 19.1                | 19.0 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 19.0 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 18.11 $\frac{3}{8}$ | 18.10 $\frac{1}{4}$ | 18.8 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 18.6 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 18.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 18.0 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 17.7 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 17.2 $\frac{1}{2}$  |                    |
| do                                              | 17.6 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 17.6 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 17.5 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 17.4 $\frac{1}{4}$  | 17.2 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 17.0 $\frac{1}{2}$  | 16.9 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 16.6 $\frac{1}{8}$  | 16.1 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 15.8 $\frac{7}{8}$  | 15.3 $\frac{3}{8}$  | 14.1               |

Portion of "Dimensions of the Spar Deck Sloop of War *Constellation* taken from the Mould loft floor." After the shape of the ship was laid off full size on the mould loft floor, the floor drawing was measured and placed in tabular form accurate to 1/8". "Taken from the floor," these were not theoretical measurements. The table of offsets could be used to reproduce another set of moulds to build a duplicate ship. Plan 142-1-7, entry 126, Record Group 19, NA.




Elliptical stern of USS *Vincennes* in 1838. The elliptical stern configuration was reportedly introduced by William Doughty in *Brandywine*, launched in 1825. Compare *Vincennes*' stern to the earlier flat stern seen on the half model of *Ohio*, 1820, and the later rounded stern displayed by the half hull model of *Constellation*, 1853. Despite the chronological differences, some authors have considered the elliptical and rounded sterns as the same, only variations of a single principle. Others have not. 1:48 scale full exhibition model by Colan Ratliff, 1990. Courtesy Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division.

ments in time, although some of his delineations might have done so. With Mr. Edson's death, the purpose of the drawings has yet to be defined, and it is not fully clear if the Ware collection does represent a record of employed sail plans or proposed plans or both. Ware also copied other artist's drawings and illustrated several ships that he had no opportunity to view firsthand. His profiles of hull form do not appear highly reliable. Countermarks (now called "watermarks") on the Ware drawing papers range from 1809 to 1820. The undated drawing of *Congress* bears a

countermark of 1819.<sup>41</sup>

#### CONSTELLATION CONTROVERSY, 1989-1995

*The American Neptune*'s role as recorder and sometimes promoter of the renewed *Constellation* controversy is considerable. Spurred by W. M. P. Dunne's article on Howard Chapelle that appeared in the winter 1989 issue of *Neptune*, we began what would become a study of the origin of USS *Constellation*. *Fouled Anchors: The Constellation Question Answered* was publicly



Enlargement of one line in the April 1854 journal of materials disbursed to the new sloop *Constellation* at the Gosport Navy Yard. The line does not read "old frigate," but "Frigates (old)." It is plural and refers to old timber selected from the frigates stockpile at Gosport. None of the timber in that stockpile came from the old *Constellation*. Entry 320, Record Group 19, NA.

released on September 12, 1991. The report briefly outlined the construction history of the ship, depicted the historical controversy from 1947 until 1975, and presented our recent findings about her age. The operational history of the frigate had only small relevance to the inquiry. Also, because it was beyond the scope of the story, no comment was made about the contemporary management and condition of the vessel or *Constellation*'s prospects for preservation.<sup>42</sup>

#### *Firsthand View, 1991-93*

The Navy Department was well prepared for the excitement *Fouled Anchors* was expected to generate. Details of findings were deliberately held close until I presented a paper synthesizing our report on September 12, 1991, at the Tenth Naval History Symposium at the Naval Academy in Annapolis. Within hours, the newspapers from Annapolis and Baltimore were arranging for interviews, followed by coverage on several Baltimore news television programs and then national and newswire articles.<sup>43</sup>

Ship's management, the USF *Constellation* Foundation, did not welcome the report and did not accept major portions of the findings. Several Foundation directors silently attended the history symposium session and expeditiously commissioned Professor W. M. P. Dunne to prepare a rebuttal. News reporters were invited to view the lower regions of the vessel where, they were apparently told, experts could clearly see substantial portions of the frigate's original timbers. At the time, tourists visiting the ship who asked about the controversy might hear, spoken in tones of derision by docents, how the report was written by misguided Navy "civilians" and "hobby model builders" who had never visited. Certainly, one volunteer said, had the authors ever bothered to

tour the ship, the unmistakable eighteenth century aura pervading the relic would have set the matter straight. The 1797 roots of the ship continued to be cultivated by the ship's management until at least February 1994.<sup>44</sup>

By early January 1992, Evan Randolph, a longtime supporter of the 1797 origin of the ship, had come forward with a proposed article critical of *Fouled Anchors*. I was invited by Dr. Timothy Runyan, editor of *The American Neptune*, to prepare an expanded synopsis of the Navy report to be published in the same issue as Mr. Randolph's piece. I was not furnished a copy of Mr. Randolph's manuscript. My article, "An Apple and An Orange: Two *Constellations* at Gosport, 1853-1855" and Mr. Randolph's essay, "*Fouled Anchors?* Foul Blow" appeared in the Spring 1992 issue. A brief response by Professor Dunne was in the summer issue and my letter offering explanation of several areas of criticism mentioned by Mr. Randolph appeared in Fall 1992.<sup>45</sup>

On January 19, 1993, I was invited, along with Professor Dunne, to participate in a panel discussion to be held regarding the identity of *Constellation*. Also contributing would be Mr. Frederick Leiner from the USF *Constellation* Foundation, and Commander Richard B. Amirault, commanding officer of the USS *Constitution*. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III USN (Retired) would chair the panel. To be convened on April 28, 1993, the discussion would be a feature of the 119th annual meeting of the U.S. Naval Institute in Annapolis.

Coinciding with the annual meeting, *Neptune* Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1993) was released bearing a second rebuttal to the *Fouled Anchors* report of 1991, "'The Frigate *Constellation* Clearly Was No More': Or Was She?" The article had originated as the piece written by Professor

Dunne for the *Constellation* Foundation shortly after the release of the Navy report.<sup>46</sup> The new essay, like Evan Randolph's earlier "Foul Blow," tended to befog the issue; *Neptune* readers had never been presented with the Navy report that each rebuttal selectively quoted, cited, and critiqued. Readers only had the standalone article "An Apple and an Orange" which had been prepared blind to accompany Mr. Randolph's earlier work.

### *Beleaguered Relic*

Naval Institute publicity proclaimed both the historical controversy surrounding the ship and the need to better preserve her. At the April 1993 panel, Admiral Metcalf was determined to emphasize saving the vessel. He strictly limited me and Professor Dunne to ten minutes of historical remarks each and the audience to three questions regarding the controversy. Commander Amirault expressed his sincere concern about the deteriorated condition of *Constellation*. Mr. Leiner from the ship had no prepared statement. The audience was not mobilized.

Responding to the pre-panel publicity issued by the Naval Institute, in April 1993 Navy officials noted that the artifactual condition of *Constellation* had never been documented. In 1955, *Constellation* had been donated by the U.S. Navy to the predecessors of the USF *Constellation* Foundation under a conditional contract. The contract required the Foundation to maintain the ship in a manner that created the best possible image of the Navy when viewed by the public. A team of Navy experts from USS *Constitution* was dispatched from Boston and inspected *Constellation* between August 2 and 6, 1993. The condition of the ship was immediately found to be very poor and in some respects unsafe for visitors. A formal report was sent to the Foundation in October 1993, and in May 1994, the dire condition of the ship first drew public attention. Rotted and leaking, the ship was faced with massive costs to keep her afloat.<sup>47</sup>

On May 24, 1994, Baltimore Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke added an adjunct committee of Baltimore business executives to the directors of the USF *Constellation* Foundation. The new group was empowered to formulate cost estimates for

repairing the ship, to raise money, and deal with the Navy regarding restoration plans. In June 1994, the National Trust for Historic Preservation donated \$5000 and nationally listed *Constellation*, "Launched in 1854...the last sailing warship built for the U.S. Navy," as one of the nation's eleven most endangered historic places. Mainly due to the *Fouled Anchors* report and the forum provided by *The American Neptune*, the identity of *Constellation* as a nineteenth century sloop-of-war had become generally accepted by historians, the press, and the public.<sup>48</sup> Now at rest, the former controversy has not distracted from the need to raise money and awareness to save the ship.

### *Dead Skunk*

On September 25, 1994, *The Baltimore Sun* published a lengthy article by reporter Frank D. Roylance about the condition of the ship. Roylance stated, "Most naval historians now agree that the ship moored in Baltimore is not the frigate built at Fells Point and launched in 1797...the *Constellation* Foundation plans to restore the ship as a sloop of war." With the egress of most of the standing directors of the USF *Constellation* Foundation in late October 1994, the adjunct committee took over the day-to-day management of the ship. Employing a twist to the old albatross legend, the new executive director has said, "The whole frigate thing is like a dead skunk around our necks, especially with the historical community."<sup>49</sup> After a nearly fifty-year battle, the frigate *Constellation* has struck her colors. The sloop-of-war *Constellation* has prevailed.

As of May 1995, *Constellation* is closed to visitors, dismasted, and trussed with cables and straps to ease her thirty-four-inch hog. Speaking of the condition of the vessel, the executive director declared, "She's a real sick puppy." Her future is yet to be determined.<sup>50</sup>



*Dana M. Wegner is Curator of Ship Models for the Department of the Navy.*

## Notes

1. W. M. P. Dunne, "The Frigate *Constellation* Clearly Was No More': Or Was She?" *The American Neptune* vol. 53, no. 2 (spring 1993): 77-97 (hereafter, "Clearly No More.")
2. *Fouled Anchors: The "Constellation" Question Answered* was not published in Washington by the Government Printing Office as in "Clearly No More" 77, n.2. It was an internal publication printed by the Navy's David Taylor Research Center in Bethesda, Maryland. Copies of the report are available for a fee from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161 (703 487-4650). Reference report AD A241-916 (hereafter *Fouled Anchors*.)
3. S. B. Luce, *Seamanship* (Newport, RI: James Atkinson, 1863), 229 quoting Griffiths. Lachlen McKay, *Practical Ship-builder* (New York: Collins, Keese, 1839); John W. Griffiths, *Treatise on Marine and Naval Architecture, or Theory and Practice Blended in Ship Building* (New York: D. Appleton, 1852), 92; Samuel M. Pook, *A Method of Comparing the Lines and Draughting Vessels Propelled by Sail or Steam* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1866); Richard W. Meade, *Treatise on Naval Architecture and Ship-Building* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1869); Theodore D. Wilson, *An Outline of Shipbuilding, Theoretical and Practical* (New York: John Wiley, 1878). "Clearly No More," 78, n.6, and n.93, dismissed the designer's half hull model of the sloop-of-war *Constellation* by terming it "mysterious," "anachronistic," and strenuously asserting several times that half models were not used by U.S. Navy ship designers in the 1850s. The assertions are false and not supported by any documentation.
4. Four of these significant and widely recognized primary sources were brushed aside by "Clearly No More," 91 as "...only four secondary references to shipbuilding in general". They are neither secondary nor general sources. All five authors were contemporaries of John Lenthall, designer of the new sloop *Constellation* in 1853.
5. "Clearly No More," 91. The offsets are plan 142-1-7, entry 126, Record Group 19, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (hereafter this repository will be cited as NA.) The model, design, and lofting processes have been described and documented in both *Fouled Anchors* (1991) and Dana M. Wegner, "An Apple and an Orange: Two *Constellations* at Gosport, 1853-1855," *The American Neptune* vol. 52, no. 2 (Spring 1992):77-93 (hereafter "Apple and Orange.")
6. "Clearly No More," n.11, confused moulds with "battens" or thin strips of wood used to draw the full-sized ship on the loft floor. Note 118 erroneously described how ships' frames were "rabetted" [*sic*] into the keel. The only rabbet in the keel was to accept hull planking. Frames were affixed by bolting the floors to the top of the keel, not by rabbeting. Note 84 incorrectly stated that there were three pairs of futtocks comprising each half frame. There were only three, not three pairs. Note 25 incorrectly defined "bevel" as the moulded surface of the ship's frame. Meade, *Treatise on Architecture*, 456, 475; John Knowles, *Elements and Practice of Naval Architecture* (London: W. Simpkin, 1822), 7; L. McKay, *Practical Ship-builder*, 45; Wilson, *Outline of Shipbuilding*, 149.
7. For evidential chain of custody see, for example, *People vs. Orenthal James Simpson*, Los Angeles, CA, 1995.
8. Five times "Clearly No More," 81, 82-83, n.33, defined "sharp" as a hull with "sleeker" or "narrow" lines.
9. Abraham Rees, *Rees's Naval Architecture, 1819-20* (reprint Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1970), 3-5; John Fincham, *Introductory Outline to the Practice of Shipbuilding* (ca. 1852, reprinted by the Ship Model Society of RI, 1933), 11; L. McKay, *Practical Ship-builder*, 103; Griffiths, *Treatise on Architecture*, 64; B. J. Totten, *Naval Text-Book and Dictionary* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862), 401.
10. *Fouled Anchors*, 139. Chappelle considered the round and the elliptical variants of the same principal: *History of the American Sailing Navy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949), 365; G. S. Laird Clowes, *Sailing Ships: Their History & Development* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1948), 82, 94-95; James A. Sharp, ed., *Memoirs of the Life and Services of Rear-Admiral Sir William Symonds* (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longman's & Roberts, 1858), 192; Robert Gardiner, ed., *Line of Battle* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1992), 43; Peter Goodwin, *Construction and Fitting of the English Man of War, 1650-*

- 1850 (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1987), 34, 36; E. H. H. Archibald, *Wooden Fighting Ship* (New York: Arco, 1969), 72.
11. "Clearly No More," 87; *Niles Register*, Nov. 19, 1825. The shift in terminology may be seen in two quotations in "Clearly No More," 87. In 1821 Doughty refers to *Brandywine's* "round" stern and in 1823 he refers to her sister's identical stern as "elliptic."
  - U.S. Navy historians prefer to class American warships by the name of the lead ship. Terms like "river class" and "city class" have a British flavor and have not been encouraged.
  12. For this section about repairs before 1853, some of the documentation was reprinted in "Clearly No More," 95-96 and can be read by reference to Appendix 1 accompanying that article. All of the material presented there had been previously reviewed and cited in 1992 in "Apple and Orange," n.3.
  13. "Clearly No More," 84, apparently confused the pumping expenses with the total amount of damages and largely underestimated the extent of injury and repair. Captain Alexander Murray's letterbook is found in NA Record Group 45, note 24, as indicated by note 38 in that essay.
  14. See for example, Darcy Lever, *Young Sea Officer's Sheet Anchor* (reprint New York: Sweetman, 1963), 96; William Brady, *Kedge-Anchor* (New York: William Brady, 1859), 187; and R. H. Dana, *Seaman's Manual* (London: E. Moxon, 1871), 67-68. "Clearly No More," 84 stated the incident caused only minor hull damage and "... water soaked her rigging, sails, powder, and the contents of her main hold."
  15. "Clearly No More," 85, 95, vigorously insisted that *Constellation's* moulded beam was increased fourteen inches. This matter had been previously discussed in "Apple and Orange," 88.
  16. "Clearly No More," 85-86, 95, stated that in 1812 *Constellation* was "cut down" and "torn down" and "Although she remained afloat,... only her keel, floor timbers, keelson, stem, stern post and lower futtocks remained..." A ship composed of only these features cannot float. The actual report states only that she was "stripped down to the lower futtocks". "Apple and Orange," 88 and n.36; "Clearly No More," Appendix 1, Part 1, 95; *American State Papers*, Naval Affairs 1: 342.
  17. "Clearly No More," 85; Evan Randolph, U.S.S. *Constellation*, 1797 to 1979," *The American Neptune* vol. 39, no. 4 (Oct 1979): 235-255; Knowles, *Elements of Naval Architecture*, 53.
  18. *Mariner's Dictionary* (Washington: William Duane, 1805), 8. "Clearly No More," 83, 86, spoke of "a complete rebuild of the internal forward section" and "a new internal forebody structure.... In addition (to)...a new apron." The three pieces were broadly interpreted in the article as an "internal forebody structure." "Internal forebody structure" appears to be a vague and technical-sounding term perhaps misleading the reader into thinking that it was another name for a complete bow.
  19. The docking plans are 107-13-4A, entry 126, Record Group 19, NA. Though acknowledged (91), the 1853 docking plans were never directly confronted by "Clearly No More." One goal of that article was to resurrect the idea that some of the hull form of the frigate was carried over into the sloop. See also various writings by Leon D. Pollard, 1962-1970, and Evan Randolph, "U.S.S. *Constellation*." The carry-over concept and its shortcomings had been previously discussed in "Apple and Orange," 87-93.
  20. C. C. Marsh, *Science of Double-Entry Book-Keeping* (New York: D. Appleton, 1864); Lorenzo Fairbanks, *Science and Practice of Book-Keeping* (Philadelphia: Sower, Barnes & Potts, 1866), 13-24.
  21. This portion of the record was selectively quoted in "Clearly No More," Appendix 2 (96-97) and was ill-named "Boykin's ledger," 92. It is a journal, not a ledger.
  22. "Apple and Orange," 91; *Fouled Anchors*, 5.
  23. The September 12, 1853 minutebook entry was significantly misquoted in "Clearly No More," 93 as, "For authority to dispose of the old timber, etc., of the *Constellation*." It should read, "For authority to dispose of at auction the old timbers, etc., of the *Constellation*." Several entries were poorly transcribed in Appendix 2 (96-97) and omit the final "S" in "frigates."
  24. "Clearly No More," 90, 91-92, n.86; Secretary of the Navy Reports: 1849, p.470; 1853, p.310; 1855, p.15; 1856, p.592; 1857, p.810; 1858, p.552.
  25. *Fouled Anchors*, 5; "Clearly No More," 91.
  26. *Fouled Anchors*, 3,5.
  27. "Clearly No More," 89, n.77, quoting Portsmouth (VA) *Daily Transcript*, 28 August 1854.
  28. "Clearly No More," Table 1, 80.
  29. Ibid.
  30. *Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War With France* 4 (Washington: GPO, 1936), 140-141. "Clearly No More," 80, stated the gun deck of *Congress* was "...more than four feet longer" than *Constellation's*. Table 1 on the same page showed it was only 2'9" longer. (165'7"-162'10"=2'9").
  31. U.S. Naval Academy Special Collections, Henley/

Sinclair, mss 24. There were many transcription errors in Table 1 of "Clearly No More" (80), and some numbers and measurements that do not appear in the original sources were added. For *United States*, depth of hold was incorrectly transcribed as 26'2" and should read 21'2". Berth deck to gun deck was incorrectly transcribed as 6'6" and should read 6'9". The numbers of quarterdeck and forecastle gunports and gun deck beams were not given by Fox and, for *United States*, should all read "N/A." For the design specifications for the 36-gun frigates, the extreme breadth was listed as 41'0" in the table. The extreme breadth is not given in the original Humphreys design specifications in *American State Papers*. There, moulded beam is specified as 40'0", to which was probably added two main wales, each 7" thick. The corrected extreme beam would then be 41'2". For *Constellation*, the number of gun deck beams was incorrectly transcribed as 26 and should read 24. The number of berth deck beams was incorrectly transcribed as 26 and should read 25. The berth deck to gun deck measurement was incorrectly transcribed as 6'2", and should read 6'0".

32. "Clearly No More," 79.

33. *Fouled Anchors*, 2.

34. "Clearly No More," 81.

35. Frederick Barley, "A British Sailor Looks At the United States Navy of the Early Nineteenth Century," *The American Neptune* vol. 21, no. 1 (Jan. 1961): 68. The implication in "Clearly No More" 79 and n.37, that modern Navy ships are not built to centralized plans and are never repaired before mothballing are personally verifiable misstatements.

36. "Clearly No More," 92.

37. "Clearly No More," 92, stated to the contrary, "No attempt was made to dismantle... *Guerriere*...." The "definitive evidence" (92) that *Guerriere*, *Java*, and *Congress* were all treated worse in their breaking up than *Constellation* was not produced by the documentation. Documentation cited does not contain any information about the location and manner of *Congress*'s end. It states that *Java* was taken to the mud flats several times between 1840 and 1842 and repaired. She was not cut up there at that time. Record Group 45, Subject File, U.S. Navy, 1775-1910, AL — Laid up ships 0-1859, Ships in Ordinary or Reserve, Norfolk Navy Yard, boxes 69, 71, NA. For the mud flats, see William S. Forrest, *Historical and Descriptive Sketches of Norfolk and Vicinity* (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1853), 486.

38. "Apple and Orange," 80.

39. "Clearly No More," 83.

40. Spencer Tucker, *Arming the Fleet* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1989), 151; William N. Jeffers, *Concise Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Naval Gunnery* (New York: D. Appleton, 1850), 193; Navy Department, *Instructions In Relation to the Preparation of Vessels of War for Battle* (Washington: C. Alexander, 1852); K. Jack Bauer, *Ships of the Navy 1* (Troy, NY: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1969), 31.

41. Ware's sail plan of *Congress* is reprinted in "Clearly No More," 82. See also "Documents: Charles Ware, Sail-Maker," *The American Neptune* vol. 3, no. 3 (July 1943): 267-268.

42. W. M. P. Dunne, "An Inquiry into H. I. Chapelle's Research in Naval History," *The American Neptune* vol. 49, no. 1 (winter 1989): 39-55. The lively exchange in *Neptune* regarding a ship thought to be *Constellation* in a painting by Antoine Roux is not covered here. Those arguments did not consider the possibilities that the painting did not date from ca. 1805, that the painting was created from accumulated sketches, and the three vessels were not in the same place simultaneously, and that the frigates depicted may have been the same ship depicted twice with different rigs.

43. *The Sunday Capital* (Annapolis), 15 September 1991; *The Sun* (Baltimore), 16 September 1991; *The Washington Post*, 17 September 1991; *USA Today*, 20 September 1991. Unless otherwise noted, this, and the following four paragraphs are based upon the author's notes and recollections.

44. "Clearly No More," 97; Baltimore WMAR television evening news, Sept. 16, 1991; USF *Constellation* Foundation press release, 15 February 1994. The *Fouled Anchors* authors had, with the ship's staff permission, visited and studied *Constellation* on June 13, 1991. This same erroneous charge was repeatedly leveled against critic Howard Chapelle in the 1960s.

45. Evan Randolph, "Fouled Anchors? Fouled Blow," *The American Neptune*, vol. 52, no. 2 (spring 1992): 94-101; Query and Response, *The American Neptune*, vol. 52, no. 3 (summer 1992): 202, and no. 4 (fall 1992): 262-263. For the most part, "Apple and Orange" was not an abbreviated version of *Fouled Anchors*.

46. That article did not have any reference to "Apple and Orange" until, apparently at my prompting, a single citation was tacked to a footnote when production of that issue was in the page proof phase: "Clearly No More," 77, n.2. The essay would have contributed more to the debate had it appeared prior to, or alongside, "Apple and Or-

ange" in the spring 1992 *Neptune*.

47. *The Capital* (Annapolis), 3 May 1994; *The Sun* (Baltimore), 19 May 1994.

48. *The Sun* (Baltimore), 19, 26 May 1994. A companion article about the historical controversy and document forgeries was written by then *Sun* reporter Patrick McGuire, but the *Sun* did not schedule publication of the piece. *Washington Times*, 30 August 1994. National Trust for His-

toric Preservation member's mail-out, June 1994.

49. *The Sun* (Baltimore), 25 September 1994; 9 February, 16 May 1995.

50. *The Capital* (Annapolis), 21 March 1995. The opinions in this note are the author's and not necessarily those of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, the Naval Sea Systems Command, or the Department of the Navy.



## The Francis B. Lothrop, Jr. 1995 Awards

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# News

## ACROSS THE WESTERN OCEAN: AMERICAN SHIPS BY LIVERPOOL ARTISTS

A major exhibition of marine portraiture produced in Liverpool during the 19th century has recently opened at the Peabody Essex Museum. Drawn from a range of public and private collections, the exhibit features the finest and most detailed depictions of American ships ever painted. Artists such as Robert Salmon, Samuel Walters, and Duncan McFarlane produced works of distinctive structure that set careful presentations of a ship on her way into or out of Liverpool before identifiable backgrounds, clearly rendered ship carvings, and readable house and signal flags. Topics addressed in the exhibit include the marine artists of Liverpool, the American packet lines that serviced the port, and the notable ships that ran in the transatlantic service.

The catalogue of the exhibition includes full-color reproductions of the thirty-nine paintings, along with entries and an essay by A. S. Davidson. During May, 1996, the exhibit will travel to the South Street Seaport Museum, New York City, and in November to the Independence Seaport Museum in Philadelphia. Catalogues of the exhibition are available through the Peabody Essex Museum shop.

## CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING OF MARITIME STUDIES

The struggle over budget allocations now taking place in the corridors and committees of the United States Congress and state legislatures may seem distant from the interests of readers focused on their chosen maritime projects, but decisions made on some critical issues will impact many in maritime studies. One major test involves the fight to retain funding for underwater archaeological work mandated by federal law. This includes underwater investigations. Proposals made in the House and Senate attacked the funding base for this work. The most notable was

an effort to eliminate all financial support for Section 106 of the National Historical Preservation Act of 1966. The Act provides for the creation of an Advisory Council on Historic Preservation charged to advise the President and Congress on national historic preservation matters. Section 106 further provides for the process to be followed in the evaluation and protection of historic sites or properties. This includes underwater archaeological surveys to determine the historic value of submerged cultural resources. This is an extremely important part of the work in maritime studies since many important historical discoveries have occurred on state or federal properties. The field of cultural resource management would be greatly impacted. As of the moment, legislators have pulled back from the most severe proposals. A move to eliminate the Advisory Council was not approved in subcommittee hearings on appropriations. But serious cuts have occurred elsewhere.

The National Trust for Historic Preservation which has successfully led the national preservation effort since its foundation was threatened with the complete elimination of all federal support but managed to "survive" the attack. The Trust's budget will be reduced by half in the coming year. Proposals call for the eventual elimination of all federal support. This will have an impact on organizations such as the National Maritime Alliance which is a partner with the Trust in the implementation of the National Maritime Heritage Act signed into law this past year. The Trust has played an important role as an advocate for maritime preservation since it opened an office solely focused on maritime issues.

Those concerned about the field of maritime studies need to become not only more attuned to the proposals floating through governmental hallways, but perhaps more active in forwarding the field.

TIMOTHY J. RUNYAN

Greenville, North Carolina

## Readers' Forum

### The *Sea Perch* Question Answered

This is in reference to the query in Vol. 55, No. 1 of *The American Neptune* (Winter 1995):

S.S. *Sea Perch*, C3-S-A2

Builder: Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp.

Keel Laid: May 20, 1943

Launched: October 29, 1943

Delivered: April 28, 1944

Original proposed operator: United Fruit Company. Contract purchased by the U.S. Navy, who completed the ship as a naval transport.

In 1947, the ship was purchased by Luckenbach Steamship Company of New York and renamed *Mathew Luckenbach* (No. 2). This was part of a purchase of eleven C3, five C2, and five C4 ships to replace the Luckenbach's pre-war fleet of twenty-three ships. They were overhauled and reconverted for commercial use, the C3 being fitted with accommodations for twelve passengers. They were first employed in foreign trades under charter to other carriers, mostly in Intercoastal Service in both the North Atlantic and the Gulf. (From *First Draft of A History of Luckenbach Steamship Company, Inc., 1850-1963* by A. D. Applegate, April 25, 1963).

Charles E. Rawson  
Maritime History, Transportation Collections  
National Museum of American History  
Smithsonian Institution  
Washington, DC



Official No. 244979, call letters KVUK AC-3 Screw Steamer, built 1944 at Pascagoula, Mississippi for the U.S. War Shipping Administration. An oil burning freighter, converted to transport by builders to carry 2,056 troops, 7,800 gross, 4,600 net tons, 468.5' x 69.6' x 29.5', 8,500 HP, crew of fifty-three, home port New Orleans, Louisiana.

Owners: 1949-1959, Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., Delaware. Renamed *Mathew Lucken-*

*bach*, New York City; 1960-1972, States Marine Lines, Delaware, renamed *Gopher State*, home port, New York City. Scrapped in either 1974 or 1975, Kaohsiung.

This information comes from *Merchant Vessels of the United States*, 1945 through 1975 issues, *America to United States*, Sawyer & Mitchell.

Colin MacKenzie, Librarian  
Nautical Research Centre  
Petaluma, California

[*The Nautical Research Centre is a non-profit reference library devoted to the lighthouse and life saving services of the world. Services are free; there is a reasonable fee for xerox, photographs, or postage when the request has to be answered by mail. Please forward any questions, along with a stamped, self-addressed envelope, to: Nautical Research Centre, 335 Vallejo Street, Petaluma, CA 94952, or call (707) 763-8453 between the hours of 9 a.m. and 9 p.m. (Pacific Standard Time) Sunday through Friday.*]

### Correction to the *Neptune* Special Supplement

I am writing in reference to *United States Trade with China, 1784-1814* by Rhys Richards (*American Neptune* Special Supplement, 1994). There is an error that I wish to have brought to the attention of the author. On pages 8 and 10, he gives the burden of the ship *Grand Turk* as 564 tons. True, there was a *Grand Turk* of that burden, but it was built for E. H. Derby by Enos Briggs in 1791 (EIHC 6:172; EIHC 40:219). The vessel that Ebenezer West, master, and William Vans, supercargo, sailed to Canton for E. H. Derby was of 300 tons burden, was built as a privateer and commissioned in June, 1781. She subsequently went on five voyages, bringing back twenty-one prizes before the end of the Revolution. Before going to Canton, she had made a trip to the Cape and West Indies. The trip to Canton was begun 3 December 1785, with return to Salem on 22 May, 1787. Derby subsequently sent

her to the Isle of France on 7 December 1787 with his son Elias Hasket, Jr. in command. Hasket was offered a good price for her, and she was sold while on that voyage in 1788 (R. H. McKey, *Elias Hasket Derby, Merchant of Salem, Mass., 1739-1799*, Ph.D. thesis, Clark University, 1961).

I believe that the second *Grand Turk* made several successful voyages, but Derby, finding her too large and cumbersome, sold her. There was a third *Grand Turk*, a brig that saw privateering service during the War of 1812.

You may ask what is my interest? Ebenezer was the brother of Nathaniel West, my great-great-great grandfather, and Derby was the father-in-law of Nathaniel.

Harry I. West, Jr., Ph.D.  
Livermore, California

### A Modeler's Search for Information

I am a serious scale model ship builder who is very much interested in Colonial vessels, with several constructions underway. *Sir Edward Hawke*, a colonial schooner which sailed on Mobile Bay in 1768, my local waters, is the most intense current project. Many *Hawkes* have been modeled over the years, and a fair amount of information is available, all disclaiming to represent the actual vessel. I am currently using the material presented by Harold Hahn, Howard Chapelle, and the Public Records Office of the British Admiralty to flesh out my intentions. At this time, I have redrafted the shear, outboard profile, body sections, half breadths, diagonals and a master frame plan. I am about to begin lofting the individual frames.

It is my intention to make two models, the first being a framed model illustrating conjectured floors, futtocks, and top timbers of main and filling frames (where it can be observed) throughout the vessel. It is my intention to present the framing as scarphed, tapering, and diminishing timbers rather than uniform "sistered uniform frames" that have become modeling convention. The first model will not feature a sail plan, and will resemble an admiralty model in some respects. The second model will be a completed solid waterline lift model with all external

details and a suite of sails trimmed for a quartering wind. The sails will be made from holly that has been milled very thin, with panels broad-seamed as a sailmaker might do in order to build in proper shape, depth, and twist.

The scale for each model will be  $\frac{1}{4}" = 1'$ . When positioned near each other, this project should make for very interesting viewing and wonderful conversation (if I live so long). My adventure will not yield a model of the actual *Sir Edward Hawke*, but it should be an interesting representative of colonial naval architecture build to Admiralty specifications.

Additionally, I am interested in securing the dimensions presented for a half-pound swivel gun found in Boston Harbor. This data is cited by several authors, and I would like to secure further information. The reference cited in Feldman is *British Naval Ordnance 1700-1815*, by Michael S. Hohimer.

Any help, thoughts, or criticisms that might be forthcoming would be greatly appreciated.

Earl S. McLaughlin, D.M.D.  
Mobile, Alabama

### In Search of...

Dr. Earl McLaughlin would like information on purchasing Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 3 (January and April, 1943) of *The Neptune*.

If any readers can answer the above questions, have questions needing answers, possess missing *Neptune* back issues or know where they can be found, or if you just want your opinion heard, please contact Dori Phillips, Publications Department, Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, MA 01970, or call (508) 745-1876, ext. 3169, or fax (508) 744-6776.

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
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## Book Reviews

ROGER F. DUNCAN, *Coastal Maine: A Maritime History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992). 573 pages, bibliography, illustrations, index, maps. ISBN 0-39303-048-2 \$35.00.

Roger F. Duncan, author of a number of volumes dealing with maritime subjects, including *A Cruising Guide to the New England Coast* (with John P. Ware), has now brought forth an enjoyable and useful book focussed on the rocky shores of Maine. It spans the period from the very earliest contact between the Europeans and the Native Americans down to the present. Because Mr. Duncan writes so well, and generally avoids the use of highly technical language, the book is very readable. This is a work that should be of interest to the general public, as well as to those with a more specialized interest in maritime history.

As Mr. Duncan indicates in the foreword, he is not a "professional historian" and did not anticipate "discovering much new truth." In preparing the book, therefore, the author read the very scattered and often specialized secondary material on Maine's maritime history. The principal service this book performs is to bring some of that disparate material together in an organized and readable manner. As a result of Mr. Duncan's efforts, the material is more easily accessible to the scholar and interested layman alike. In addition, the author is at his very best when he brings his considerable knowledge as a sailor familiar with the Maine coast to bear on the historical material. He clearly knows the area and is enthusiastic about the subject matter. This shows throughout the volume.

The book is composed of thirty-three chapters and a selected bibliography. Approximately half of the book deals with the colonial period, and the second half includes chapters on topics such as yacht building and lobstering, as well as the "Downeasters" and the "Great Schooners." Because the book does not employ customary source documentation in the form of footnotes or endnotes, the author provides brief comments at the conclusion of each chapter. These comments

or "notes" give the reader a general idea about the sources used for each chapter. At times, the author also takes the opportunity to speculate about matters that are only suggested by the chapters themselves. Some of his speculation is really quite interesting as, for example, when he relates contemporary Mainers' "independence of spirit" to the early history of the coast.

Notwithstanding the positive features of this book, a general criticism is in order. While Mr. Duncan avoids the pitfall of writing about arcane and technical subjects of interest only to specialists, his intellectual focus remains much too narrow. Maritime history, like any other field of study, is at its best when it places its subject in a broad political, economic and social context, and attempts to raise and to answer large questions. In general, Mr. Duncan avoids doing this.

For example, how can one write meaningfully and significantly about the "Downeasters" of the Sewalls of Bath, a family whose shipping interests literally girded the globe during the second half of the nineteenth century, and make no mention of the political and economic forces transforming the United States at that time into an industrial nation and an expansive world power? During this period, Maine political leaders such as James G. Blaine, Thomas Reed, William Frye, and Nelson Dingley exercised considerable influence on national and international levels. To ignore these leaders, and the political and economic issues with which they dealt, issues that defined the very context in which Maine shipbuilders and ship operators worked, is to distort the picture, and ultimately to diminish the significance of maritime history itself.

The problem here extends beyond Mr. Duncan and his work. The problem is specialization. It affects all branches of historical inquiry, including maritime history. What would benefit historians, and the history they write, as well as the general public to whom they should speak, is less specialization and more integration. If one picks up almost any economic history of the United States and checks the index, for example, it is clear that very little space and significance are

attributed to shipping and other maritime issues. This should not be. As Mr. Duncan makes clear, maritime enterprise loomed too large and too long in Maine and elsewhere in the country to receive such short shrift. On the other hand, as has been suggested here, maritime history in general, and Mr. Duncan's book in particular, can only benefit if written from a broader perspective with some of the larger issues of interest to other branches of the historical community kept well in view.

Paul T. Burlin

University of New England

ANN BREEN AND DICK RIGBY, *Waterfront: Cities Reclaim Their Edge* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). xiv + 333 pages, illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-07-068458-8. \$49.95.

The authors of this coffee-table book are leaders of The Waterfront Center, Washington DC, an independent, nonprofit organization dedicated to "the careful planning and diverse development of America's waterfront neighborhoods and communities." *Waterfront* is interpreted literally and widely, and includes not only harbor side, but also beachfront, riverbank, and lakeside. For maritime historians, only a part of all waterfronts are of direct interest. Yet, there is a fundamental thread in this work which must inspire maritime historians or at least should make them sit up and think: the direct appeal of water, as a physical element, to the senses and emotions of the observer, and the challenge to create some meaningful structure at the edge uniting land and water.

This book provides a catalogue of seventy-five projects, mostly but not entirely architectural, which during the last decade have won awards for "outstanding design, site usage, and community impact." Almost all are located in the United States, but there are also several entries from Canada as well as one each from England, Australia, and Spain. They differ immensely in kind, scope, and impact — not to speak about style and taste.

It is easy to be fascinated by this well-produced catalogue of the prizewinning projects.

First, there is an introductory chapter which roams far and wide in formulating its theme and establishing the mission of the book (and, *en passant*, the Waterfront Center). Then follows a description of each project, with photographs and maps, and a critical evaluation in terms of the aforementioned criteria. The design and technical aspects of the projects are well presented in this way, and the authors often include both cost levels and methods of financing. Students of the political economy of greening America and developing heritage sites can find much of interest in these pages.

The authors do not hesitate to give some mild criticism and even to indicate that some projects have evoked controversy. Yet, as they only deal with award winners, the reader inevitably gets a sense of profound self-congratulation — after all, the Waterfront Center is in the business of enthusing people about its activities, values and judgments. And little or nothing is said about the many projects that did not come close to being considered for an award, and whether they were examples of insensitive money-grubbing commercialism, the plodding of visionless local councils, or any other causes. This is not a book which impartially surveys all waterfront developments and attempts to assess why there is such a diversity in success and failure — however these are to be adjudged.

For maritime historians several sections are of particular interest, none more so than chapter four which deals with the historic waterfront. There is hardly a port city in the world that does not have to deal with the manifold spatial, economic, social, political, and also cultural problems resulting from the seaward and outward movement of port facilities and the death of inner-city harbors. Nine examples of the rejuvenation of such areas are discussed. But it is somewhat disappointing that all of these relate to no more than aspects of that problem — inevitably so, perhaps, as the theme of the book is architectural projects. Thus, at Baltimore, Brown's Wharf at Fell's Point is discussed and at Boston the Long Wharf Reconstruction. A highlight is no doubt the restoration project of the Ellis Island immigration center in New York harbor, but New Orleans' Jackson brewery and Harbor Place, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, show that the waterfront concept is

(excuse the pun) not entirely watertight.

Many of the other sites and projects have little to do with the call of the sea and, at least in my opinion, the appeal of the waterfront. To my mind, it is a travesty to include the Horace E. Dodge & Son Memorial Fountain at Detroit or the Bayside Marketplace at Miami — neither appear to be in any way inspired by their site and especially the former has a debatable social purpose and value. But highly evocative are some of the projects in the chapters on “The Residential Waterfront” and “The Working Waterfront.” The latter include buildings of a maritime function that too often have remained obscure: a watermen’s cooperative, a fish pier, and a marine police headquarters. The former, even more powerfully, demonstrates the pull of the water, and especially the sea, for residential purposes. Almost inevitably, the controversial “Town of Seaside,” Florida — which also got a rave review in Prince Charles’ book *A Vision of Britain* (London, 1989, pp. 142-146) — features prominently.

It would be easy to dismiss this book as largely irrelevant to our discipline. But I think that would be a wrong position to take. There are projects with a very pointed significance. Against the spurious “World Financial Center Plaza Battery Park City,” New York, stands, for example, the challenging and deeply moving “Japanese American Historical Plaza Tom McCall Waterfront Park” at Portland, Oregon. And the transformation of the Monterey fish cannery into an imaginative aquarium is a stunning example of how a traditional building of considerable maritime heritage value can be recycled for an alternative maritime purpose.

Moreover, the introductory chapter on “The Urban Waterfront Phenomenon,” which I signaled earlier, provides a valuable overview of the background and dynamics of waterfront studies. Containerization, in particular, is highlighted as one of the causes of the acceleration of port area dereliction. Both environmental factors and the growth of a preservation ethic are singled out to explain the “comeback” of many downtown areas. Recreation, tourism, and special events, such as the Tall Ships phenomenon, further helped to inspire citizens, business, and government to see the waterfront as an area of particular interest. This chapter contains valuable cultural maritime

history, all the more so as the authors underpin their arguments with the judicious use of a broad range of examples. Their great expertise also becomes evident from the book’s extensive and wide-ranging bibliography (pages 318-327).

Altogether, I find this book highly recommendable and well worth its price. But any maritime historian who would like to take its themes any further, should read and view it in combination with the fabulous volume edited by Rinio Bruttomesso, *Waterfronts: A New Frontier for Cities on Water* (Venice, 1993), and also B. S. Hoyle and D. A. Pinder, eds., *European Port Cities in Transition* (London, 1992).

Frank Broeze

University of Western Australia



RUSSELL P. BELLICO, *Sails and Steam in the Mountains: Maritime and Military History of Lake George and Lake Champlain* (Fleischmanns, New York: Purple Mountain Press, 2nd printing 1993). 7"x10", 393 pages, 150 illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-96579-632-0 \$45.00 (hardcover), \$22.50 (paperback).

The modern world identifies Lake Champlain and Lake George with their beautiful scenery and alluring tourist trade. Historians know, however, that in the past these lakes were a main route between the St. Lawrence River and the Atlantic Ocean, via portages (and later canals) and the Hudson River. Control of the lakes meant dominance in the early northeastern arena, and their waters saw many pivotal military and naval encounters in the colonial and early American periods. As warfare gave way to commerce, Lake George and especially Lake Champlain provided a major transportation route for trade, a route that lasted until railroads and over-land highways replaced it.

Bellico’s book meticulously traces the history of these two lakes; beginning with sections that describe the events leading to the French and Indian War and detailed descriptions of certain

maritime and military episodes in that combat; a discussion of similar activities in the Revolutionary War, including the Battle of Valcour Island; and local details of the War of 1812. In all of this material Bellico presents much primary data as well as a complex synthesis of events. Although his discussion of the French and Indian War includes both sides of that conflict, the narrative shows a distinctly British focus; similarly, the discussion of the Revolution shows a bias for the patriots rather than the British. Bellico then turns to a discussion of canalboats and steamboats in the post-war period. He chooses not to include the history of early twentieth-century pleasure craft, and he does not discuss that continuing tradition, to be found today at such places as the Hacker Yard on Lake George.

The dense text of *Sails and Steam in the Mountains* provides a robust review of events on the lakes for historians unfamiliar with this region's maritime history. The volume also offers copious textual and citation footnotes and additional page-end comments, including some new primary sources of interest to the specialist. The illustrations and other materials relating to the ships of each chapter suggest an opportunity for further investigation, especially into how inland shipbuilding techniques might compare and contrast with those of the coast. A simple map of the lakes, included in the revised 1993 printing, locates major place names.

*Sails and Steam in the Mountains* is, however, more than a conventional recounting of historical circumstances. Its great contribution lies in the author's description of what happened to many of the ships after their moments in history, including the successes and failures of modern efforts to exploit or protect them. Not only has Bellico documented this history, but he has dived and photographed many of the vessels that now lie submerged on the lake floors. His exquisite photographs provide a counterpoint to the historical illustrations in the text.

Russell Bellico was also the historian and a photographer for the Lake George *Land Tortoise* Radeau Research Team, an effort that documented a unique French and Indian War vessel, also known as North America's oldest intact warship. During this research the present reviewer (as senior archaeologist for the team) had

the opportunity to observe the zeal with which Russell Bellico approaches his work. *Sails and Steam in the Mountains* is a testament to that zeal.

D. K. Abbass

#### Rhode Island Marine Archaeology Project

ALVIN KERNAN, *Crossing the Line* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 192 pages, 21 photographs, 2 maps, index. ISBN 1-55750-455-5. \$21.95.

Memoirs and reminiscences often tend to be self-serving, particularly in those works written by senior officials striving to show how they won the war, or the peace, or whatever. Occasionally, though, a memoir appears that has the raw impact of reality and the vibrancy of life. Such a work is Alvin Kernan's *Crossing the Line*.

Kernan, now a distinguished academic, was just a naive teenager from Wyoming when he enlisted in the Navy in March of 1941. With no job, he realized that staying on the remote ranch where he lived with his stepfather was a dead end. So, he enlisted in the Navy as a way to escape that life and, perhaps, succeed elsewhere. Kernan signed up for only a minority enlistment (only until he was 21), and did not realize, of course, what momentous events lay ahead.

Following boot training, Kernan was assigned to VT-6 as an ordnance man. He was aboard the *Enterprise* on that terrible December day, and saw the devastation when the carrier returned to Pearl Harbor. Then "The Big E" was back at sea and Kernan had a ringside seat for many of the early operations in the Pacific — the Marshall Islands, the Tokyo raid, and Midway.

With VT-6 virtually wiped out, most of the surviving members of the squadron were re-assigned. Kernan remained with a completely reorganized VT-6 and began learning the trade of gunner in the new Avenger torpedo bombers. When VT-6 went back to sea, it was on the *Hornet*, not the *Enterprise*. Action was now centered in the southwest Pacific, and Kernan saw the *Wasp* sink and then had to abandon ship himself when the *Hornet* was sunk.

After a period of "floating" here and there

throughout the Navy personnel system, Kernan wound up as a gunner back in VT-6 when a new Air Group 6 was formed. In November 1943, Kernan was involved in one of the most famous, and tragic, incidents of the war in the Pacific — the loss of Butch O'Hare during a night interception mission. This incident forms a major portion of Kernan's book and for this reviewer, at least, provides for the first time an insider's look at what actually happened. This chapter alone is worth the price of the book.

When Kernan returned to the United States, he was ordered to flight training as a V-5 cadet. When pilot casualties were not as large as had been anticipated, the Navy cut back on pilot training, and Kernan resigned from the program. But instead of returning to the big carriers, he found himself assigned to VT-40 on the escort carrier *Suwannee*.

(It should be mentioned that the names of two escort carriers are misspelled in the book. One, the *Liscome Bay*, is constantly misspelled by authors. But Kernan should have gotten the *Suwannee* [note: two Ns, not one] right. Still, the properly-spelled names of these vessels are really minor points in a generally typo-free and error-free book.)

The *Suwannee* saw action off Okinawa and Borneo, and then the war ended. Although many veterans returned home quickly following the Japanese surrender, Kernan didn't make it back until late 1945. At the end of his book, he compares his return from the war to that of some Vietnam veterans who have complained they were unwelcome and unappreciated. Kernan feels this occurs to veterans of most wars and says, "But who cares? What matters is to have survived, to have escaped all those traps and those people who had such total power over you. To be young and free and on your way seemed a gift beyond compare..." (Page 163.)

"Crossing the Line" is a small book, only 163 pages of narrative. It is not "wordy" but it is large in vitality and humor. Kernan's tales of squadron life, on and off duty, are both hilarious and sad. (Like other enlisted men, however, he does not appear to have met many officers he respected.) Even those passages dealing with death, particularly the few paragraphs about his mother's suicide, leap off the page at the reader, wrapping

him in the embrace of a fine storyteller. Kernan's book moves forward with a speed that pulls the reader with it. One is always ready to find out what is on the next page.

The fifty years since World War II are passing rapidly, and, unfortunately, so are the men and women who served in that war. Soon, there will be no more veterans to tell of those days. Thus, those who read Alvin Kernan's marvelous account are blessed that they are able to share with the author his evocative yet straightforward, humorous yet painful, recollections of a time fading into the mists of what is called history.

William T. Y'Blood

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MARY PAT KELLY, *Proudly We Served: The Men of the USS Mason* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995). xiv + 198 pages, illustrations, index. ISBN 1-55750-453-9. \$29.95

The destroyer escort *Mason* (DE 529), commissioned in March 1944, was not untypical of the hundreds of similar vessels that did vital work during World War II in moving convoys across the Atlantic. Before decommissioning at war's end, the *Mason* had sunk no subs, but had accumulated her full share of adventure, including the infamous convoy NY-119, in which a motley assemblage of tugs and barges did furious battle with a hurricane. The *Mason* was unique, however, for she was the only American warship sent into battle with an African-American crew (a smaller submarine chaser, PC-1264, had a similar crew but was confined to American and Caribbean coastal waters). Her officers and her chief petty officers were white at first, but by the end of the war one officer (Lt. James Hair, one of the "golden thirteen," the navy's first commissioned black officers) had been assigned to her, and many of the CPO's, who had worked their way up the ranks, were black.

Mary Pat Kelly, a professional television and screen writer and producer, developed her interest in the *Mason* while producing a documentary on American servicemen in Northern Ireland in

World War II. She has done an admirable job of gathering recollections from surviving veterans, and merging these with extracts from the *Mason's* Deck Log and War Diary (and some fifty photographs) to provide a graphic description of the *Mason's* career and the experiences of her crew. Clearly, they worked hard to prove their abilities at a time when blacks were usually restricted to service as cooks and waiters; just as clearly, they fought a constant battle against prejudice at all levels of the Navy. However, there was support in important quarters for this racial experiment — for such it was — including Eleanor Roosevelt, and the ship was well served by her captain for most of her career, Lt. Comdr. William M. Blackford, a capable sailor who cared only that his crew did their best whatever the color of their skin and obviously commanded their complete respect.

It is an important story, which deserves to be told — and to be the subject of a companion documentary on PBS (and, it would seem, a feature film). But as a historical record, the book leaves a good deal to be desired. Perhaps it is enough to carry the men in their own words from enlistment through boot camp to the *Mason* and on past the war, and to treat the larger question of the role of African-Americans in the Navy mainly through the words of a report on "The Negro in the Navy" prepared by the Historical Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1947. The result, however, is that the reader is as much in the dark about larger policy issues — who, for example, decided that the *Mason* would have a black crew? — as the boot camp graduates who were sent hither or yon by some unseen power. It is indicative that the book has no bibliography, and very few footnotes, though Kelly has used some important sources such as Charles Dana Gibson's study of NY-119. Even a brief framework, such as that given by Bernard Nalty in his *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (1986), would do much to put the *Mason* in perspective and help explain the debate over just how blacks would serve in the Navy. Perhaps it is unfair to ask Kelly to discuss the views on integration of Navy Secretaries Knox and Forrestal, but it does seem appropriate to ask for some explanation of why the *Mason's* crew was restricted to segregated USO's in

England or why the vessel never received the commendation for which she was recommended after her heroic efforts with NY-119.

Despite such remarks, however, Kelly certainly has made an important contribution in a book which will stand next to Paul Stillwell's *The Golden Thirteen: Recollections of the First Black Naval Officers* (1993) in the ongoing process of reconstructing the history of black Americans in America's navy.

Briton C. Busch

Colgate University

BASIL GREENHILL AND ANN GIFFARD, *Steam, Politics & Patronage: The Transformation of the Royal Navy 1815-54* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1994). 256 pages, illustrations, photographs, tables, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-85177-612-4. £25.00

*Steam, Politics & Patronage: The Transformation of the Royal Navy 1815-54* is another interesting and multi-faceted book from the distinguished team of Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard. The general subject is the changeover from sail to steam in the Royal Navy during the period between the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars. Particular attention is given to the development of the armed paddle steamers of the Royal Navy which were the first warships to utilize steam power. These vessels showed the usefulness of steam propulsion in the Opium War with China (1839-1842), also off Africa in the battle against the slave trade (1842), and then had another brief period of glory in the Crimean War (1854-1855).

The authors had access to personal family papers from Captain H. W. Giffard who, after a distinguished naval career in sail and steam, was in command of HMS *Tiger*, a paddle frigate, when it went aground south of Odessa during the Crimean War (12 May 1854). *Tiger* was shelled by land-based Russian forces against which there was no effective response. Captain Giffard was forced to surrender and subsequently died of his wounds while a prisoner of war.

The book is an uneven mixture of material from the Giffard Papers and his dispatches which

trace his personal career during the period concerned, and, on a different plain, an attempt to reassess the role of the Admiralty in accepting and encouraging the transformation from sail to steam. The Giffard material is interesting, and the subject of the Admiralty reaction to marine construction and engineering advances worthwhile. Together they seem to get in each other's way a bit. The highly compartmentalized technique of writing leads to frequent referrals to material already covered (or to be covered) in other chapters, tends to be distracting from the flow of the narrative and to detract from the continuity of the work.

In 1901, the distinguished naval historian Sir William Laird Clowes expressed the opinion that the Royal Navy had been excessively slow in adopting and encouraging steam propulsion. Subsequently, Sir Geoffrey Callender, Michael Lewis, and Christopher Lloyd, all distinguished professors of history at the Royal Naval College, agreed. Greenhill and Giffard disagree and present the argument that the Admiralty probably did all it could to stimulate and promote advances in steam naval vessels considering the restrictions of peacetime budgeting. An historical reappraisal always is welcome even if not everyone is convinced.

The fact that a paddle-propelled warship was so terribly vulnerable to enemy action because of the exposed nature of its paddle wheels, while being restricted in the nature and position of its armament to the fore and aft ends of the vessel, was realized from its inception. Isambard Kingdom Brunel pointed the way to the future with his *Great Britain* fifteen years before the Crimean War, and this leaves the skeptics continuing to have reason to judge the normally conservative Admiralty as slow to respond. The scene of wooden ships-of-the-line in the Black Sea being towed into firing position by paddle-wheel escorts does not represent the cutting edge of available naval technology in the 1850's. Change was underway but not as rapidly as conditions might have warranted. In the period concerned there may not have been a *Turbinia* to race through a Naval Review, but the evidence pointing to the future was in existence.

Notwithstanding some differences of opinion, Greenhill and Giffard's *Steam, Politics & Patron-*

*age, The Transformation of the Royal Navy 1815-54* is an interesting work which should be considered for personal and academic libraries. The illustrations and photographs are excellent.

William Henry Flayhart III

Delaware State University

TREVOR H. LEVERE, *Science and the Canadian Arctic: A Century of Exploration 1818-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). xiv + 428 pages, illustrations, index. ISBN 0-521-141933-6. \$64.95.

The search for a Northwest Passage, the disappearance of Franklin's expedition, and the quest for the North Pole are the grand, familiar themes in the abundant literature on the exploration of arctic Canada. The often-fascinating first-hand narratives of the men who crossed the tundra and sailed the icy seas have been followed by countless books and articles, recycling the old titillating tales of danger, hardship, heroism, and tragedy. Is anything new to be said? Evidently so! Trevor Levere, of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology at the University of Toronto, has focussed on a neglected aspect of the exploration process in this "study of the nature and role of science in the exploration of the Canadian Arctic" (page 1).

The explorers of the nineteenth century were not guilty of neglecting science, for they routinely burdened themselves with cumbersome equipment in order to delineate coastlines, measure air and sea temperatures, determine the variation and dip of the compass needle, take celestial observations, extract samples of bedrock, collect and preserve specimens of the flora and fauna, and so on. To their published narratives, they often attached appendices summarizing scientific results. Their natural history and ethnographic collections were used by scientists at home to publish valuable papers, and enabled museums to educate people about the arctic environment and its inhabitants. As Levere points out, almost half of the two hundred or so expeditions resulted in scientific publications, and almost all of them contributed to geographical science by traversing

and observing unfamiliar territory.

If the polar literature has slighted scientific efforts in the Arctic, it is largely because many authors of secondary works tended to concentrate on tales of high adventure, disaster, and controversy rather than stories of meticulous scientific observation and measurement. And who can blame them? Classifying rocks and minerals, reading the magnetometer and dip circle, hauling the plankton net and sounding line, stuffing dead birds, and pressing plants — important though such activities are — do not have the same capacity to excite the imagination as navigating among towering icebergs or fighting cold, exhaustion, and starvation on the windswept tundra.

Readers may therefore have been the innocent victims of bias in the literature. In the popular mind, Franklin's first overland expedition (1819-22) may be remembered mainly as an exercise in cannibalism, but in fact, it made important contributions to geology, botany, and ornithology. Many people may know something about the tragic outcome of the Greely expedition of 1881-84, marred by starvation, scurvy, suicide and execution, but few may recall that its principal role was scientific observation, as part of the world's first International Polar Year, in which a dozen countries participated. I confess that for many years I associated John Ross's first expedition (1818) mainly with his erroneous observation that a chain of mountains stretched right across Lancaster Sound, barring westward progress, until I learned from an oceanography textbook (not a book on arctic exploration!) that he was regarded as a pioneer in ocean sciences for his design and use of the deep-sea clam to retrieve the deepest samples of ocean-bottom sediments and benthic life up to that time.

Readers of arctic history may also perceive the principal expedition leaders as bold navigators battling the powerful forces of nature, peering ahead into the swirling blizzard with unwavering eyes, their beards and eyebrows frosted, their gaze unwavering in the blinding snow. But Levere shows that they were often men of science as well, men who yearned to push back the frontiers of ignorance about the natural world, and who knew the importance of systematic, careful observation. Sir Edward Parry, for example, lauded for his three attempts to find a Northwest

Passage, was also "omnivorous in his scientific curiosity" (page 67). Not only was he familiar with the equipment and procedures for observations in physical and natural sciences, but he played a prominent role in ethnographic researches describing native clothing, snow houses, and implements, and recording religious beliefs, place-names, vocabulary, and songs (by written notation).

Geographically, the book focuses on the mainland region between Hudson Strait and Alaska, and the archipelago extending towards the North Pole. Levere opens his discussion in 1818 with the resurgence of interest in the Northwest Passage and closes in 1918 after the Canadian Arctic Expedition. This period of a hundred years thus begins with an enterprise entirely British, at a time when Canada was still a colony, and ends with the "first major Canadian government-sponsored scientific expedition to the Arctic" (page 1).

The book's first three chapters deal with developments before 1835, including the work of several maritime and overland expeditions of the Royal Navy. Chapter four uses the Admiralty's *Admiralty Manual of Scientific I* (1851), to assess the state of arctic science at mid-century. Chapter five returns to the Northwest Passage theme, outlining the scientific achievements of the legion of expeditions sent in search of Franklin. After 1859, attempts to reach the North Pole assume the nature of an "arctic crusade" (Chapter 6), spearheaded by the United States in waters north of Baffin Bay. Chapters seven and eight describe the scientific activities of the British expedition under Nares (1875-76) and the work of American and German stations during the International Polar Year (1882-83). The last two chapters examine the broadening participation in northern exploration and science following the American purchase of Alaska in 1867 and the transfer of the arctic islands from Britain to Canada in 1880. Despite the new political order, uninhabited and unexplored tracts of the High Arctic still attracted ambitious foreigners; Sverdrup's explorations led to a Norwegian claim for sovereignty.

*Science and the Canadian Arctic* contains forty-four illustrations, including four maps and a number of photos and sketches depicting some of the explorer-scientists, the equipment they used, the animals, plants, and natural phenomena

they examined, and the waterways and lands they traversed. The book is thoroughly researched, with more than 1450 footnotes citing many obscure and valuable sources. The inter-woven themes of science, exploration, nationalism, and international cooperation constitute a unique and important contribution to the history of the Arctic and of science.

W. Gillies Ross

Bishop's University

DENNIS L. NOBLE, *That Others Might Live: The U.S. Life-Saving Service, 1878-1915*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). xix + 177 pages, glossary, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55750-627-2. \$27.95.

The United States Life-Saving Service, which passed into history eighty years ago, is certainly worthy of a book-length study, and Dennis Noble would seem to be the obvious man to write it. After retiring from the Coast Guard, in which his initial assignment was a lifeboat station, he earned a Ph.D. in history at Purdue University, and has been doing research on the Life-Saving Service for nearly twenty years (pages 57-58).

The service was an independent "bureau" for less than thirty-seven years, yet its performance in rescuing seamen and others from wrecked vessels helped to begin a tradition that has continued to the present in the U.S. Coast Guard, of which it became a part when the latter was formed in 1915. Noble begins with an account of three shipwrecks in 1880 and then sketches briefly the period before 1871, when most of the rescue activity on the nation's coasts depended on volunteers. Governmental support had begun in 1848, but until after the Civil War it amounted to little more than the provision of equipment to be used by volunteer crews. In 1871, Treasury Secretary George Boutwell selected Sumner I. Kimball to head the Revenue Marine Bureau, which included the Revenue-Cutter Service and the lifesaving stations. Kimball oversaw the development of both until 1878, when Congress established the Life-Saving Service as a separate entity in the Treasury Department. Kimball chose to superin-

tend the new service and served in that capacity until 1915. Subsequent chapters deal with personnel, boats and beach equipment, and life at the stations. A brief final chapter seeks to explain the service's incorporation into the Coast Guard.

This book is a useful introduction to its subject and is well-illustrated, but those familiar with such works as Stephen H. Evans's *United States Coast Guard, 1790-1915* (1949) will find disappointingly little that is new herein. Some problems are apparent as well, e.g., "The station at Cape Aargo, Oregon, a rather isolated unit near the California-Oregon border, saw its first keeper assigned in 1878." (page 64) There is a "Cape Aargo" — Cape Aargo is 120 miles north of the border, but the 1888 *Annual Report*, the earliest available to this reviewer, does not list a lifeboat station there. One was established soon after 1890, before which the lighthouse keeper seems to have had a boat in his care, summoning volunteers when a wreck occurred. After 1903, it was the Coos Bay station. Noble cites the "Cape Aargo" station as having had the greatest turnover of keepers — fourteen in thirty-seven years — yet he makes no real effort to explain this phenomenon. One even accepted a reduction in rank to move to another "semi-isolated" station; he "may simply have wished to move." (pages 64-65) What about the hydrographic conditions and frequency of wrecks on the Coos Bay bar? Noble tells us nothing, although one might think that these would be factors. Indeed, had he read the *Annual Report* for 1910, he would know that another keeper took a demotion after the *Czarina* wreck of that year — he returned to the nearby Coquille River station because of local feeling that the rescue attempt had been poorly handled, leading to the loss of twenty-three lives — one man survived. The Coquille River station is mentioned twice on page 25; on the next page, it is the "Brandon, Oregon" station. (It was at Bandon.)

When discussing surfmen, Noble selects one Theodore Roberge to "serve as representative for all the forgotten men who filled the ranks of the service." (page 70) The reader cannot complain of lack of information about Roberge before he became a surfman in 1911; he was assigned to the Cape Disappointment, Washington, station, and his boat was involved in the tanker *Rosecrans*

rescue attempt in January 1913. Although there were only three survivors from the tanker's company, picked up by the Point Adams lifeboat after it assisted the lifeboat from Cape Disappointment, the crews of both boats were awarded gold lifesaving medals. But Roberge has disappeared from the story, never to be mentioned again. Noble seems to have forgotten "the representative for all the forgotten men"!

Even "the legendary Joshua James" (page 56), perhaps the greatest lifesaver of them all, might have escaped the author's notice but for his death at the age of seventy-five when he stepped from his boat after a drill — nowhere are we told why he was "legendary." Nor does Sumner Kimball himself fare much better, despite being described as "the driving force" behind the Life-Saving Service (page 155); we learn that he was "a lawyer and former politician from Maine" (page 24) and little more. There is no biography, as Noble notes; are there any Kimball papers? Has Bowdoin College no record of this illustrious alumnus?

Rescues were "the *raison d'être* for the organization" (page xii), but only twelve are described, each selected because it illustrated a different challenge. The *Huron* and *Metropole* disasters of 1877 and 1878 are not among them yet these led to a proposal that the service be put under the Navy and, one suspects, had some bearing on the formal establishment of the Life-Saving Service. Surely they deserve more than passing notice.

The Life-Saving Service still awaits a proper study. We should have expected better from this publisher.

Robert Erwin Johnson  
Tuscaloosa, Alabama

WALTER A. MCDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific From Magellan to MacArthur* (New York: Basic Books, 1993). 793 pages, illustrations, maps. ISBN 046-505-1529. \$30.00.

Professor McDougall has written an important book which will undoubtedly become a regular on the reading lists in colleges and univer-

sities across the English-speaking world. Masterfully and in a very readable way, McDougall presents the historical collage which led to the development and increasing westernization of the north Pacific region.

An imaginative and creative style is employed in telling his story and doing his analysis, which some professional historians might find questionable at least and objectionable at most. Dr. McDougall brings to life prominent historical figures from different countries and in different eras to assist with the interpretation of events in which they participated. While some may criticize this approach, the vast majority of readers, especially students, will appreciate it and find that it vastly aids in motivating interest, as well as providing amusement. To wit: King Kaahumanu of Hawaii, in dialogue with a Scholar says, "The coming of Cook killed my culture. Our people liked what the *haoles* brought and wanted more. Unfortunately, the whites debased what we gave to them in return. The *hula*, for example, was not art to the *haoles*." The Scholar then replies: "But a strip-tease."

For the academic community within the North Pacific itself, the book also has considerable value. This is partly because it is conveniently divided into three essential periods of western thrust into the region: (1) "Of Sail and Muscle;" (2) "Of Steam and Rails;" and (3) "Internal Combustion;" each with its own definable characteristics which separate it from the others. Thus, the student as well as the professor — and the casual reader as well — can organize and choose historical segments easily and appropriately.

The Pacific Islands in the North Pacific Ocean have populations, including significant student groups in three large universities which serve the area, that have never been able to get such a clear picture of the wider regional development as is possible now with McDougall's work.

*Let the Sea Make a Noise* is an outstanding example of interdisciplinary narrative. Professor McDougall combines the disciplines of geography, anthropology and history, as well as the future, past and present, and his product is a masterful major achievement. He sets an example which younger historians will surely follow and imitate.

Overall, McDougall's assessment of devel-

opments in the north and western Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur, and the influences they wrought or brought, is positive. The frailties and misadventures are accounted for, but, on the whole, it was a good thing that it all happened. Here, some moderns may disagree with some of McDougall's ideas.

The only clear criticism which might be leveled against this fine volume, might be that it mentions the Pacific Islanders themselves only in passing, or as they relate to the adventurous activities of the human figures and economic developments brought from the outside which occasionally touched the islands. The North Pacific Ocean as well as the entire Oceanic region has been, historically, a place which have been traversed in order to get to some other place. McDougall is also guilty of this. However, his literary finesse and academic excellence in the material and developments which he does address and interpret, is so outstanding and valuable, that it certainly outshines such slight tarnish.

Dirk Anthony Ballendorf

University of Guam

WILLIAM H. DORRANCE, *Fort Kamehameha: The Story of the Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor* (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1993). 170 pages, illustrations. ISBN 0-942597-51-6. \$22.50.

For the better part of this century, Pearl Harbor, on the island of Oahu in Hawaii, has been a key element in American strategic planning in the Pacific region. Because of its position on the northern Pacific trade routes and its excellent natural harbor, Pearl Harbor was the logical place for the Americans to develop shipyards and other support facilities to allow the U.S. Navy to help control the sea lanes and to forward stage fighting forces in the event of war. Since annexation by the United States around the turn of the century, these facilities have grown and evolved along with the means for their defense. It is only natural that with the recent growing interest in naval and military history, archaeology, and architecture that these defenses should have begun to attract the interest of scholars.

The protection of this valuable strategic resource was for half a century the responsibility of the Coastal Artillery Corps, whose job it was to man and maintain shore batteries of sufficient range and power to ward off any potential invader or blockade fleet. In *Fort Kamehameha, the Story of the Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor*, William H. Dorrance relates the history of the Coastal Artillery Corps on Oahu and the people involved in it from the beginning of the 20th century until the disbandment of the Corps after the Second World War. Mr. Dorrance, with his background as a military pilot and a weapons systems analyst, brings a strong understanding to a story of over forty years of constant technical development and refining of a defense strategy basic to American military planning on all U.S. coasts, yet which would only be put to the test once at the battle of Pearl Harbor.

Focusing on the key installation of Fort Kamehameha, which controlled the entrance of Pearl Harbor, Dorrance tells of the development of the coastal defenses with a clear insight of their changing rationale and the day-to-day problems of putting technical innovations into practice.

Until the development of reliable aircraft and guided missiles the only practical form of coastal defense was artillery. Oahu, with its relatively small and accessible coastline was well-suited to this form of defense. As Pearl Harbor was developed into a proper naval base after the Spanish-American War, the defenses were established around a series of fortified batteries augmented by rail-mounted guns and mortars. The idea was to present any potential aggressor with an array of weapons, linked by observers and telephones, which could exceed in range and power that of any ship-borne guns. During the First World War and after, the lessons learned in that conflict were changed into considerable advances in gun and gun-director designs. This forced a constant upgrading of Oahu's defenses as new, longer range guns became available and as shore fortifications became vulnerable to shells made to drop straight down on their targets. Dorrance does a very good job explaining each step of these changes and the reasons behind them, such as the introduction of the searchlight and radar, and the growing menace of the airplane. He clearly relates the day-to-day problems of keeping gun crews at

their needed level of proficiency — an extremely difficult task when only a few rounds of ammunition a year were available for practice and with guns which were at constant risk of being so worn out by exercise that they would be useless when the time came to use them in anger.

In addition to dealing with the technical side of the story, Dorrance gives a view of the human side. He talks about the institutional changes that occurred in the Corps on the island and the daily lives of the men and women involved in Fort Kamehameha; from the women who had to put up with broken windows of their homes when the guns fired; to the young men who had to find some way to enjoy their time off with only a few dollars a month in their pockets. At times, these come across in amusing anecdotes, though there are others when Dorrance descends into trivia about this commander or that trophy which are distracting in so short a work.

If there is any real fault in Dorrance's work, it is in how he deals with the Battle of Pearl Harbor itself. This was the only time that these carefully developed defenses were brought into play, and yet the only thing that they could bring to bear against the waves of warplanes which went roaring over their coast batteries were a handful of hastily collected machine guns. Decades of work and millions of dollars were leapfrogged in an instant. Despite this, Dorrance defends the strategy of Oahu's defenses by pointing out in his conclusions that the Japanese fleet never came against them directly. This is true, but the same could also be said about the Germans and the Maginot Line.

David H. Szondy

Honolulu, HI

JAMES BRADFORD, *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993). xxii + 269 pages. ISBN 1-55750-079-7. \$31.95.

*Crucible of Empire* is a curious collection of miscellaneous essays by military and naval historians on the Spanish-American War. Cobbled together by a network of specialists with essays

that did not fit in their other published work, this collection seemed destined for the grab bag reserved for *festschritts* and proceedings, volumes. Surprisingly, the collection is useful, cohesive, and a worthy addition to the historical literature on the Spanish-American War.

Diane E. Cooper's well-researched "Diplomat and Naval Intelligence Officer: The Duties of Lt. George L. Dyer, U.S. Naval Attaché to Spain" establishes the care American diplomats exercised with the Spanish threat. The Spanish press was as jingoistic and bellicose as its American counterpart; its ignorance about American geography infuriated George Dyer's teenaged daughter, who was intrigued by where the Spanish intended to land their 30-40,000 troops and asked, "What will they do with their troops when they are landed? Destroy our population with one blow? March across the continent and take Salt Lake City? Or perhaps confine themselves to burning Chicago?" (page 21).

Naval attaché Dyer played a dual role as a naval spy and a more sophisticated diplomat than Stewart Woodford, who took Dyer's advice on matters of protocol to avoid offending the sensitive Spanish.

David Trask's review of intelligence operations reveals that the Americans often misinterpreted the huge amount of information they gathered. The U.S. was so much stronger than Spain that most of the intelligence failures were not decisive. By failing to understand Emilio Aguinaldo and the Philippine insurgents' commitment to independence, both American commanders, Commodore Dewey and General Otis, condemned the U.S. to fighting the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902, an unwanted and probably unnecessary conflict.

Three of the essays deal directly with the well-known scandal of the war of 1898, the tangled controversy between naval commanders William T. Sampson and Winfield Scott Schley. An insider with an impressive technical background, Sampson won the top command over the more flamboyant Schley. At fifty-six, Sampson, seemingly at his physical and intellectual peak, was in fact gravely ill, possibly from Alzheimer's disease. The intense incompatibility of the two naval commanders insured that the many flaws of the U.S.-Cuban naval operations would be well

publicized. The army was as badly served by Major General William R. Shafter, a three-hundred-pound, sixty-three-year old commander with gout, who should not have been in an army uniform, let alone near the front line. Shafter's and Sampson's health problems offered each service a handy excuse to sabotage effective interservice cooperation. The Americans fought many wars; Spain was but one of the enemies.

In detailed articles on the Sampson-Schley controversy, however, neither Trask, Joseph G. Dawson III, nor Harold D. Langley settle any of the major issues that vexed an entire era of American naval affairs. When the U.S. blockade finally flushed the Spanish fleet from Santiago, Sampson, on his way to another postponed rendezvous with Shafter, missed what should have been his moment of triumph. Even worse, in hurriedly turning his ship to join the battle, he narrowly missed colliding with *Texas*. Although Schley's *Brooklyn* was at the center of the fight, Sampson's graceless victory communique ignored Schley. Schley's detractors point to his diddling over fuel before the blockade. One of the best moments in the near comic opera Battle of Santiago was the Spanish fleet "decorated with streamers and flags" coming out "as gaily as brides to the altar."

Graham Cosmas focuses on the flawed joint operations that inspired Elihu Root's 1903 army reform and reorganization; Jack Shulimson traces the usefulness of a marine corps as part of the navy's independent amphibious operations. Shulimson's account of U.S. Marine politics reinforces the conclusions that all the U.S. services devoted a great deal of time to fighting each other in Washington. Vernon L. Williams surveys how the careers of naval officers benefitted from war service.

Brian M. Linn's "The Struggle for Samar," is a marvelous essay on how inept American planning reduced the island of Samar to a Philippine "howling wilderness." With two rival U.S. military groups and its naval forces acting independently, the U.S. balkanized an island and precipitated the Balangiga massacre of American soldiers in September 1901. Samar was a victim of its hemp production, needed for ropes used in war. But a series of inept American commanders destroyed crops, blockaded harvests, and even

shelled Filipinos at a pro-American rally.

Ephraim Smith's concluding historiographical essay traces William McKinley's evolving decision to take the Philippine Islands. Using the new evidence from the George C. Cortelyou papers and an exhaustive reading of the large literature, Smith argues that McKinley made a series of difficult decisions. Smith's McKinley was an effective leader who acted with nuance in weighing the difficult strategic and domestic political pitfalls of the modern American presidency.

James C. Bradford's introduction is a surprisingly unsophisticated overview of the existent historiography. Americans "aroused" by sensational journalists "to demand that their government assist the people of Cuba" is part of Bradford's simplistic theme of a "reluctant administration" bowing to a "people's war." The editor did very well in collecting the essays, but his introduction does them little justice. One cannot blame him for the global misspelling of Guantánamo (without the accented a) throughout the book, a piece of imperial diction the generally careful Naval Institute Press has perpetrated (it says by accident) in many of its other books.

On balance, this is a useful and welcome volume. It is filled with information that will delight and inform specialists. The cost of coal made transatlantic expeditions almost impossible (page 73). The number of useful Spanish sources translated in American archives is prodigious. Diane Cooper's research suggests further study of comparative journalistic jingoism. Theodore Roosevelt's useful list of Spanish naval assets is reprinted as an appendix. The full citations to the mature archival research by senior historians in the field — with the articles themselves — serve as a valuable introduction for graduate students to a good mine of older historical sources, accessible in less crowded pre-Cold War archival collections.

Richard H. Collin

University of New Orleans



JONATHAN M. WEISGALL, *Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 446 pages, cloth, 46 plates, 2 maps, appendix, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55750-919-0. \$31.95.

Weisgall has written a wide-ranging account of the planning, execution, and results of Crossroads, the two nuclear bomb tests conducted at Bikini in 1946 primarily to ascertain the effect of such weapons on naval vessels. In constructing his tale Weisgall cites a wide variety of sources, including ethnographies culled from anthropological literature on the Pacific region and Bikinian court pleadings, as well as relevant historical works. The eclectic nature of his sources reflects the fact that Weisgall, a lawyer who represented the Bikinians in Crossroads' related legal proceedings against the people of the United States, avowedly based this book largely on material he collected to buttress his case.

Weisgall views Crossroads in a historical perspective as a continuation, in a nuclear context, of the battleship vs. bomber controversy that exercised military leaders in the 1920s and 30s. He begins his description of the operation by contrasting the environmentally benign Bikinian culture with that of the West, as exemplified by an intrusive and destructive technology. "Bikini was the Pacific paradise," according to Weisgall, "where humans and nature had for centuries coexisted" (page 5). This idyll was abruptly ended by Crossroads, when "Westerners began to tinker dangerously with nature" (page 5). As a result of this tinkering, he avers that the second test (Baker) became "the world's first nuclear accident" (page 9) and he later labels it "America's Chernobyl" (page 224), equating it with the 1986 Soviet reactor accident.

In elaborating on this theme, Weisgall portrays military leaders such as Admiral Blandy, commander of the operation, and General Groves, one of the planners, as scientific naifs who failed to understand the radiological safety problems entailed by the tests and whose decisions were biased by bitter interservice rivalry. In this internecine struggle, Crossroads was a victory for the Navy, according to Weisgall, because the test results were "inconclusive on what the public saw as the key issue of whether a battleship could

survive an atomic bomb" (page 229). Thus, he concludes that, for the Navy, Crossroads was "a reprieve from possible extinction" (page 282).

If there is a flaw in this picture, it is that Weisgall's depiction of Crossroads is limned in the black and white of the advocate rather than the more subtle shadings generally used by historians to capture reality. For example, Bikini was hardly a "Pacific paradise." Measured by regional standards its atypically poor soil and sparse rainfall rendered it marginally habitable. The 167 Bikinians eked out a subsistence diet mainly from the sea, and contemporary reports indicate that they acceded willingly to resettlement. Also, "accident" seems to be an inappropriate word to describe a planned event like Baker whose effects, including the massive contamination of target ships, were predicted in advance. Equating Baker and Chernobyl is even less appropriate. Chernobyl killed a number of people, injured many more, and heavily contaminated a huge area necessitating the evacuation of 135,000 people. In contrast, the Crossroads radiological safety officer reported that not one of the 42,000 men who went to Bikini was detectably injured by radiation, nor has conclusive evidence surfaced in the intervening years to contradict this opinion. Unlike Chernobyl, Baker produced virtually no long-range contamination.

Moreover, Weisgall's portrayal of key military figures as technically unsophisticated seems strained, and some of the evidence he uses to illustrate their scientific naiveté is flawed. For instance, he quotes a scientist who claimed that military leaders, led by General Groves, believed that America's atomic monopoly would be long-lasting because they knew little about science and assumed that there was an "atomic secret perhaps written on a single sheet of paper" (page 56) that could be adequately safeguarded. The implication that Groves thought naively in terms of such a "secret" has long since been refuted (see Gregg Herken's *The Winning Weapon*, 1981; this book is cited elsewhere by Weisgall, which raises the possibility that he has ignored evidence contrary to his view).

In assessing the results of Crossroads, Weisgall's conclusion that the Navy was saved from "possible extinction" is dramatic, but dubious. Regardless of the outcome of the tests and the

putative value of ships in nuclear warfare, there was a continuing role for the Navy in confrontations with a non-nuclear power and with a nuclear power under conditions of nuclear stalemate — as was demonstrated in the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Weisgall downplays the scientific value of Crossroads, but there is an important omission in his description of the technical information obtained (due, apparently, to his heavy reliance on secondary sources). Namely, he fails to mention that, at General Groves' urging, Crossroads was used to test the feasibility of long-range detection techniques for use in a projected world-wide nuclear surveillance system aimed at monitoring covertly the atomic activities of foreign powers. Based partly on the Crossroads findings, this Top Secret system was later established, and it proved to be of crucial value throughout the Cold War.

In discussing the after effects of Crossroads, Weisgall describes movingly the travail of the Bikinians who were unhappy living on other islands. Their plight, however, owed little to the bungling of Crossroads bureaucrats as is implied by Weisgall. Had Bikini been used only for Crossroads, the Bikinians could have returned in the early 1950s. But, by then, it had been decided to use the island for further tests thus precluding resettlement for several decades. In 1988, as a result of lawsuits and government rulings, Bikinians received \$75 million for the use of the island and \$110 million in trust for cleanup and resettlement; an outcome that prompted one Bikinian to observe that, although money could not make up for the protracted absence from their homeland, "we've learned to dry our tears of sorrow with dollar bills" (page 315).

In sum, Weisgall provides a readable, information-packed narrative about a significant event in maritime history. But the account is marred by some questionable interpretations, factitious characterizations, and dubious conclusions that may reveal more about Weisgall than about Crossroads.

Charles A. Ziegler

Brandeis University



JOSETTE DERMODY WINGO, *Mother was a Gunner's Mate. World War II in the Waves* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). viii + 234 pages, illustrations. ISBN 135750-924-7. \$24.95

The year 1993 marked something of a watershed in the recording of the history of women in the United States Navy. The publication of Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall's *Crossed Currents: Navy Women from WWI to Tailhook* (Washington, New York, and London: Brassey's, 1993) placed in the hands of interested readers an overview of the manifold services rendered by women in the Navy from their first official enlistment until the immediate past. Both authors and readers could hope that the picture thus broadly sketched would be filled and colored in by specialized works and memoirs of particular periods and incidents. *Mother was a Gunner's Mate* is one of the latter, and a worthy contribution to the genre.

Josette Dermody was twenty years old in 1944 when she enlisted in the WAVES in her native Detroit and "shipped out," first to basic training at Hunter College in New York, then to gunnery school at Great Lakes, and finally to her duty station as a gunnery instructor at Treasure Island in San Francisco. While the story contains much salty detail of Navy life (female version), what fascinates the reader most of all is the way in which the narrative follows the time-honored pattern of the *Bildungsroman*. This is as much a story of growing up, leaving home, self-discovery and "self-dependence," to borrow a phrase from Elizabeth Cady Stanton, as is any of the tales of young manhood so familiar to world literature. But this is the tale of a young woman. She moves from innocence to "savvy," from girlhood to womanhood; when her hitch is up, she makes no attempt to go home again for more than a short visit. She takes her G. I. benefits to the University of Chicago. Her less venturesome, stay-at-home sisters, meanwhile, are waiting: for husbands to return from overseas, for babies to be born. Even if Josette and many of her WAVE buddies followed the path of marriage and motherhood, they would never be the same. They have worn the uniform, pinned on the "ruptured duck," and earned their place in history.

Something of the author's spirit is conveyed

by her refusal to spend her Navy days as a yeoman (clerk-typist), which would only be another version of her civilian past. She deliberately fails the clerical skills test (mentally apologizing to Sister Victoria Albertine) and gets her wish — hence the title, and ultimately the book, as her sons urged her to write because “nobody believes our mother was a gunner’s mate.” With her, to Great Lakes and on to Treasure Island, go several of her roommates from Hunter, including “Tolli-ver,” the rugged West Virginia woman who had never seen a Catholic before, and eventually married one. There is romance in the book, too, much of it light-hearted, but some bittersweet and even bitter, when Dermody learns, through the misfortune of one of her shipmates, about the Navy’s attitude toward lesbians. Her own war ends with V-J Day and the mad celebrations in the streets of San Francisco. This latter part of the book, from the time of Dermody’s arrival at Treasure Island, provides special pleasure to all those who know, or have known, the City by the Bay, including its cold, rain, and fog, as surprising to a Detroit woman then as now.

The book is written in a light, conversational style, a pleasure to read. The Naval Institute Press has dressed it in a similarly informal garb, a visual signal that this is a book to be enjoyed. I recommend it as an addition to the shelf of any reader who likes a good yarn, but especially to those who want to know more about the real lives of Navy women, our mothers, the gunner’s mates who helped win the war and went on to make the peace a new era for American women.

Linda M. Maloney

Berkeley, California

## Shorter Notices

HASKELL SPRINGER, *America and the Sea: A Literary History* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1995). xi + 414 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-8203-1651-2. \$40.00.

Haskell Springer, professor of English at the University of Kansas, has assembled an excellent collection of chapters by several hands, remarkably free from disciplinary jargon, intended to explore the presence of the sea in American writing. Of the fourteen sections, two — both by Roger Stein — on “American Seascape Art” and “Realism and Beyond” include extensive illustration, though unfortunately limited to black-and-white reproduction. Focusing more specifically on literature, Donald Wharton discusses both the colonial and revolutionary/federal periods. Hugh Egan turns to Cooper and his contemporaries, John Springer (with Douglas Robillard) deals with Melville. Joseph Flibbert and Dennis Welland discuss poetry from different standpoints in their chapters. John Samson (personal narratives), Robert Madision (hymns, chanteys, and sea songs), Elizabeth Schultz (African-American literature), Bert Bender (fiction by seamen after Melville), and Victoria Brehm (Great Lakes maritime fiction) are supplemented by treatment of modern (and modernist) prose by Joseph DeFalco and Dennis Bethold. Springer has kept his authors within the framework set for the widest possible audience, and the whole is complemented by an extensive bibliography (pages 327-384). Overall, this is a work which belongs in every comprehensive collection on the history (and literature) of America and the sea.

JAAP R. BRUIJN AND FEMME S. GAASTRA, *Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and Their Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries* (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1993, NEHA Series III, vol. 20). xi + 208 pages, maps. ISBN 90-71617-69-6. No price indicated.

The seven papers in this collection result from a workshop organized by the Center for the History of European Expansion at the University of Leiden in 1987. The delay in publication (caused in part by the desire to translate the papers from their original languages into English) in no way reduces the book’s value. In essence it offers a comparative look at the structure, routes, and procedures of the principal East India companies. Treated in detail are the Portuguese Carreira

da India, 1497-1810 (V. Magalhães Godinho); the English East India Company, c. 1660-1760 (K. N. Chaudhuri); the French Compagnie des Indes, c. 1725-1770 (page Haudrère); the Danish Companies, 1616-1807 (E. Gobel); the Swedish East India Company, 1731-1807 (C. Koninckx); the Ostend Company, 1715-1732 (K. Degryse and J. Parmentier); and the Dutch East India Company, 1602-1795 (F. Gaastra and J. Bruijn). Although the book lacks an index, each chapter is provided with full citations, and much interesting detail. While economic historians will find considerable data here, in fact, all the papers deal extensively with problems of navigation, as well as shipboard health (and mortality) and similar aspects of social history. Altogether this volume is a most valuable addition to the growing bibliography on European voyaging to Asia in the early modern era. The distributor is the International Instituut voor sociale Geschiedenis, Cruquiusweg 31, 1019 AT Amsterdam.

DAVID RALPH MATTHEWS, *Controlling Common Property: Regulating Canada's East Coast Fishery* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993). xiii + 277 pages, bibliography, index. ISBN 08020-7757-9 (paper); 0-8020-2932-9 (cloth). \$22.95 (paper); \$55.00 (cloth).

Though not intended as a historical study, David Matthews' book includes much material on the way in which the Newfoundland fishing industry, and the communities which live or die with that industry, have been transformed over time by changes in technology and regulation by the state. Specifically, he offers detailed study of five communities of varying size (King's Cove, Charleston, Grates Cove, Fermeuse, and Bonavista), often through interviews with the fishermen themselves. It is a work of contemporary sociology, but it should not be overlooked by historians interested in Newfoundland or in the general issues of fishing rights, community property, and government regulation of men who go to sea for a livelihood.



JOSEPH G. SAWTELLE, *John Paul Jones and the RANGER: Portsmouth, New Hampshire, July 12 – November 1, 1777 and the Log of the Ranger November 1, 1777 – May 18, 1778*, (Portsmouth, NH: Peter Randall, 1994, for the Portsmouth Marine Society, Publication No. 20). xvi + 234 pages, illustrations, index. ISBN 0-915819-19-8. \$28.00.

Joseph Sawtelle, founder of the Portsmouth Marine Society, has here collected all available documents relating to Jones' years with the Portsmouth-built *Ranger* from the time of his arrival in the port until he relinquished command in 1778, including those logs which survive of the *Ranger's* activities in France and the Irish Sea. Jones' own reports and correspondence are included, and several lithographs and other illustrations compliment the text. Proceeds from this book (available from the Society at Box 147, Portsmouth, NH, 03802) are intended for the benefit of the John Paul Jones House in Portsmouth.

GEORG HEINRICH VON LANGSDORFF, *Remarks and Observations on a Voyage Around the World from 1803 to 1807*. Translated and annotated by Victoria Joan Moessner; ed. by Richard A. Pierce. (Fairbanks, AK: Limestone Press, 1993). Two volumes in one. xxxviii + 239 pages, and xvi + 280 pages, illustrations, index. ISBN 1-895901-00-6. No price indicated.

Von Langsdorff, a German naturalist, accompanied the Rezanov-Krusenstern Russian expedition to the Pacific Northwest. His rather typical early 19th-century travel remarks include his impressions of Polynesia and Japan (vol. I), and Kamchatka, Alaska, and California (vol. II). He was a careful recorder, and his memoir still holds value in the areas of natural history and anthropology. A translation into English appeared in London in 1813-14 (reprinted in a handsome edition by N. Israel/Da Capo Press in 1968). As Victoria Moessner, the translator, points out in a useful introduction, the earlier translation from the original German was both full of errors and

censored for courtly sensibilities. This new edition should now be consulted by anyone using Langsdorff in English. Some 44 engravings from the original German edition compliment the text.

ALFRED B. PALMER AND MARY E. CURTIS, *The Pirate of Tobruk: A Sailor's Life on the Seven Seas, 1916-1948* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). ix + 205 pages, illustrations, index. ISBN 1-55750-667-1. \$26.95.

"Alfred B. Palmer died 4 July 1993, at the age of ninety-four, too soon to see his book in print..." remarks Mary Curtis in an epilogue (page 197) to this volume. It is a curious statement indeed, for in fact Palmer's memoirs were first published as *Pedlar Palmer of Tobruk: An Autobiography* by the Roebuck Society in Canberra in 1981 (a version that is not particularly scarce). The original ran some 384 pages in a slightly larger format; the volume under review is in fact a much curtailed reprint, presumably reduced by Ms. Curtis, though this information is indicated only by the volume's cataloging data page. In either form, however, it is a lively memoir. Palmer served in the Royal Navy in both world wars, and between the wars on all manner of merchant vessels the world around. He was the sole survivor of an explosion at sea; he ran a captured Italian schooner along the North African coast (hence "pirate of Tobruk") until captured; he lost his arm in one of his many escape attempts; and so on. It is certainly a memoir worth reprinting, and reading, though many who savor precisely the details of a good sea yarn will still prefer the original.

WALLACE CLARK, *The Lord of the Isle Voyage: Western Ireland to the Scottish Hebrides in a 16th Century Galley* (Naas, County Kildare, Ireland: Leinster Leader, 1993). 171 pages, illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. Paper. ISBN 0-950-1758-6-2. \$20.00 (postage included).

Wallace Clark's credentials for this replica voyage are most impressive, including as they do

leadership of a 12-man curragh voyage from Derry to Iona in 1963, participation in Tim Severin's *Brendan* voyage, and so on. This delightful, very personal account (illustrated with 15 handsome color photos) is well worth the price of admission. In addition to the Ireland to Scotland voyage of the *Aileach* in 1991, the volume includes the tale of a second voyage north to the Faroes in 1992. For those interested in the seafarers of Ireland and Western Scotland, this book is a must, but it is also recommended for those who like a lively tale of the sea. After all, who can fault a project of which one of the main sponsors is "Bunnahabhain Single Islay Malt Scotch Whisky"? Available from the author, \$20 postage included, at 115 Kilrea Road, Upperlands, Country Derry, Northern Ireland, BT46 5SB, United Kingdom.

J. MICHAEL JONES, *Historic Warships: A Directory of 140 Museums and Memorials Worldwide, with Histories* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993). xxv + 245 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-89950-779-4. \$45.00.

Lt. Cdr. Jones (RCN, Ret.) has collected 144 warships from 25 countries, arranged by country (and by state in the case of the United States). Each entry provides type, class, tonnage, armament, data on propulsion, crew and the like, along with information on the current location of the vessel, with address and phone number. Most entries are illustrated with a black-and white photograph. Overall, this is a useful reference volume, though it seems a bit overpriced for its size (6" x 9½") and format. (McFarland & Co., Box 611, Jefferson, NC 28640).

JOHN B. HATTENDORF, ED., "*Ubi Sumus?*" *The State of Naval and Maritime History* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1994). viii + 419 pages, paper. ISBN 1-884733-04-2. \$12.50.

John Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, has assembled a most valuable collection of thirty-

three chapters on the current state and probable direction of naval and maritime history in twenty-nine countries, based upon a 1993 Yale – Naval War College conference. Some are simply brief reports, but even these offer interesting surveys of nations with significant maritime histories — Chile, Ireland, Norway, and New Zealand are a few examples. It is surprising, and encouraging, to note how often maritime history is alive and well-witnessed, for example, the Central Maritime Museum in Gdansk, Poland, which has a staff of 250! The major maritime nations are all well served. The United States, for example, is studied on the maritime side in a most thorough article by Ben Labaree, while Ken Hagen and Mark Shulman take up the naval side. Canada similarly receives double coverage, with Lewis Fischer and Gerald Panting organizing the social and economic material, and Marc Milner the RAN. Other notable chapters by well-known experts are the Ancient World (Lionel Casson), Britain (N. A. M. Rodger), Germany (Werner Rahn), and Spain (Carla Rahn Phillips), to name only a few. Unfortunately, the volume lacks an overall index, but each article is well footnoted. Overall, this is a state-of-the-art survey which no maritime historian can afford to overlook. (Naval War College Museum Store, Founders Hall, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207, \$10 plus \$2.50 shipping and handling.)

BOB NICHOLLS, *Naval Notations: Warships in the "Illustrated London News"* (Published by the author, 25 Duke St., Balmain N.S.W. 2041, Australia). 37 pages, spiral bound.

Bob Nicholls has listed all warship illustrations in the famous popular periodical, the *Illustrated London News*, from its foundation in 1842 through volume 99 in 1891 (after which date photography generally replaced the work of staff illustrators). Over these years some 600 illustrations of warships appeared, sometimes decorated with artistic licence, but often quite accurate. Naturally, British ships predominate, but many other nations are represented — most notably in the era of the American Civil War. Vessels are organized alphabetically by name, but it would

not be difficult to track down a vessel of a particular type or from a particular builder or year. Since the ILN is available (if only on microfilm) in many libraries, this list is a valuable reference tool to any scholar who has need of naval illustrations from time to time. Order direct from the author at the above address.

ROGER MORRISS, COMPILER, *Guide to British Naval Papers in North America* (London: Mansell, for National Maritime Museum, 1994, distributed in the U.S. A. by Cassell, New York). xxii + 418 pages. Chronological, ship, and general indices. ISBN 0-7201-2162-0. \$120.00.

As the title indicates, this is a reference guide which is intended to facilitate research relating to British naval affairs in North American holdings. The five basic sections, augmented by detailed information on libraries and comprehensive indices, list treatises, government records, fleet records, ship records, artificial collections, and personal papers, by far the largest category (pages 95-265). In each case, the entry identifies the individual or other source, notes the extent of the holding, and briefly lists the contents — adding, where applicable, a note on the location of "further papers" of the person concerned. Each library entry gives an impression at a glance of the extent of its naval holdings, with cross-references to specific items in the detailed sections. In sum, an important reference work for specialists and libraries.

JOE A. MOBLEY, *Ship Ashore! The U.S. Lifesavers of Coastal North Carolina* (Raleigh, NC: Division of Archives and History, North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, 1994). 185 pages, illustrations, bibliography, paper, index. ISBN 0-86526-260-8. \$10.00.

Joe Mobley has written extensively on North Carolina history, and he brings his expertise to the exciting story of lifesavers on a lengthy and complex coast — often called the "graveyard of the Atlantic" as a result of losing battles with such features as Cape Hatteras and Cape Fear.

The Lifesaving Service began operating here in 1874, and eventually had twenty-nine stations, manned by North Carolinians (white and black). How active they were may be demonstrated by a sample statistic: in the decade 1891-1900, some 260 vessels stranded in North Carolina, at least 75 of which were total losses. Though well aware of the high drama in his tale, Mobley does not lose sight of his goal — the history of the Lifesaving Service in this area. This useful volume is available for a modest price from the Historical Publications Section, Dept. of Cultural Resources, 109 East Jones St., Raleigh NC 27601-2807 (add \$2.00 for postage and handling).

SANDRA L. OLIVER, *Saltwater Foodways: New Englanders and Their Food, at Sea and Ashore, in the Nineteenth Century* (Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1995). xiii + 440 pages, illustrations, bibliography, indices. ISBN 0-913372-72-2. \$39.95.

At first sight, this is another oversized coffee table book which merges recipes and illustrations with a text providing some historical framework. Indeed it is just that, but it is also a good deal more. Sandra Oliver's profession is food history rather than simply food preparation, and this handsome volume has much to offer any historian of the sea — especially one with an interest in food. It is of particular value to anyone familiar with the delights of Mystic Seaport Museum, for the book is built around that institution's collections of buildings, artifacts, and manuscripts. Whether reproducing foodways demonstrated at Mystic's Buckingham House or used aboard the fishing schooner *L. A. Dunton*, Oliver makes a point of exploring the lifestyles associated with her specific instructions on such treasures as dandyfunk and lobscouce, adding not only color photographs of the dishes (usually in a Mystic setting) but also delightful period illustrations in black and white. It should be stressed that this book is not merely about shipboard fare, but studies the foodways of shoreside types, rich and poor, most notably, of course, on such special occasions as July 4th, Thanksgiving, and Christmas. Each reader will no doubt find his or her special bit of forgotten lore to treasure here: how

many of us, for example, have sampled the delights of chocolate rice?

HISTORY DIVISION, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, *Inventory of Historic Light Stations* (Washington DC: National Park Service, 1994). xix + 386 pages, illustrations, bibliography. ISBN 0-16-045100-1. \$25.00 (paper).

This volume is the first comprehensive list of some 631 existing historic lighthouses in the United States. The product of the National Park Service's National Maritime Initiative program, it lists location, details of the structure and light, with information on ownership, use, and access, often providing a photograph of the unit. The organization is alphabetical by state. No maps are provided; though a capsule written note on the location is furnished, the list will be most useful when the name of a particular light station is already known. For those with an interest in lighthouses, it is essential; purchasers should contact the Superintendent of Documents (stock no. 024-005-01139-1), but institutions requiring a copy should try a letterhead request to the NPS History Division, PO Box 37127, Washington, DC 20013-7127.

HEINZ HAAKER, *Die Schiffswerft von Henry Koch Ag: Ein Kapitel Lübecker Schiffsbau — und Industriegeschichte* (Hamburg: Ernst Kabel, with the Deutsches Schifffahrtsmuseum, Bremerhaven, 1994). 224 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 3-8225-0299-5. DM 98.

The firm founded by Henry Koch in Lübeck in the 1880's became one of Germany's principal shipbuilders. Heinz Haaker in this volume provides not only a detailed history of the firm (pages 1-101), but also an extensive "Baulistel" with detailed ship biographies of the nearly 300 vessels which it built between 1883 and 1930 — mainly cargo vessels for such firms as Norddeutscher Lloyd of Bremen and Lütgens & Reimers of Hamburg. The volume is fully illustrated with photographs of both the yards and the vessels themselves. Basically, this is a reference

work for steamship specialists (text is in German throughout). (Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum, Van-Ronzelen-Straße, 2850 Bremerhaven-Mitte, Germany.)

JOBST BROELMANN AND TIMM WESKI, "*MARIA*" *HF 31: Seefischerei unter Segeln* (Munich: Deutsches Museum, 1992). 190 pages, illustrations, tables, bibliography. ISBN 3-924183-19-81.

For generations through the nineteenth century, hardy German fishermen in sturdy "Kutters" (in English, such a vessel with fore-and-aft rigged mainmast and smaller mizzen would more probably be termed a ketch) prowled the notorious North Sea fishing grounds off Borkum, Helgoland, Sylt, and the Horns Reef. *MARIA* (HF 31) was one such vessel, a mere 20 meters overall, and her permanent exhibition at the Deutsches Museum in Munich preserves a significant artifact of a vanished profession and way of life. This handsome oversized (8½" x 10¾") volume is a visual record of the vessel itself, the fleet of which it is so representative, and the industry as a whole in the era of sail: 167 monochrome illustrations, principally photographs, are well selected to enhance an authoritative text (in German). Detailed plans are included, making this a volume which might interest modelers as well as those interested in the history of Europe's struggle to put the North Sea to good use. Concluding pages even answer the question of why such an interesting exhibit came to rest in Munich, not exactly a famous seaport. (Deutsches Museum, Museumsinsel 1, D-8000 München 22, Germany.)

WIM JONSON, ED., "*Shaky Ships*": *The Formal Richness of Chinese Shipbuilding* (Antwerp: National Maritime Museum, 1993). 119 pages, soft-cover, illustrations, bibliography. Bfr. 700.

This is a handsome catalog of an exhibition (May-December 1993) of a unique collection of Chinese ship models held by the Belgian National Maritime Museum. Over 120 photographs, a few in color, illustrate a large variety of Chinese junk

types (the peculiar phrase "shaky ships" seems to refer to the junks, rather than the models themselves), combined with a discussion of rigs, Chinese nautical terminology, and a brief history of navigation in China, written by several hands. The collection actually was part of the Chinese exhibit for the 1904 World Fair in St. Louis, moved on to a similar exhibition in Liege, Belgium, the next year, and somehow passed into the hands of the Belgian government, vanishing into the storerooms of the Royal Museums of Art and History. It is an impressive collection, and this well-prepared catalog should interest any student of Chinese maritime history. (National Scheepvaartmuseum, Steenplein 1, B-2000 Antwerpen, Belgium.)

IAN MARSHALL, *Ironclads and Paddlers* (Charlottesville, VA: Howell Press, 1993). 108 pages, index, bibliography. ISBN 0-943231-62-0.

In essence, this book is a showcase for thirty-eight paintings by Ian Marshall, who supplies a text to accompany each. The paintings, all reproduced in color, appear to be watercolors in their original form, though little information such as medium, dimensions, or current location is supplied. They are, however, most attractive, providing both an accurate rendering of the vessel or vessels featured in each and the atmosphere of selected harbors around the world. The warships themselves range from Civil War ironclads of the 1860s to turn-of-the-century dreadnoughts, spanning an era of much transition in the development of capital ships. Inevitably, the majority of vessels illustrated are American (*Monitor*, *Maine*, etc.) or British (*Warrior*, *Iron Duke*, *Devastation*, *Renown*, *Illustrious*, etc.), but the collection is filled out with a variety of the ships of other nations. Though the expert historian is more likely to refer to the other more extensive works for the detailed history of the warships of this era, Marshall's research is certainly extensive and his paintings sufficiently masterful to belong in any collection of maritime art, all the more since so few maritime artists seem to have chosen 19th-century battleships, some of which were quite ungainly compromises, as their subject matter.

R. C. ANDERSON, *The Rigging of Ships in the Days of the Spritsail Topmast, 1600-1720* (New York: Dover, 1994). xii + 278 pages, paper, illustrations, index. ISBN 0-486-27960-X. \$8.95

R. C. Anderson's classic work on 17th-century riggings was first published by the Marine Research Society of Salem in 1927, and has now been made available in a useful paper bound edition by Dover. A detailed, fully illustrated reference work, it is essential for model-makers and any one else with an interest in the detailed rigging of European ships in that era.

JOHN SELLER, *The Sea-Gunner* (Rotherfield, East Sussex, England: Jean Boudriot Publications, 1994) xiv + 234 pages. ISBN 0-948864-25-5 (limited edition of 700 copies).

Another in the Boudriot reprint series of scarce sources, Seller's *Sea-Gunner* was first published in 1691 as a gunner's reference manual — small enough, in fact, to fit into a pocket for easy access (this edition is roughly 4"x6"). Seller himself seems to have been a nautical book and instrument maker rather than a gunner, and he borrowed copiously from the works of others. It is a book full of lore for the interested student of basilisks, rabonets, and their ilk together with their proper care and handling; chapters treat such interesting subjects as "How much Rope will make Breechings, and Tackles for any Piece," "The Practical way of making Gun-Powder," and such like.

JOHN E. REYNOLDS, *Thames Ship Towage, 1933-1992* (Durham, England: Pentland Press, 1993). 299 pages, illustrations. ISBN 1-85821-028-3. £16.50.

Frank C. Bowen's book *One Hundred Years of Towing* was published in 1933 to mark the centenary of towage on London's Thames River by William Watkins Ltd., the oldest firm on the river. John Reynolds' new volume picks up where Bowen left off, recording year by year the subsequent fortunes of Watkins and all other firms. In a way it is a sad record, as with few exceptions there were fewer tugs and fewer firms each year; in fact, by 1969 there existed only one amalgamated concern known as "London Tugs Ltd." Although a fairly dry chronicle at first sight, the book actually records some challenging long-distance tows outside the London area, together with more than a few moments of danger and heroism as tugs fought collisions, fires, and strandings on a notoriously difficult and crowded river. The author, incidentally, knows whereof he speaks, having worked his way from cook to tug master. The last third of the volume is a detailed listing of each of the 166 tugs mentioned, giving such data as dates the vessel worked, tonnage, ownership history, and the like, providing a small photo in each case. It is this section in particular which makes this book an important addition to any comprehensive vessel reference collection. (Pentland Press, 1 Hutton Close, South Church, Durham, England.)

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